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Abstract: Methodological naturalists generally believe that science is the best and only 
method for discovering the properties of reality and what exists. A central tenet of 
methodological naturalism is that science is limited to evaluating only natural things. 
Science cannot allow for the possibility of supernatural objects because doing so would 
irreparably damage the scientific method. Or, it may be that evaluating the supernatural is 
beyond the capabilities of science. In this thesis, I challenge these assumptions. I defend a 
form of naturalism known as Provisory Methodological Naturalism which holds that science 
can, at least theoretically, evaluate supernatural claims. Provisory methodological 
naturalists believe the notion that science only evaluates natural things is provisional and 
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I. Project Overview 
The subject of this work is a philosophical view called naturalism. Naturalism is the thesis 
that only natural things exist. According to this view, there are no supernatural entities or 
phenomena. Under naturalism, things like planets, chairs, and trees exist. Dark matter and 
molecules also exist. But ghosts, demons, and angels do not. Naturalism implies atheism; A 
supernatural God that operates in or effects our world does not exist, according to 
naturalism.  
But we can go further and refine the term. For example, the above view concerning 
existence is often referred to as ontological naturalism. Ontological naturalists believe that 
only natural things exist. Along with ontological naturalism there is also methodological 
naturalism. This is the thesis that science is the only reliable method for discovering the 
nature of our world. To methodological naturalists, non-scientific or supernatural methods 
are untenable. There are other types of naturalism besides these ontological and 
methodological varieties (for example, epistemological naturalism, according to which the 
empirical sciences can help us develop a theory of knowledge and ethical naturalism, 
according to which moral properties are reducible to facts about the natural world) but I will 
not focus on those here. Instead, my primary concern in this project will be to argue that 
methodological naturalists, besides holding that science is the only reliable method, should 
also accept that science can evaluate supernatural claims. They should not believe, as many 
methodological naturalists currently do, that supernatural claims lie outside of the evaluative 
boundaries of science. The type of methodological naturalism that I endorse, a 
methodological naturalism that assumes that science can evaluate the supernatural, is called 
Provisory Methodological Naturalism.   
 Why might a methodological naturalist, who values science as the only valid tool 
for discovering reality, disagree with me and argue that science is unable to evaluate 
supernatural claims? In this thesis, I will look at several reasons naturalists give for doing 
so. For example, one might argue that science cannot adequately function if it allows for the 
evaluation of supernatural claims. If science were to permit supernatural explanations, then 
the entire enterprise of science would be negatively impacted or quit working altogether. Or 
it may be that, because there does not appear to be any universal method for objectively 
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distinguishing the natural from the supernatural in our world, science would never be able 
to make pronouncements on the existence of supernatural objects. Since we have no accurate 
criterion by which we might determine a thing to be supernatural, we cannot say that science 
can prove the existence of supernatural objects. If one or both of these reasons are valid, 
then science must be cut off from evaluating any supernatural hypothesis. 
Let us take the latter assertion, that we cannot objectively distinguish the natural 
from the supernatural. One can surely imagine a scenario where the categorization of, say, 
a newly discovered life form as natural or supernatural would be debatable. What 
characteristics would make it one or the other? Its origin? Its abilities? Its composition? 
There does not seem to be any way to know. There seem to be no objective standards for 
“supernatural-hood”. The matter is complicated when we consider that the term 
“supernatural” can refer not only to objects like ghosts or demons but to phenomena and 
practices like extra-sensory perception, psychic healing, or feng shui as well. What qualifies 
things like ghosts or extra-sensory perception, as opposed to trees, as supernatural? Is it 
simply our lack of experience in observing them? Is it a property or characteristic of these 
things? If we hold that naturalists believe that only natural things exist while supernaturalists 
believe that natural and supernatural things exist, then these questions are obviously 
important. They are questions that both naturalists and supernaturalists must address. But 
while much has been written about the problem of demarcating science from non-science 
or pseudoscience, relatively little has been written about this problem of distinguishing 
natural objects or phenomena from supernatural objects or phenomena. I will attempt to 
rectify this in this work.   
A naturalist who disagrees with me and believes that science is limited to 
discovering only natural things will address the above question by arguing that the 
distinction made between the natural and the supernatural is itself misguided. There is no 
need to distinguish the natural from the supernatural in our world because, by default, 
anything and everything we will ever observe will be natural. Being observable 
scientifically automatically qualifies a thing as natural. Thus, the methodological naturalist 
who restricts science from evaluating supernatural claims avoids the problem of 
distinguishing the supernatural altogether.  
On the surface, this approach to methodological naturalism may seem appealing. It 
is certainly a popular view among naturalists. However, I will argue that it is incorrect. 
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While we have thus far only discovered natural things, the potential exists for science to 
observe and prove the existence of supernatural things in our world. Therefore, we cannot 
simply assume that everything that science discovers will be natural. Again, this is the 
Provisory methodological naturalist’s view. Provisory Methodological Naturalism does not 
limit scientific evaluation to the natural realm, either by saying that science is incapable of 
recognizing supernatural objects like ghosts or demons or by holding that such things would 
be classified as natural objects were they ever discovered.  
The distinction between these two methodological approaches is important. The 
approach that I oppose has lasting, real-world consequences. Perhaps nowhere are these 
consequences more obvious than in the debate between science educators and the creationist 
or “Intelligent Design” (ID) movement. Proponents of ID argue that the universe shows 
evidence of having been designed, perhaps by a supernatural agent. Moreover, these 
supporters go to great lengths to argue that theirs is a scientific rather than a religious theory. 
ID, according to its proponents, is a subfield of science. It is not, as many critics of ID insist, 
religion masquerading as science. All of this is meant to suggest that science could 
potentially uncover evidence of the creator (Crucially, it is also meant to suggest that ID 
should be taught in in publicly-funded schools’ science classes). Per ID, science should be 
able to evaluate supernatural things. The supernatural should be within the purview of 
science and science should remain open to the possibility of supernatural objects. But ID 
proponents argue that this has not been the case. Because it is unjustly wedded to a biased 
methodological naturalism, science has shown no willingness to consider supernatural 
explanations.  
I cannot defend ID as a theory since the science it is based on is spurious (Dawkins, 
2015; Dembski and Behe, 2002). Moreover, while it is true that ID is not a religion, the view 
is certainly religious-based. ID undoubtedly prioritizes religious ideology over scientific 
theory. It attempts to justify the Creator-based accounting of the universe that is at the center 
of most prominent religions (Shermer, 2007). That said, the worry of ID proponents is 
justified. Many scientists and naturalists are problematically biased in favoring natural 
explanations. And “bias” may not even be a strong enough word. These individuals do not 
simply prefer natural explanations, they assume natural explanations. Science, they hold, 
can only ever observe natural things.  
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This assumption is so prevalent it was even cited in an important court decision 
against the teaching of ID in public schools. The following is excerpted from US District 
Judge John E. Jones III’s decision in Kitzmiller v. The Dover Area School Board:  
Expert testimony reveals that since the scientific revolution of the 16th and 
17th centuries, science has been limited to the search for natural causes to 
explain natural phenomena… While supernatural explanations may be 
important and have merit, they are not part of science… This self-imposed 
convention of science, which limits inquiry to testable, natural explanations 
about the natural world, is referred to by philosophers as “methodological 
naturalism” and is sometimes known as the scientific method (Kitzmiller et 
al. v. Dover Area School Board, Middle District of Pennsylvania, December 
20, 2005).     
According to the judge, methodological naturalism simply rules out supernatural 
explanations by fiat. The scientific method requires strict allegiance to natural explanations. 
ID proponents see this decision and correctly accuse those holding it of bias toward natural 
explanations.  
Additionally, this requirement for natural explanations sets the stage for another 
problematic naturalist argument. Roughly, this argument is the following: “Science only 
ever observes natural things and, given its successes, we have cause to believe its reach is 
exhaustive. Additionally, science is also the only tenable method for discovering our world. 
As such, anything unobservable by science would need to be outside our world. Therefore, 
everything in our world must (always) be a natural thing. In other words, ontological 
naturalism must be unfalsifiable (irrefutable).” My intention with this project is to further 
the discussion of methodological naturalism by examining and refuting various arguments 
for this view.   
Some naturalists may think that, by holding this restrictive methodological view, 
they remain neutral about supernaturalism. Or they even might think that, by prohibiting 
science from evaluating the supernatural, they are helping supernaturalists. Perhaps the lack 
of scientific data on the existence of the supernatural may not be that detrimental to 
supernaturalism if we hold that science cannot evaluate such claims in the first place. But 
insisting that science refrain from commenting on supernatural matters does not do 
supernaturalism any favors. A great many supernaturalists, many of whom are ID 
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proponents, value science (even if they misuse it or misinterpret its data). At the very least, 
they value being able to utilize scientific tools in their attempt to support their view. Denying 
them these tools by asserting that science is separate from the supernatural is wholly unfair. 
Furthermore, this methodological approach does not help naturalism either. Preventing 
scientific evaluation of the supernatural only lends support to the popular supernaturalist 
claim that science seeks to shut out or silence any opposition or competition to its method.  
Granted, not all supernaturalists feel that science should be able to validate their 
views. Many supernaturalists are fine with the idea that science either cannot or does not 
confirm their beliefs. Nor is it the case that science being problematically biased invalidates 
the findings of science on something like evolution. Even if science unfairly leans toward 
naturalism, its findings may still be correct. Still, as a naturalist, it does not sit well with me 
to place limitations either on science (by restricting it to observing only natural things) or 
on objects in the world (by insisting that any observed object or phenomenon must be 
natural). Thus, I will defend a methodological approach to naturalism which does neither. 
Distinguishing between these two approaches to methodological naturalism has a 
significant impact on the broader debate between science and religion. Specifically, it affects 
how that debate is framed. The general argument between science and religion has 
traditionally been thought to concern compatibility. Is science compatible with religion? Do 
any scientific claims conflict with religious beliefs? Approached from the methodological 
perspective I oppose, which has it that science is restricted from evaluating the supernatural, 
the debate between science and religion becomes a question of whether science and religion 
can co-exist within their respective spheres. We know that science and religion are not 
compatible in one sense because science can never prove the veracity of religious claims. 
That said, we can still ask whether science and religion are compatible with each other while 
remaining in their respective spheres. Do both science and religion offer something 
meaningful to the world or does one sphere negate the need for the other?  
 From the perspective of Provisory Methodological Naturalism, the debate might be 
reframed. The Provisory naturalist does not assume that science is cut off from the 
supernatural. Therefore, to her, the question may be more than simply whether science, in 
its own sphere, negates the need for religion. Since she holds that science can evaluate 
supernatural claims (with the assumption that truly supernatural phenomena might exist), 
the debate might become a question of whether science can support religious and other 
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supernatural claims. Might we ever prove scientifically that a supernatural soul exists, for 
example? Is there such proof and, if not, what does this say regarding religious claims about 
the soul? So, depending on whether the methodological naturalist holds that the truly 
supernatural is evaluable by science, her approach to the wider debate between science and 
religion may vary. 
I should note that, because my primary concern is to advocate for the adoption of 
one form of naturalism over another, I will not devote space in this thesis to a general defense 
of naturalism over supernaturalism (or science over religion). Rather, I will take the truth of 
naturalism as given. Of course, this is a huge assumption to make; Many disagree with this 
conclusion. But one does not need to be a naturalist to find at least some merit in my 
argument. A supernaturalist may think that, while naturalism is wrong, my preferred form 
of naturalism is at least the right kind of wrong. Although my defense of naturalism assumes 
that only natural things exist, it at least leaves the door open for supernatural discovery. The 
alternative, meanwhile, holds that naturalism is and always will be true. Forced to choose 
between my naturalism and the alternative, mine is the lesser of two evils.   
To summarize: There are right ways and wrong ways to be a naturalist. One form of 
methodological naturalism, Provisory Methodological Naturalism, has the right idea about 
the role of science as a method for discovering the world. Science can indeed discover truly 
supernatural objects or phenomena. The competing form, which prohibits such discovery, 
is wrong. Similarly, only Provisory Methodological Naturalism has the correct approach 
regarding ontology or, existing things. Provisory naturalists correctly assume that 
supernatural things are possible. The other form of naturalism requires the incorrect 
ontological assumption that supernatural objects are impossible.  
 
II. Project Structure 
I will begin this thesis by introducing the two opposing forms of methodological naturalism 
that will be the focus of this project. Each form will then be examined in greater detail in its 
own separate chapter. I will spend the four remaining chapters responding to arguments 
against my preferred form, Provisory Methodological Naturalism. Three of these four 
chapters focus on problems for Provisory Methodological Naturalism exclusively. The last 
chapter concerns a problem for methodological naturalism generally (i.e., both the Provisory 
form and its opposing form).    
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In Chapter One, I will introduce the various types of naturalism and supernaturalism. 
I have already noted two types of naturalism. These are methodological naturalism and 
ontological naturalism. There are two types of supernaturalism which correspond to these 
naturalisms. They are methodological and ontological supernaturalism. I will spend the first 
half of this chapter looking at ways in which these various methodological and ontological 
approaches might be combined. For example, one might consider oneself a naturalist with 
respect to methodology and a supernaturalist with respect to ontology. Or, one might be a 
supernaturalist with respect to both method and ontology. Alternatively, one can coherently 
believe in only natural things (ontological naturalism) and subscribe to the natural method 
(methodological naturalism). However, if one subscribes to the thesis that there are methods 
besides science that help us accurately discover the nature of the world (ontological 
supernaturalism), then one cannot also hold a natural ontology and believe that only natural 
things exist (ontological naturalism). Such a view is incoherent.     
After examining these types and combinations of naturalism and supernaturalism, I 
will then focus more specifically on the naturalistic method. The two forms of 
methodological naturalism that I will concentrate on in this thesis are called Essential 
Methodological Naturalism and Provisory Methodological Naturalism. The former view 
holds that science is restricted to evaluating natural things. It is the methodological approach 
I noted above which holds that if something is evaluable scientifically, then that thing is 
automatically natural. I will argue that this approach should not be adopted by 
methodological naturalists. Rather, it is the latter view, which argues that science can 
observe truly supernatural objects, that should be adopted by methodological naturalists.  
In Chapter Two, I will focus on Essential Methodological Naturalism exclusively. I 
will examine some of the arguments naturalists might give for adopting the problematic 
Essential Methodological Naturalist approach. Despite placing obvious restrictions on the 
purview of science, this approach to naturalism is widely accepted, even among scientists. 
Naturalists sympathetic to the Essentialist view might argue that this is because a 
methodological naturalism which restricts science from evaluating the supernatural leads to 
greater cooperation between naturalists and supernaturalists. Naturalists and 
supernaturalists might cooperate by mutually agreeing not to interfere with each other’s 
domains. By assuring that science cannot evaluate the supernatural, naturalists guarantee 
that supernaturalists cannot in-turn interfere in science. Another argument for Essentialism 
holds that allowing science to evaluate supernatural claims would hinder the scientific 
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enterprise or prevent it from functioning entirely. I conclude that these and other arguments 
for Essential Methodological Naturalism are unsuccessful.  
Chapter Three is devoted to the alternate methodological position, Provisory 
Methodological Naturalism, and the advantages this position holds over its rival. I will argue 
that this view is preferable in part because it allows that the naturalist thesis on ontology, 
the thesis that only natural things exist, may be proven wrong. In other words, Provisory 
Methodological Naturalism is preferable because it holds that ontological naturalism is 
falsifiable in our world and falsifiability is always more attractive than unfalsifiability. The 
alternative view, meanwhile, has it that only natural things can ever exist in our world. I will 
also argue that the Provisory approach to methodological naturalism is preferred because it 
assures that real cooperation can take place between naturalists and supernaturalists. Rather 
than immediately discounting the supernaturalist position, Provisory Methodological 
Naturalism assumes that supernaturalists might use the established tool of science and 
possibly validate their ontology. Granted, for the Provisory naturalist, the chance of this 
occurring is low. It is not a strong possibility that supernaturalists will use science to verify 
their ontology. But it remains a possibility nonetheless. This seems more in the spirit of 
cooperation than the alternative approach to cooperation noted above. Finally, I will show 
that Provisory Methodological Naturalism is beneficial because it allows as valid the idea 
that competent work on the supernatural has been done and will continue to take place. The 
Provisory naturalist knows that such work is not being done merely to prove the existence 
of unknown or undiscovered natural objects. Rather, such work could theoretically prove 
the existence of supernatural objects.            
Starting with Chapter Four, the focus of my thesis will switch from the advantages 
of my methodological position to the supposed disadvantages of my view. Three chapters 
will be devoted to specific arguments against my preferred form of methodological 
naturalism. In each of the three chapters, I will propose a new argument against Provisory 
Methodological Naturalism. I will then provide responses in defense of my position. In 
Chapter Four, I will present an argument against Provisory Methodological Naturalism that 
uses inductive reasoning to defend the idea that ontological naturalism is unfalsifiable in our 
world. If ontological naturalism is unfalsifiable, then Provisory Methodological Naturalism 
is false (and Essential Methodological Naturalism is true). The problem with this approach, 
I will argue, is that inductive reasoning can never motivate Essential Methodological 
Naturalism. Inductive reasoning can only take us as far as possibility. However, the 
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Essential naturalist requires certainty in her view that science will only ever discover natural 
things. Therefore, an Essential methodological naturalist cannot use an inductive argument 
of this sort to defend her position. 
In Chapter Five, I will return to the question of distinguishing between natural and 
supernatural things. One could argue that, unless the Provisory methodological naturalist 
can present a criterion for distinguishing between natural and supernatural objects, then her 
position is untenable. A naturalist who argues that science can theoretically observe 
supernatural phenomena over-and-above natural phenomena must be able to provide a 
method for distinguishing between the two categories. If she cannot, the argument goes, 
then her methodological approach is incorrect. I will look at several possible responses the 
Provisory naturalist might give. For example, one might respond that it does not matter 
whether a thing is deemed natural or supernatural. The only thing that matters is whether a 
thing is deemed to exist. Perhaps, despite the argument above, the Provisory naturalist is not 
required to devise a distinguishing criterion simply because she believes that the 
supernatural must be amenable to scientific evaluation.  In that case, naturalism would then 
consist of the view that the only things which exist in the world are things which science 
deems to exist (with the possible presumption that science can discover all existing things).   
However, a problem arises. We surely cannot discount the categories of natural and 
supernatural entirely. The question of distinguishing natural from supernatural is crucial for 
the naturalist. Naturalism must stand opposed to some other worldview (namely, 
supernaturalism). Otherwise, it would be pointless as a philosophical position. Nobody 
needs to subscribe to the toothless view that the only things that exist are all the things that 
exist. But this is, essentially, what this sort of naturalism would be. It is better, I will argue, 
to assume a pragmatic solution to the distinction problem. This solution holds that 
distinguishing between natural and supernatural things is necessary and that our current 
conceptions of natural things are sufficient for making this distinction. 
In Chapter Six, I will present an argument which challenges the Provisory 
methodological naturalist claim that valid scientific work can be done on all supernatural 
phenomena which act in our world. Specifically, I will examine a paper written by John T. 
Chibnall, Joseph M. Jeral, and Michael A. Cerullo that argues that scientific experimentation 
cannot be done on the supernatural phenomenon intercessory prayer. I will then show that 
this argument is flawed. Provisory Methodological Naturalism holds that science can 
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evaluate such phenomena. Not only can it evaluate the phenomenon itself, science can also 
help us determine whether our philosophical position of ontological naturalism is false. 
Again, this last assumption is what separates my preferred form of methodological 
naturalism from its rival.  
As noted above, I define methodological naturalism as the thesis that science is the 
best and only method for discovering reality. However, the methodological supernaturalist 
might argue that Provisory and Essential Methodological Naturalism, which both rely on 
this definition of methodological naturalism, are examples of scientism. A view might be 
labeled scientistic if it over-exaggerates the abilities of science, holds that the only real 
knowledge is scientific knowledge, or asserts that all disciplines are reducible to natural 
science. In short, scientism is overconfidence in science. The supernaturalist might assert 
that holding science to be the best and only method for discovering reality qualifies as 
overconfidence. In the last chapter, Chapter Seven, I will examine this argument. I will argue 
that it is in the Provisory naturalist’s best interest to revise her approach to methodological 
naturalism to avoid falling prey to scientism. The Provisory methodological naturalist 
should not hold that science alone explains reality. The reason for this is that some elements 
of reality, things like art or morality, resist scientific explanation.  
That said, while these things may resist scientific explanation, this does not mean 
they are supernatural. The Provisory methodological naturalist who is an ontological 
naturalist maintains that art and morality are natural phenomena with natural origins. So, 
the Provisory naturalist needs to offer some means by which to explain these elements 
naturally. I will present a naturalist approach by which they may do this. This approach is 
known as pluralism. Pluralism assumes that science and other cultural practices like art and 
morality together represent the best and only method to explain reality. These other cultural 
practices are not explained by (i.e., do not reduce to) science. But nor do they have a 
supernatural explanation. They are wholly natural practices.  I will conclude the chapter by 
combining the methodological naturalist approach that prohibits reducing reality to 
scientific theory (pluralism) with the methodological naturalist approach that prohibits 
restricting science to the natural realm (Provisory Methodological Naturalism). These two 




1. Forms of Methodological Naturalism  
 
1.1 Introduction 
Methodological naturalism is generally thought to be the thesis that science is the best and 
only method for discovering the properties of reality. My focus in this project will be on 
defending one form of methodological naturalism against the rival form. However, because 
methodology and ontology are so closely linked and usually combined (we use a method or 
methods to determine the set of things we believe exist), it may be helpful to first conduct a 
brief investigation into how methodology and ontology generally relate to one another 
before jumping into a more exclusive discussion of method. I will consider two types of 
methodology, naturalistic methodology and supernaturalistic methodology along with the 
two types of ontology, naturalistic ontology and supernaturalistic ontology. I will begin by 
establishing which combinations of methodology and ontology can be held consistently by 
the naturalist and supernaturalist. Not all combinations of methodology/ontology types are 
viable. Once this has been done, I will separate methodological naturalism into two forms 
and discuss various attributes of each. 
This chapter has the following structure: In Section 1.2, I will begin by briefly 
defining terms. In Section 1.3, I will discuss the relationship between the various methods 
and ontologies. Despite the regularity with which individuals who identify as “naturalists” 
hold both methodological naturalism and ontological naturalism, the presence of 
methodological naturalism does not entail the presence of ontological naturalism. For 
instance, one can hold methodological naturalism, saying that science is the best and only 
method for discovering the properties of reality, while simultaneously being an ontological 
supernaturalist and believing that supernatural objects exist. Additionally, not all 
combinations of supernaturalistic and naturalistic ontologies and methodologies are viable. 
Some are contradictory. In the end, only three such combinations are coherent. Once these 
three ways in which methodology and ontology can interact has been established, I will 
then, in Section 1.4, examine methodological naturalism itself. I will primarily concentrate 
on two forms of methodological naturalism. The first form, Essential Methodological 
Naturalism, places certain limits on science. It holds that science is essentially limited to 
natural explanations. As a result, science is prevented from evaluating supernatural objects. 
The alternative to this form is Provisory Methodological Naturalism. This approach holds 
that science is not limited to natural explanations and can indeed evaluate supernatural 
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objects. Section 1.5 concludes the chapter by briefly summarizing the concepts and 
terminology introduced.    
 
1.2 Terminology 
In this thesis, I will be focusing on the following two varieties of naturalism:  
Ontological naturalism: The thesis that only natural things exist. 
Methodological naturalism: The thesis that science is the best and only 
method for discovering the properties of reality and what exists. 
The first variety of naturalism above tells us something about the make-up of the 
world and what it contains while the second variety suggests how we should best interact 
with the world to further our knowledge and understanding of it. These two theses may be 
contrasted with:  
Ontological supernaturalism: The thesis that supernatural things exist. 
Methodological supernaturalism: The thesis that non-natural or, 
supernatural methods allow us to discover the properties of reality and what 
exists. 1 
Again, the first variety of supernaturalism tells us something about the make-up of 
the world while the second variety suggests how we should best interact with it. Ontological 
supernaturalism obviously differs from its naturalistic counterpart in its inclusion of 
supernatural objects. However, we should be careful to note that this inclusion can come 
about in one of two ways. The first way to include supernatural objects in an ontology is to 
hold that only supernatural objects exist. So, like the way the ontological naturalist denies 
the existence of supernatural things and holds that only natural things exist, this particular 
ontological supernaturalist would deny the existence of natural things and hold that only 
supernatural things exist. She would, for example, deny the existence of trees while 
                                                             
1 In this thesis, I will take the terms “non-natural” and “supernatural” to be synonymous.  However, some 
distinguish between them. Those who do often define “non-natural” things as “those things manufactured by 
humans” (as opposed to “natural things” which are “those things produced by nature”). “Supernatural 
things”, which, obviously, does not refer to things manufactured by humans, would then require its own 
separate definition. Work that acknowledges the distinction includes (Clarke, 2007) and (Luck, 2007).  
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accepting the existence of ghosts (Or, perhaps more likely, she would hold that things like 
trees which are normally thought to be natural objects are in fact supernatural objects). 
The second way to include supernatural objects within an ontology is to hold that 
supernatural objects exist in addition to natural objects. This type of ontological 
supernaturalist would say that ghosts exist but trees exist as well. A supernaturalistic 
ontology of this sort is more encompassing than the naturalistic one. It contains all the 
objects of ontological naturalism plus objects that the naturalistic ontology rejects. For 
example, it includes trees, chairs, and planets but also demons and the Judeo-Christian God. 
We might imagine the objects of the naturalistic ontology as contained within a circle. 
Surrounding this circle is a larger circle containing the objects of this less restrictive 
supernaturalistic ontology. The larger circle includes all the members of its own set along 
with the members of the naturalistic ontology set. 
 
Figure 1.1 







Since the first way to include supernatural objects in an ontology is not commonly defended 
(few will deny the existence of natural objects including such things as chairs, tables, 
particles, etc. or hold those things to be supernatural), I will set it aside and assume an 
ontological supernaturalism which takes the second, less restrictive way. 
The second variety of supernaturalism listed above, methodological 
supernaturalism, has something in common with methodological naturalism. Again, it too 
suggests how we should best interact with the world to further our knowledge and 





can be realized in two different ways. The first way holds that only non-natural methods 
allow us to discover the properties of reality and what exists. So, for example, only religious 
revelation and not physics can tell us about the properties of reality. The second way 
methodological supernaturalism may be realized assumes that supernatural methods in 
addition to science allow us to discover the properties of reality. So, for example, scientific 
experimentation leads to valid new discoveries about the nature of the world but the reading 
of tea leaves does as well.2 The first methodological approach is not commonly defended. 
To require methodological supernaturalism to hold that only supernatural methods are 
viable is too strict. The scientific method has proven much too fruitful to disregard entirely. 
Most supernaturalists recognize this and have found ways to reconcile their supernaturalistic 
methodologies with science. Therefore, when discussing methodological supernaturalism, I 
will be referring to the second version which holds that certain supernatural methods are 
fruitful but the natural method of science is fruitful as well.  
One final terminological note: Both ontological naturalism and ontological 
supernaturalism are sometimes referred to as metaphysical positions. Often the terms 
metaphysical naturalism and metaphysical supernaturalism are used instead of 
“ontological”. However, both “ontological” and “metaphysical” refer to the same thing, a 
view on what exists in the world. Similarly, some prefer to use the terms epistemological 
naturalism or epistemological supernaturalism instead of methodological naturalism and 
supernaturalism. Again, the meanings are the same. In this case, both “methodological” and 
“epistemological” refer to how we know what exists in the world.  
 
1.3 Methodology and Ontology Combinations 
Sometimes discussions of naturalism result in the conflation of ontological and 
methodological naturalism. When this happens, “naturalism” is meant to imply both a set 
of believed-in objects as well as a method for determining the members of that set. 
Additionally, given the considerable number of methodological naturalists who are also 
ontological naturalists, some people might assume that ontological naturalism suggests 
methodological naturalism or vice-versa. A fair amount, perhaps even most, of the people 
                                                             
2 We can draw a parallel to Figure 1.1 for methodological supernaturalism and methodological naturalism in 
which the former is a large circle surrounding the smaller circle of the latter. Methodological 
supernaturalism is the larger set which also includes the viable method (science) that is in methodological 
naturalism set.  
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who would label themselves ontological naturalists also consider themselves to be 
methodological naturalists since they see science as the best and only method for 
discovering reality. Likewise, most methodological naturalists hold that correct 
interpretation of scientific findings should be the basis of a rejection of supernatural objects.  
However, we cannot assume that ontological naturalism and methodological 
naturalism will accompany each other in every case. And because of this, we cannot assert 
that one entails the other. Take, for example, the atheist parapsychologist who believes in 
ghosts. This is someone who does not hold any religious belief and who works to apply 
naturalistic methods to study and prove the paranormal. Unlike many theists, this atheist 
parapsychologist would not utilize a supernatural methodology such as religious experience 
or biblical revelation. Instead, she would use a naturalistic method to inform her 
supernaturalistic ontology. Science, in her view, reveals the existence of supernatural 
objects. Thus, the simple application of the naturalistic method does not entail a resulting 
naturalistic ontology as some might believe. 
 One’s methodology plays a role in determining one’s ontology. For example, one 
might use the method of science to discover the existence of a new particle. After discovery, 
that particle becomes part of that person’s (and others with knowledge of the particle’s 
existence) ontology. Likewise, supernaturalists have long supported a belief in the existence 
of God with the argument that the method of prayer reveals Him to them.  The method of 
prayer, therefore, plays a role in determining the nature of the supernaturalist’s ontology. It 
is important to keep this methodology/ontology dependence in mind as we chart the various 
methodology/ontology combinations: 
 
Figure 1.2  
Combination 1: Methodological 
Naturalism and Ontological Naturalism 
Combination 2: Methodological 
Supernaturalism and Ontological 
Naturalism 
Combination 3: Methodological 
Naturalism and Ontological 
Supernaturalism 
Combination 4: Methodological 
Supernaturalism and Ontological 
Supernaturalism 
 
Of these four combinations, Combination 2, the pairing of methodological 
supernaturalism with ontological naturalism, is problematic. It requires us to assume that a 
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naturalistic ontology does not preclude a supernatural methodology. In other words, it states 
that it is possible to hold the belief that methods other than science can help us discover the 
properties of reality while simultaneously holding the belief that only natural things exist. 
Some might argue that this is indeed possible to do. Such individuals could believe that 
science is one method, maybe even the best method, for uncovering truths, but that there are 
other methods as well, such as meditation and religious or spiritual inspiration. And these 
other methods reveal (only) natural truths about the world. These individuals would 
ostensibly be using supernatural methods while maintaining a naturalistic ontology.  
But there are problems with the combination of supernaturalistic methodology and 
naturalistic ontology generally. This is because to be a methodological supernaturalist, one 
needs to assume the existence of non-natural things. The use of religious experience to 
understand the properties of reality, for example, usually sees an accompanying belief in a 
deity or deities from whom the understanding originates and from whom the knowledge is 
gained. If not a god or gods, at least some sort of outside supernatural force is needed to 
supply the knowledge.3 If the knowledge is not derived from some existing non-natural 
object or phenomenon then it is knowledge derived naturally, and religious experience 
would be methodological naturalism rather than methodological supernaturalism. To take 
another example, divination is a supernatural methodology in which insight is gained 
through tarot cards or other tools. Practitioners of this method appeal to non-natural spiritual 
forces or a collective unconscious for knowledge and, therefore, a belief in these is required 
if one is to be thought of as truly practicing the supernatural method of divination. If the 
force or collective unconscious were believed by the practitioner to be natural phenomena, 
divination would be a natural method. Therefore, methodological supernaturalism entails a 
belief in non-natural things or, ontological supernaturalism. This is true even though we 
previously saw that methodological naturalism does not entail ontological naturalism (e.g., 
the atheist parapsychologist). 
So, by discarding the untenable combination of methodological supernaturalism and 
ontological naturalism, we are left with three viable methodology/ontology combinations: 
                                                             
3 Admittedly, the relation the supernatural object stands in to the knowledge transmitted here is unclear. It 
may be that different methods see the supernatural object standing in different relation to the knowledge. For 
example, one method may allow knowledge to be actively derived from the object while another allows for 
the practitioner to appeal to the object for knowledge (passively-derived knowledge). However, we might 
posit that, at the very least, a supernatural entity is required if a supernatural method is to be reliable. This is 
because (1) such an entity explains the reliability of the method, (2) there must be an explanation for the 


















Combination 1, methodological naturalism paired with ontological naturalism, is held by a 
majority of working scientists according to Pew Research polling (Pew Research Center, 
2009). It is the position I assume in this thesis. This combination holds that science is the 
best and only method for discovering reality and that only natural things exist.  
The atheist parapsychologist noted above is an example of someone holding 
Combination 3. Here, a naturalistic method is said to entail a supernaturalistic ontology. In 
other words, science alone tells of our world and it tells us that supernatural objects exist. 
Unlike Combination 2 in Figure 1.2, this combination is not immediately incoherent. In fact, 
I will argue later, when I discuss my preferred form of methodological naturalism, that 
science could indeed prove the existence of supernatural objects were they to exist.  Last is 
Combination 4, the combination of supernaturalistic method and supernaturalistic ontology. 
This too is not an uncommon view. The average tarot practitioner, moderate religious 
observer or astrologer qualifies as this combination. All that is needed is a belief that a 
particular supernatural method, perhaps religious revelation or astrological charting, is at 
least as reliable as science in uncovering the properties of reality. This method is then 
coupled with a belief in the existence of supernatural objects or phenomena.  
One may question what it is, exactly, that makes a method reliable. Here naturalists 
and supernaturalists may disagree. Naturalists and supernaturalists may have different ideas 
about which characteristics are required for reliability. Or they may agree on what 
potentially qualifies a method as reliable but disagree on whether said method meets those 
qualifications. For our purposes here, I would argue that a method is reliable if it is 




1.4 Methodological Naturalism   
In the preceding section, I attempted to paint a clear picture of the relationships between 
naturalistic and supernaturalistic methods and ontologies. With these relationships in mind, 
we can now focus on the naturalistic method. Again, our definition of methodological 
naturalism is: 
Methodological naturalism: The thesis that science is the best and only 
method for discovering the properties of reality and what exists. 
Natural science is thought of as the best method because it has proven more fruitful than 
other methods at discovering the properties of reality and what exists. Science has given us 
tools to chart our place in the solar system and discover the basic building blocks of life, for 
example. Other, non-natural methods such as extra-sensory perception, for example, are not 
as successful at revealing such truths about our world. Additionally, for methodological 
naturalists, no method other than science can be considered reliable and so science is also 
thought of as the only method by which to accurately discover the properties of reality. 4  
My definition above concerns the appropriateness of science in its application to all 
of reality. It also notes science’s privileged position ahead of every supernatural 
methodology. But there are other ways to define ‘methodological naturalism’. An 
alternative (but quite common) definition is given by Maarten Boudry, Stefaan Blancke and 
Johan Braeckman (hereafter, ‘BBB’):  
According to [methodological naturalism], science is strictly limited to 
investigating natural causes and putting forth natural explanations. Lacking 
the tools to evaluate supernatural claims, science must remain studiously 
neutral on questions of metaphysics (Boudry et al., 2012, p. 1151). 
The differences in the two definitions are worth noting. While my definition of 
‘methodological naturalism’ focuses on the relevance of science and its place in the 
hierarchy of methods, BBB’s definition concentrates on the application of science and 
establishing the limits of science’s purview. My definition places science at the apex of all 
existing methodologies and implicitly argues for its adoption. BBB’s definition sets 
boundaries: BBB hold ‘methodological naturalism’ to be the thesis that science is only 
                                                             
4 “Best and only” would be redundant if “only” implied that there were no other, less reliable methods 
available. If something is the only method available, it would, necessarily, be the best. But here I mean “the 
only method for accurately discovering the properties of reality”. I do not mean the only method simpliciter. 
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useful within the natural realm. Additionally, according to the BBB definition, science itself 
remains agnostic with regards to supernatural ontology. I will label mine the hierarchical 
definition of ‘methodological naturalism’ and the above BBB definition the restricting 
definition.  
 With these definitions in mind, we can say that one or more of the following traits 
are commonly attributed to methodological naturalism: 
(1) Supremacy of science: Science is the best and only method for discovering the 
properties of reality and what exists. All other tools are either less than the best (less 
accurate, faulty) or are incapable of discovering the properties of reality and what 
exists.  
(2) Restriction of science: Science is restricted to evaluating only the natural realm. 
Science lacks the tools to evaluate supernatural objects. 
(3) Agnosticism of science: Science must remain neutral on questions of metaphysics. 
The supernatural, if it exists at all, occupies a realm outside of science. Science must 
always remain agnostic with respect to supernatural ontology. It can suggest neither 
ontological naturalism nor ontological supernaturalism. 
My hierarchical definition of ‘methodological naturalism’ only obviously incorporates (1). 
In fact, I hold that ‘methodological naturalism’ simply is the thesis detailed in (1). BBB, 
meanwhile, incorporate both (2) and (3) in the restricting definition of ‘methodological 
naturalism’ they give above. Again, that definition restricts science to the natural realm and 
divorces science from ontological commitments. We should note that, although BBB’s 
definition does not incorporate (1), it seems possible that they, as methodological naturalists 
would still hold or endorse (1). So, even though their definition differs from my own, they 
may still view it as an acceptable trait of methodological naturalism. 
While BBB and other methodological naturalists may accept (1), they may differ 
over the inviolability of the other two traits. For example, the restricting definition holds 
methodological naturalism to involve the restriction of science to the natural realm (2). But 
we might question the truth of (2). Is science really prevented from evaluating supernatural 
objects? If (2) is not true, would methodological naturalism be false? The same questions 
might be asked of (3) and science’s purported agnosticism regarding ontology. Is science 
really prevented from making pronouncements with regards to ontology? If science can tell 
us whether supernatural things exist, does that mean that methodological naturalism is false? 
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These questions bring to the forefront methodological naturalism’s role in science: 
If science is restricted to the natural realm (2) and must be agnostic with regards to ontology 
(3), then methodological naturalism’s role is to limit science. According to this conception 
of methodological naturalism, science cannot tell us that ontological naturalism is true (or 
false). But maybe science is not so restricted. Perhaps methodological naturalism should 
instead be defined as a tentative commitment to natural explanations. As methodological 
naturalists, we are tentatively committed to the idea that only natural explanations are viable. 
But, being tentative, such a commitment is revocable. Should circumstance warrant it (say, 
proof of the supernatural is discovered), then the commitment to natural explanations could 
be revoked. In this case, methodological naturalism’s role is as a provisional attitude of 
science. Methodological naturalists of this persuasion do not look at traits (2) and (3) as 
inviolable. Instead, they acknowledge that supernatural explanations have simply failed in 
science. The supernatural is not beyond science and science is not restricted from evaluating 
supernatural objects. Rather science can evaluate said objects and has found all claims of 
their existence to be false or lacking.  
The remainder of this chapter will examine three distinct approaches to 
methodological naturalism. The first approach to methodological naturalism holds that 
science is limited to the natural realm and cannot evaluate supernatural objects. In other 
words, this approach assumes the truth of (2). In answer to the above question concerning 
whether methodological naturalism would be false if (2) were not true, those who adopt this 
approach would answer affirmatively. This first approach also assumes that science must be 
agnostic with regards to ontology (3). BBB call this version of methodological naturalism 
Intrinsic Methodological Naturalism and I will discuss it in more detail in the next section 
(1.4.1). Using the above description, we can define Intrinsic Methodological Naturalism in 
the following way: 
Intrinsic Methodological Naturalism: The thesis that science is restricted to 
evaluating the natural realm (i.e., unequipped to evaluate supernatural 
objects) (trait 2). Additionally, science is agnostic about the existence of the 
supernatural (trait 3). 
Intrinsic Methodological Naturalism appears to be coherent (although it is important 
to note that neither BBB nor I endorse this form of methodological naturalism). However, 
it will not be focused on much in this thesis. In fact, after briefly examining it I will set it 
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aside indefinitely. The reason for doing this concerns Intrinsic Methodological Naturalism’s 
commitment to the idea that science must remain agnostic with regards to ontology (3). In 
Section 1.4.2 I will discuss two problems associated with the utilization of trait (3). These 
problems concern the use of trait (3) both in this thesis specifically and for methodological 
naturalists generally.   
 In Section 1.4.3 I will discuss the second approach to methodological naturalism. I 
call this version, Essential Methodological Naturalism. Like Intrinsic Methodological 
Naturalism, Essential Methodological Naturalism holds that science cannot evaluate 
supernatural objects since science is limited to the natural realm (2). However, Essential 
Methodological Naturalism differs from Intrinsic Methodological Naturalism in that it does 
not hold that science must always remain neutral on questions of metaphysics (3). This 
leaves the door open for the Essential naturalist to use science as support for their 
ontological view. Also, rather than accept the restricting definition of methodological 
naturalism, as Intrinsic naturalism does, Essential naturalism accepts my own hierarchical 
definition of methodological naturalism (1).  
Essential Methodological Naturalism: The thesis that science is the best and 
only method for discovering the properties of reality and what exists (trait 1) 
and that science is restricted to evaluating the natural realm (i.e., unequipped 
to evaluate supernatural objects) (trait 2).  
 Finally, in Section 1.4.4 I will introduce the third approach to methodological 
naturalism. The third approach to methodological naturalism differs from the first two 
approaches in that it dismisses (2). It holds that science is not restricted to the natural realm 
and can indeed evaluate supernatural objects. BBB call this form Provisory Methodological 
Naturalism.  I hold that Provisory Methodological Naturalism accepts the claim that science 
is the best tool for discovering the properties of reality (1) but it rejects the claims that 
science is limited to the natural realm (2) and that science must always remain agnostic with 
respect to supernatural ontology (3). Thus, I define Provisory Methodological Naturalism 
in the following way: 
Provisory Methodological Naturalism: The thesis that science is the best and 
only method for discovering the properties of reality and what exists (trait 1) 
and that science can provisionally evaluate supernatural objects.  
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It is this third approach to methodological naturalism which I will set out to defend (against 




































1.4.1 Intrinsic Methodological Naturalism 
The first approach to methodological naturalism holds that science is only equipped to tell 
us about the natural world. Science cannot evaluate supernatural objects. This first approach 
assumes that trait (2) is true. But it also assumes that (2) provides overwhelming grounds to 
believe (3). In other words, the restriction of science to the natural realm provides grounds 
to accept the divorce of science and ontology. Because science is limited to the natural realm 
and cannot evaluate supernatural objects, science cannot commit to ontological naturalism 
or ontological supernaturalism. We cannot use science to evaluate supernatural objects or 
phenomena because science is not equipped to tell us about things like God, ghosts or the 
soul. In their examination of methodological naturalism, BBB refer to a methodological 
naturalism which assumes traits (2) and (3) (or, we might say, a methodological naturalism 
which holds that science is beholden to those two traits) as Intrinsic Methodological 
                                                             
5 Gregory Dawes makes a similar distinction to the one here between Essential and Provisory 
Methodological Naturalism. His distinction concerns objections to proposed religious explanations. 
According to Dawes, a de facto objection to religious explanations “accepts that a religious explanation may 
be a potential explanation of some fact about the world. But it denies that any theistic explanation meets the 
other criteria that would warrant our regarding it as true” (Dawes, 2009, p. 29). This mirrors Provisory 
Methodological Naturalism. Meanwhile, an in principle objection to religious explanations holds that “no 
theistic explanation is an actual explanation… [N]o proposed theistic explanation could even be a potential 
explanation” (Ibid.). This is similar to Essential Methodological Naturalism.    
29 
 
Naturalism. According to BBB, Intrinsic methodological naturalists believe that 
methodological naturalism is “an intrinsic and self-imposed limitation of 
science…something that is part and parcel of the scientific enterprise by definition” (Boudry 
et al., 2010, p. 229). Again, I define Intrinsic Methodological Naturalism as follows: 
Intrinsic Methodological Naturalism: The thesis that science is restricted to 
evaluating the natural realm (i.e., unequipped to evaluate supernatural 
objects) (trait 2). Additionally, science is agnostic about the existence of the 
supernatural (trait 3). 
I will provide an example of Intrinsic Methodological Naturalism (traits 2 and 3) 
shortly. However, it may help to first look at a case in which trait (2) alone is used to defend 
methodological naturalism. In Richard C. Lewontin’s review of Carl Sagan’s book, The 
Demon-Haunted World, Lewontin writes 
It is not that the methods and institutions of science somehow compel us to 
accept a material explanation of the phenomenal world, but, on the contrary, 
that we are forced by our a priori adherence to material causes to create an 
apparatus of investigation and a set of concepts that produce material 
explanations, no matter how counter-intuitive, no matter how mystifying to 
the uninitiated. Moreover, that materialism is absolute, for we cannot allow 
a Divine Foot in the door (Lewontin, 1997). 
According to Lewontin, scientific investigation involves a strict “adherence to material 
causes”. Because of this, all explanations by science will necessarily involve and/or refer to 
material things (Although he never explicitly says as much, Lewontin’s ‘materialism’ 
appears to be synonymous with my definition of ‘naturalism’ and the two terms appear 
interchangeable. At the very least it seems likely that my definition of ‘naturalism’ 
encompasses Lewontin’s ‘materialism’, i.e., anything that is material is also natural). 
Science, according to Lewontin in the above quote, has no room for the non-material or non-
natural. Lewontin says nothing with regards to agnosticism and ontological commitment so 
I will refrain from categorizing his view as Intrinsic Methodological Naturalism per se (as 
opposed to the alternative version I will introduce later). But he does at least assume (2) 
and, therefore, Lewontin’s position falls under either this form of methodological naturalism 
or the one I will introduce in the following section.  
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 However, someone who more explicitly assumes the Intrinsic version of 
methodological naturalism is Eugenie Scott. She makes it clear that she accepts the truth of 
(2), a position she calls ‘methodological materialism’ (Scott, 1998, p. 20). But she also 
writes, “Science is a way of knowing that attempts to explain the natural world using natural 
causes. It is agnostic toward the supernatural- it neither confirms nor rejects it” (Scott, 2003, 
p. 111). In making these claims Scott clearly accepts the truth of (3) along with (2) and so 
adopts the two assumptions made by BBB’s proposed first form of methodological 
naturalism, Intrinsic Methodological Naturalism.  
 We might wonder why a form of methodological naturalism which places such 
restrictions on science would appeal to methodological naturalists. Under Intrinsic 
Methodological Naturalism, not only is science restricted to operating in the natural realm 
but, seemingly because of this limitation, it cannot even maintain a position regarding which 
types of things exist. In the next chapter, I will examine arguments for a methodological 
naturalism which incorporates the restriction trait (trait 2). These arguments will hopefully 
shed light on why many scientists feel restricting science to the natural realm is 
advantageous or even necessary. As far as the agnosticism of science to ontology (trait 3) 
goes, one apparent advantage of an agnostic methodological naturalism of the sort BBB 
defines is that it allows the naturalist to remain neutral on the stickier questions of ontology 
or metaphysics. For example, an Intrinsic methodological naturalist’s science cannot be 
immediately linked to atheism if said science refuses to take a stand on ontological 
naturalism and the question of whether atheism is true. Certain methodological naturalists 
might want to keep science and atheism separate and may feel that having science remain 
neutral with regards to ontology allows them to do that.  
The fact that many scientists consider the question of God to be outside the purview 
of science is evidenced by the following quote from David Johnson. Johnson was the lead 
author of a study published in Public Understandings of Science examining scientists’ 
attitudes about religion. In an article about the study written shortly after its publication he 
states 
“Scientists differ in their view of where such borders [between science and 
religion] rest. And they may even view belief in a deity as irrational, but they 
do not view questions related to the existence of deities or ‘the sacred’ as 
within the scope of science” (Griffin, 2016). 
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Many, perhaps even most of the scientists involved in the above-referenced study would 
identify as methodological naturalists. However, despite their personal beliefs, many also 
hold that science cannot validate belief or non-belief in the supernatural. According to them, 
science can neither prove nor disprove God. And thus, contrary to the assertions of some 
theists, science should not be linked to or equated with atheism. The article goes on to detail 
many British scientists’ dislike of popular evolutionary biologist and prominent atheist, 
Richard Dawkins. Dawkins, many of the scientists believe, incorrectly argues that science 
can and does rule out a supernatural deity.6 
 Besides its contentious assumption of trait (2) (an assumption which I will explore 
in more detail when I look at arguments for and against the different forms of 
methodological naturalism), there are reasons why Intrinsic Methodological Naturalism will 
not work for our purposes in this thesis. I will now look at two problems associated with its 
use here. Both problems concern Intrinsic Methodological Naturalism’s acceptance of trait 
(3) and the notion that science must be agnostic with respect to supernatural ontology. The 
first problem concerns the fact that one particularly interesting argument (that I will 
introduce later) for methodological naturalism requires acceptance of trait (2) but not trait 
(3). As such, that argument will only work for Essential Methodological Naturalism and not 
Intrinsic Methodological Naturalism. The second problem concerns the idea that acceptance 
of trait (3) appears to prevent methodological naturalists who are ontological naturalists 
from justifying their ontological naturalism. If their method (science) must remain agnostic 
with regards to the existence of supernatural objects, it seems they have no solid justification 
for their personal ontological naturalism.  
 
1.4.2 Problems with Intrinsic Methodological Naturalism 
Intrinsic methodological naturalists argue that science cannot pronounce on whether 
supernatural things exist. Science is a natural method but it cannot make definitive claims 
regarding the existence or non-existence of supernatural objects. However, an argument 
which I will explore in the next chapter denies this. This argument holds that it is true that 
                                                             
6 Assigning this belief to Dawkins is highly questionable. Dawkins argues that science, particularly the 
scientific process of evolution through natural selection, provides natural explanations for questions which 
were previously assumed to be answerable only by invoking supernatural processes. This makes the God 
hypothesis highly unlikely although not impossible. Dawkins may assume that science can evaluate 
supernatural claims (although he neglects to offer an argument in support of this) but he never states, at least 
in his published work, that science conclusively disproves ontological supernaturalism (Dawkins, 2007).  
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science is limited to the natural realm and cannot evaluate supernatural objects (trait 2). But 
this does not mean that science must be agnostic with regards to ontology (trait 3). Rather, 
because science is limited to only evaluating natural objects, everything which science 
evaluates must be a natural object. Assuming there are no non-observable objects in our 
world (or, that science can observe everything in our world), then everything in our world 
must be natural. Ghosts, were they to be discovered, would be natural objects, for example. 
The same would hold true for other objects currently considered to be supernatural. Per this 
argument, ontological naturalism is seemingly unfalsifiable in our world.  
Regardless of its merits, I believe this is an argument worth exploring. However, to 
do so, as previously noted, requires us to substitute Essential Methodological Naturalism 
for Intrinsic Methodological Naturalism. This is because Intrinsic Methodological 
Naturalism expressly forbids science from pronouncing on ontology while Essential 
Methodological Naturalism does not. The argument I will explore involves a leap from 
scientific observation to an ontological claim, namely the claim that ontological naturalism 
is true in our world. By neglecting to accept trait (3) along with trait (2) the Essential 
methodological naturalist can make this argument while the Intrinsic methodological 
naturalist cannot. 
The second problem in utilizing a methodological naturalism which holds that 
science cannot pronounce on ontology is that it is not clear what justification such 
methodological naturalists would have for their personal ontologies if science itself cannot 
tell us whether supernatural objects exist. Consider the following quote from Eugenie Scott, 
the scientist previously identified as an Intrinsic methodological naturalist: 
If science is restricted to methodological materialism, it must ignore the 
possibility or impossibility of divine interference. Wearing my personal 
philosophy hat, I can say that I don’t think there is a God or gods or any other 
supernatural powers. I can say wearing my scientist hat that I don’t see 
evidence of supernatural interference in nature…but I cannot as a scientist 
say “There is no supernatural interference in nature” (Scott, 1998, p. 20). 
Given the above quote, we can assume Scott to be an ontological naturalist as well as an 
Intrinsic methodological naturalist. She does not believe in the existence of gods or 
supernatural powers. But we might question the justification for her personal ontology if it 
is not the method of science. Presumably, the lack of scientific evidence she cites for the 
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existence of supernatural interference in nature is a driving factor for her own ontological 
naturalism. But if her method of science is required to remain agnostic about the existence 
of supernatural objects then it seems that her ontology, informed by said method, should be 
agnostic as well. If it is a lack of scientific evidence for a particular hypothesis that forces 
an individual to claim that said hypothesis is likely false, then that is indeed science 
indirectly pronouncing on ontology. Thus, it is unclear how Scott can reconcile her personal 
ontological naturalism with a methodological naturalism that holds that science cannot 
provide answers with regards to ontology.7  
Perhaps Scott’s justification for her own ontological naturalism coupled with 
Intrinsic Methodological Naturalism is something like the following: “Science shows no 
evidence of the supernatural, therefore ontological naturalism is likely true. The method of 
science suggests ontological naturalism in this way. However, one cannot say that science 
proves there is no God or that science proves ontological naturalism. Therefore, science 
must be agnostic with regards to ontology. As such, one may hold that only natural things 
exist while simultaneously believing that science cannot tell us whether only natural things 
exist.”  
The problem with this reasoning is that science does not need to go so far as to prove 
a particular ontology in order to avoid being agnostic about it. We do not need to adopt 
Scott’s agnosticism simply because science cannot prove ontological naturalism. As noted 
above, a method such as science arguably suggests ontological naturalism. Such a 
suggestion may not be proof, but it is certainly not a position of agnosticism either. Because 
of this, Scott’s science is not really agnostic with regards to ontology. She leans toward 
ontological naturalism as a ‘personal philosophy’ because this is what her science 
unequivocally suggests. I am aware that this is not an uncontroversial claim and that much 
space may be devoted to arguments for and against this view. That said, I believe it is a 
justifiable position to maintain. A similar argument could be made for the assumption of 
atheism itself (over agnosticism): One does not need to claim knowledge that there is no 
God to qualify as an atheist rather than an agnostic. One who simply argues that the lack of 
evidence suggests that there is no God may still label herself as an ‘atheist’.  
                                                             
7 Science does not need to be agnostic with regards to ontology but nor does science require ontological 
naturalism. As I will argue, science can provisionally pronounce on ontology. A provisional pronouncement 
is subject to change. The view that science requires naturalism is an example of scientism and is 
unwarranted. I will discuss scientism further in Chapter Seven.  
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The belief that the lack of evidence suggests there is no God is encompassed in the 
broader belief (expressed by Scott) that the lack of evidence suggests there are no 
supernatural objects. In both cases, the lack of evidence obtained via the method of science 
can lead to the adoption of non-agnostic stances (atheism or ontological naturalism). So, it 
seems that Scott’s science is not agnostic with regards to ontology and the assumption that 
definitive proof is required for one to pronounce on ontology is incorrect. 
Given the above issues with Intrinsic Methodological Naturalism or, a 
methodological naturalism which requires traits (2) and (3), I will utilize an alternative form 
of methodological naturalism for the remainder of this thesis. Like Intrinsic naturalism, 
Essential Methodological Naturalism holds that science is limited to evaluating the natural 
realm and cannot evaluate supernatural objects. However, Essential naturalism differs from 
Intrinsic naturalism in that it does not restrict science from making pronouncements on 
ontology. Because it neglects to adopt (3), Essential Methodological Naturalism will allow 
us to explore the interesting argument alluded to above for this type of methodological 
naturalism. The Intrinsic version prohibits this argument. Additionally, Essential 
Methodological Naturalism avoids the concerns raised regarding personal ontology and (3).  
It is important to note that Essential Methodological Naturalism is not the form of 
methodological naturalism I will ultimately defend (that form, as noted, is the third 
alternative, Provisory Methodological Naturalism). However, I believe that Essential 
Methodological Naturalism is the strongest challenger to my preferred form.  
 
1.4.3 Essential Methodological Naturalism 
The Intrinsic methodological naturalist holds that science can only tell us about natural 
things. Science is silent on the existence of supernatural objects. This silence allows it to 
remain neutral with regards to ontology and metaphysics and to avoid sticky conclusions 
such as atheism. However, given the issues discussed in the previous section, a substitute 
form of methodological naturalism which accepts trait (2) but abandons trait (3) is needed. 
Like Intrinsic Methodological Naturalism, Essential Methodological Naturalism argues that 
science cannot evaluate supernatural objects. However, instead of attaching itself to the 
restricting definition of ‘methodological naturalism’ which prevents science from 
pronouncing on ontology (trait (3)), Essential Methodological Naturalism follows my own 
definition (trait (1)). The Essential methodological naturalist holds that science is the best 
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tool for discovering the properties of reality. Although she believes that science cannot 
evaluate supernatural objects, the Essential methodological naturalist is not prevented from 
recognizing, as noted above, that everything observed naturally via science is natural. If 
science observes a thing, that thing must be natural.  Thus, the Essential methodological 
naturalist maintains ontological naturalism. Recall that we define Essential Methodological 
Naturalism as follows: 
Essential Methodological Naturalism: The thesis that science is the best and 
only method for discovering the properties of reality and what exists (trait 1) 
but that it is restricted to evaluating the natural realm (i.e., unequipped to 
evaluate supernatural objects) (trait 2).  
The argument by which the Essential methodological naturalist might defend 
unfalsifiable ontological naturalism will be discussed in the next chapter. For now, though, 
we might wonder how Essential Methodological Naturalism differs from the 
methodological naturalism I will discuss in the next section (Provisory Methodological 
Naturalism). It may seem like Essential Methodological Naturalism is no different from 
Provisory naturalism if it too allows for pronouncements to be made regarding ontology. 
Additionally, Essential Methodological Naturalism is similar to Provisory Methodological 
Naturalism in that Essential methodological naturalists can, theoretically, argue that the 
objects which supernaturalists claim to exist really do exist. An Essentialist, like the 
Provisory naturalist, might be able to say that a ghost exists, for example. However, 
Essential naturalists differ from Provisory naturalists in that the Essentialist would believe 
that this ghost is not really a supernatural object. The Essentialist would hold that existing 
supernatural objects are not truly supernatural objects but rather misidentified natural 
objects. This is because, again, the Essentialist holds that whatever science discovers in our 
world must be natural.8 Provisory methodological naturalists, as we will see, would hold 
that those objects really are supernatural.   
 
1.4.4 Provisory Methodological Naturalism 
The third form of methodological naturalism, the form which I seek to defend in this thesis, 
does not require science to be agnostic with regards to ontology. However, it states that 
                                                             
8 Alternatively, Essential methodological naturalists might argue that supernatural objects can only exist in 
other spatiotemporally-distinct possible worlds.  
36 
 
while science is committed to ontological naturalism, this commitment is provisory and can 
be revoked under extraordinary circumstances (for example, the production of definitive 
proof of the supernatural). This form recognizes that the long history of scientific inquiry 
points to the adoption of a naturalistic ontology. However, it also acknowledges that 
ontological naturalism might someday be disproven. In this way, this form of 
methodological naturalism grants Hume’s problem of induction which states that we have 
no definitive cause to believe that routine or regular events will occur in the future as they 
have in the past (Hume, 1888, p. 89). Ontological naturalism may be true now, but there is 
no guarantee that such will be the case in the future.  
Because this type of methodological naturalist is open to the possibility of 
ontological naturalism being disproven or falsified, she needs a method by which such 
falsification might take place. And, since she is a methodological naturalist, that method is 
going to be science. Thus, contrary to the Essential methodological naturalist, this 
methodological naturalist holds that science is not limited to the natural realm. We can use 
science to evaluate supernatural objects. Again, I define this view, which BBB call 
Provisory Methodological Naturalism, as follows: 
Provisory Methodological Naturalism: The thesis that science is the best and 
only method for discovering the properties of reality and what exists (trait 1) 
and that science can provisionally evaluate supernatural objects.9  
I will examine Provisory Methodological Naturalism in Chapter Three after discussing its 
strongest challenger, Essential naturalism, in the next chapter. For now, it will suffice to say 
that all methodological naturalists who consider the role of science in evaluating the 
supernatural fall into one of two camps; either they accept that science can, theoretically, 
observe supernatural objects (Provisory methodological naturalists) or they believe that 
scientifically observing truly supernatural objects is impossible (Intrinsic and Essential 
methodological naturalists). We might also say that Intrinsic and Essential methodological 
naturalists hold that, necessarily, all supernatural objects must be unobservable. In other 
words, these objects must be outside the evaluative range of science and cannot affect the 
                                                             
9 BBB’s own definition of Provisory Methodological Naturalism differs somewhat from mine in that they 
only hold it to be a provisional acceptance of methodological naturalism rather than of methodological and 
ontological naturalism. I will discuss Provisory Methodological Naturalism’s provisional acceptance of 
methodological naturalism in more detail in Section 3.3.  
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observable natural world. Provisory naturalists, meanwhile, can only go as far as to say that 
it is possible that all supernatural objects are unobservable.10 
Previously, I posed a couple of questions regarding trait (2) and the idea that science 
is limited to the natural realm. The first question asked if (2) was true: “Is science limited 
to the natural realm?” The second question asked whether methodological supernaturalism 
would be proven false should (2) prove false: “If science is not limited to the natural realm, 
is methodological naturalism false?” Provisory Methodological Naturalism assumes that (2) 
is false. Provisory naturalists assume that science is not limited to the natural realm. 
Therefore, in defending Provisory naturalism, I am asserting that the answer to the first 
question is “No.” (2) is not true. Regarding the second question, Provisory Methodological 
Naturalism is, obviously, a form of methodological naturalism. If Provisory naturalism is 
shown to be true, then clearly methodological naturalism would not be proven false. So, it 
is not the case that methodological naturalism would be proven false if (2) is proven false. 
In addition to these two questions, there is a third, larger question related to our 
various definitions of ‘methodological naturalism’. If science can indeed pronounce on 
ontology (if Essential or Provisory Methodological Naturalism but not Intrinsic 
Methodological Naturalism are correct), then which ontology do the findings of science 
suggest? Does science suggest ontological naturalism or ontological supernaturalism? I will 
conclude this section by briefly touching on this question which will, admittedly, go largely 
unaddressed in this thesis. I will not be devoting much space here to defending a particular 
ontology using the findings of science. This is because the evaluation of arguments for and 
against the existence of scientific proof of the supernatural is largely fruitless. 
Naturalists and supernaturalists have long debated the consequences and credibility 
of scientific and pseudoscientific findings regarding the supernatural. However, little 
progress has been made towards universal acceptance of either ontological naturalism or 
supernaturalism. The non-ubiquity of naturalism may be at least partly due to the belief that 
science should never rule out the possibility of the existence of supernatural objects. Such a 
task is not only unwise, it is impossible. One can never prove with certainty that entities 
                                                             
10 The Provisory view seems to allow for the possibility of unobservable supernatural objects existing in the 
natural world while not affecting it. Thus, it allows for a conciliatory view which argues that science might 
observe some of the supernatural objects in the natural world but not all of them. However, this may be 
controversial. Some might insist that, per methodological naturalism, there are no objects in the natural 
world which science cannot observe. I will return to this idea in Section 2.5.1.    
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such as ghosts do not exist. As such, naturalism can be strongly suggested by science but 
never concluded.  
This gives some room for supernaturalism to assert itself. Some individuals may 
assume supernaturalism to be true in the absence of evidence otherwise. And this may be 
the case even if evidence of the non-existence of the supernatural is impossible to produce. 
Also, as alluded to in in the Introduction, some supernaturalists are not concerned about 
whether scientific proof exists for their beliefs. What science says about the supernatural is 
irrelevant for these believers.  
Additionally, while we noted that methodological naturalists who espouse 
ontological supernaturalism do exist, they are a decided minority. Ontological naturalism is 
by far the more popular position among methodological naturalists (although this, 
obviously, says nothing about the validity of the view). To the dismay of those involved in 
the field, parapsychology is considered a fringe discipline by mainstream science and is 
rarely taken seriously. Science, to most methodological naturalists, suggests ontological 
naturalism. And, to the extent that I must support my defense of ontological naturalism here, 
I would register my agreement with this conclusion.   
 
1.5 Conclusion 
In this opening chapter, I set out to introduce the concepts of naturalistic and 
supernaturalistic ontologies and methodologies and to analyze the relationships between 
them. This was done to discover the three viable methodology/ontology combinations or, in 
other words, the three ways in which our sets of believed-in objects might be combined with 
our methods for determining those sets.  One consequence of determining these three 
combinations is the discovery that, although a supernatural methodology requires a 
supernatural ontology, it is not the case that a naturalistic methodology requires a naturalistic 
ontology. One might believe that science is the best and only tool for discovering the 
properties of reality and what exists while still believing in supernatural objects. Following 
this discussion of methodology/ontology combinations, I then focused on naturalistic 
methodology more intently. This involved defining and discussing three varieties of 
methodological naturalism. Intrinsic and Essential Methodological Naturalism prohibit 
scientific evaluation of supernatural objects while Provisory Methodological Naturalism 
places no such restrictions on science. Because of the problems surrounding agnosticism 
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with regards to ontology and because Intrinsic Methodological Naturalism requires such 
agnosticism, I will put aside the Intrinsic version of methodological naturalism and will 
focus only on the latter two varieties: Essential and Provisory Methodological Naturalism. 
The next two chapters will be devoted to critically evaluating these two forms of 
methodological naturalism. Chapter Two will focus on the Essentialist approach and 
Chapter Three the Provisory view.11 I will examine many of the proposed strengths and 
weaknesses of each. While Essential Methodological Naturalism has many supporters 
among methodological naturalists, I ultimately conclude that this form is problematic and 
that Provisory Methodological Naturalism is the correct version of methodological 
naturalism to adopt.
                                                             
11 I will at various times use “the Essentialist view” or “Essentialism” to refer to Essential Methodological 
Naturalism and “essentialist” to refer to the naturalist who subscribes to it. Likewise, “the Provisory view” 
refers to Provisory Methodological Naturalism.   
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2. Essential Methodological Naturalism 
 
2.1 Introduction  
In the previous chapter, I sought to define three approaches to methodological naturalism: 
Intrinsic Methodological Naturalism, Essential Methodological Naturalism, and Provisory 
Methodological Naturalism. The first two forms, Intrinsic and Essential Methodological 
Naturalism are very similar. They both hold that science is restricted to evaluating only the 
natural realm. In this way, they are opposed to Provisory Methodological Naturalism which 
holds that science is not so restricted. Essential Methodological Naturalism only differs from 
the Intrinsic form in one way: It does not restrict science from pronouncing on ontology. 
Essential Methodological Naturalism very clearly holds that only natural objects exist in our 
world. Furthermore, Essentialism holds that only natural objects will ever exist in our world. 
Because this change opens up some interesting arguments, I have chosen to set aside 
Intrinsic naturalism and am focusing solely on the Essential form as the strongest challenge 
to my preferred Provisory method. Regarding Essential and Provisory Methodological 
Naturalism, I also noted that the two approaches are exhaustive with regards to the forms 
methodological naturalism can take when faced with evaluating the supernatural (1.4.4). In 
other words, the methodological naturalist considering supernatural objects must subscribe 
either to the Essentialist view that science cannot evaluate any supernatural objects or to the 
Provisory view that it is possible that science can evaluate at least some supernatural objects. 
Additionally, we can say that the two views are mutually exclusive; they cannot both 
be true. If Essential Methodological Naturalism is true, then science cannot evaluate 
supernatural objects at all. This means that Provisory Methodological Naturalism must be 
false. If the Provisory view is true, then Essential Methodological Naturalism must be false. 
For these reasons, as methodological naturalists we can make the following two 
assumptions: First, if one approach fails, then the other must be correct. Second, one of these 
views must be true. Thus, if Essential Methodological Naturalism is unjustifiable (as I will 
ultimately argue it is), then the methodological naturalist must adopt Provisory 
Methodological Naturalism. In this chapter, I will focus on arguments in support of Essential 
Methodological Naturalism. I will present five arguments which proponents of the Essential 
Methodological Naturalism might use to support their view before showing why each of 
these arguments ultimately fails. The implication is not simply that Essential 
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Methodological Naturalism is unjustifiable but also that, given the above, the alternative 
view must be correct. 
 The structure of this chapter is as follows: In Section 2.2 I will introduce the five 
arguments in support of Essential Methodological Naturalism. I call these arguments a) the 
Argument from Functionality, b) the Argument from Established Models, c) the Argument 
from Hindrance, d) the Argument from Cooperation and e) the Argument from Automatic 
Naturalization. In Section 2.3, I will offer responses to arguments (a-c), illustrating why 
they are unsuccessful in supporting the Essentialist view.  In Section 2.4, I will address d) 
the Argument from Cooperation. I will also briefly explore a flawed argument against 
Essential Methodological Naturalism. This argument holds that the Essentialist position is 
incoherent because it lends credence to supernaturalism. Finally, in Section 2.5, I will 
respond to e) the Argument from Automatic Naturalization.  
  
2.2 Five Arguments in Support of Essential Methodological Naturalism 
a) The Argument from Functionality: Despite the apparent limitations it places on 
science, Essential Methodological Naturalism is a common view among scientists and other 
methodological naturalists.1 BBB list a few reasons why this might be the case. One reason 
people might hold that science cannot evaluate supernatural objects is that, were things 
which violate laws of nature (miracles, for example) to be allowed as possibilities in our 
world, science could not adequately function (Boudry et al., 2010, p. 234–35). I take the 
procedure of “evaluation” in my definition of Essential Methodological Naturalism to 
involve the admission of possibility. So, if one conducts a scientific evaluation or 
investigation of the supernatural, one is, on some level, admitting the possibility of 
supernatural objects. But such an admission, some might argue, prevents the method of 
science from functioning adequately. Thus, the first argument in support of Essential 
Methodological Naturalism, the Argument from Functionality, holds the following: Science 
relies on the fact that the universe operates in accordance with certain laws. If we allow even 
for the possibility of a violation of those laws, then science will break down. Therefore, we 
                                                             
1 For example, see (Mahner and Bunge, 1996a). Also, in a statement included in a publication entitled Three 
Statements in Support of Teaching Evolution from Science and Science Education Organizations the 
National Science Teachers Association asserted the following: “Because science is limited to explaining the 
natural world by means of natural processes, it cannot use supernatural causation in its explanations. 
Similarly, science is precluded from making statements about supernatural forces because these are outside 




must assume that science and the supernatural are closed off from one another, i.e., that 
Essential Methodological Naturalism is true.  
b) The Argument from Established Models: This argument is similar to the previous 
one in that it too suggests that supernatural explanations are incompatible with science. 
However, the incompatibility is between supernatural explanations and scientific models of 
explanation. In 1948, Carl Hempel and Paul Oppenheim suggested that scientific 
explanations have a distinct form (Hempel and Oppenheim, 1948). All scientific 
explanations consist of a set of premises leading to a conclusion. At least one of the premises 
must state the initial conditions or, the appropriate set of physical circumstances. Another 
premise must state a natural law. A scientific explanation of datum is then attained by 
deduction from these two types of premises (Parsons, 2014, p. 139). In this way, scientific 
explanations differ from other types of explanations and more closely resemble arguments. 
Hempel and Oppenheim called this model of scientific explanation the Deductive-
Nomological (DN) model. Below is a simple example from Keith Parsons: 
Natural law: When water freezes, it expands with enormous force.  
Initial Conditions: The water in the pipes froze solid overnight.  
Conclusion: The pipes burst (Parsons, 2014, p. 139). 
Later, other models were introduced to cover perceived deficiencies in the DN model. The 
Inductive Nomological (IN) model, for example, suggests that we might infer the probable 
occurrence of the conclusion from the preceding premises. The Causal Statistical (CS) 
model holds that, by isolating the causal processes that bring about an event along with the 
physical factors statistically relevant to it, we can then understand said event (Parsons, 2014, 
p. 139). In addition to these, other models of scientific explanation, such as the Unificationist 
and Pragmatic models, were also developed.  
The problem with supernatural explanations is that they do not seem to fit into any 
of these established models of scientific explanation. For example, we cannot point to any 
laws governing supernatural things in the way that natural laws govern natural things. 
Because of this, we must rule out the DN and IN models as scientific models for supernatural 
explanations. But nor can we isolate the causal processes of supernatural objects or 
phenomena which are necessary for the CS model. What, for example, is the causal process 
by which ESP operates? The answer is unclear. Other models seem to have similar 
problems. The Argument from Established Models, therefore, holds the following: Because 
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supernatural explanations do not fit into any of the established models of scientific 
explanation, a supernatural explanation could never be a scientific one. Therefore, we must 
assume that science and the supernatural are closed off from one another, i.e., that Essential 
Methodological Naturalism is true.  
c) The Argument from Hindrance: It might be argued that should we allow for “easy” 
supernatural explanations in science, the search for natural explanations of the phenomena 
would be hindered. Rather than putting in the effort required to discover the correct natural 
cause, scientists might take the simpler route to answers (Boudry et al., 2010, p. 236–37). A 
scientist might conclude, for example, that God is the cause of some unexplainable event 
and end her research there. As a result, the correct natural explanation would never be 
discovered. Thus, the Argument from Hindrance holds that allowing science and the 
supernatural to interact would increase the likelihood of reliance on easily-generated but 
invalid supernatural explanations over difficult-to-discover but valid natural ones. 
Therefore, we must assume that science and the supernatural are closed off from one 
another, i.e., that Essential Methodological Naturalism is true. 
d) The Argument from Cooperation: This argument states, in part, that Essential 
Methodological Naturalism is a step toward fostering cooperation between two opposing 
views. Because it argues that science cannot evaluate supernatural objects, Essential 
Methodological Naturalism sets the stage for naturalists and supernaturalists to agree that 
both of their domains lie outside the critical reach of each other.2 Science acknowledges it 
is unequipped to evaluate the supernatural and supernaturalists, in turn, agree not to meddle 
with science. 3  The result is that both parties are happy: Science is shielded from 
supernaturalist criticism and supernaturalists are shielded from scientific intrusion. The 
Argument from Cooperation’s “agree to disagree” approach might be used by the 
ontological naturalist as a response to supernaturalist attempts to encroach on or misuse 
science (e.g. “I will refrain from disputing the mechanism behind creation, but you must 
refrain from insisting that valid science supports creationist theory”).  
However, because it avoids dismissing the supernatural outright, some might feel 
that the Argument from Cooperation suggests a more agnostic position with regards to 
                                                             
2 A similar division is seen in Stephen Jay Gould’s “non-overlapping magisteria” (Gould, 2002). 
3 The division between natural and supernatural may involve the separation of science and religion, such as 
in the case of mainstream science and creationism. Or it may involve the separation of science and 
pseudoscience. We see this in the case of something like Intelligent Design, which is not a science but 
masquerades as one. 
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ontological supernaturalism. Or, that it at least suggests a position that sees benefits in 
supernaturalism without necessarily subscribing to it. Thus, naturalists who feel that science 
is antithetical to the supernatural will likely not see any value in this argument. Additionally, 
the methodological naturalist who uses the Argument from Cooperation must believe that 
science being shielded from criticism in this way is worth limiting the domain of science. 
Preventing supernaturalist misuse or criticism of science must be worth restricting science 
to the natural realm. If the compromise is not worth it, then the argument fails. Therefore, 
we can say that the Argument from Cooperation, in its entirety, holds that Essential 
Methodological Naturalism fosters cooperation between the opposing views of naturalism 
and supernaturalism and that the resulting agreement is worth the limitations placed on each.  
e) The Argument from Automatic Naturalization: The final argument presented in 
this chapter for Essential Methodological Naturalism is slightly more complex than the first 
three. The Argument from Automatic Naturalization shows how, under the assumptions 
made by Essential Methodological Naturalism (traits 1 and 2), ontological naturalism can 
never be disproven in our natural world. Since science is the best and only tool for 
discovering reality and since science can only discover natural things, then it seems that no 
non-natural things can ever be discovered. This apparent unfalsifiability of ontological 
naturalism is the first, preliminary conclusion of the Argument. From that preliminary 
conclusion, the Argument then makes a secondary conclusion that Essential Methodological 
Naturalism is better for the methodological naturalist to adopt than the alternative form of 
methodological naturalism. Both conclusions will have their detractors but the latter 
conclusion is especially controversial. For example, methodological naturalists who are 
ontological supernaturalists (e.g., the previously-mentioned atheist parapsychologist) will 
surely not be swayed to the Essential view by a promise of the unfalsifiability of ontological 
naturalism. However, for the purposes of this argument, we will assume that many or most 
methodological naturalists do see the value in ontological naturalism or already identify as 
ontological naturalists.   
 The notion of the unfalsifiability of ontological naturalism is one of the core 
principles of Essential Methodological Naturalism. It is how the Essential view differs from 
the previously-discussed Intrinsic Methodological Naturalism. And because Essential 
Methodological Naturalism does not prevent science from making pronouncements on 
ontology, the Essential methodological naturalist who uses the Argument from Automatic 
Naturalization can attempt to defend an unfalsifiable ontological naturalism based on 
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scientific findings. The ability to hold ontological naturalism to be unfalsifiable obviously 
serves as a great advantage to the methodological naturalist who also happens to be an 
ontological naturalist. If ontological naturalism is unfalsifiable, no discovery of any object 
(natural or “supernatural”) could ever disprove their worldview. Thus, one assumed 
conclusion from the Argument from Automatic Naturalization for Essential Methodological 
Naturalism is that Essential Methodological Naturalism can provide an adequate response 
to any scenario in which irrefutable proof is discovered of an object or phenomenon that 
appears to be supernatural. As we shall see in the next chapter, if a Provisory methodological 
naturalist who is also an ontological naturalist is faced with a situation in which the 
supernatural is proven to exist, she seemingly must re-evaluate or relinquish her ontological 
naturalism. If God, for example, is proven to exist, it is impossible for the Provisory 
methodological naturalist to hold that only natural things exist. However, it might be argued 
that this would not be the case for the Essential methodological naturalist who is also an 
ontological naturalist. This is because of the above assumption that anything and everything 
verified by natural science must itself be natural (i.e., ontological naturalism is 
unfalsifiable). And this assumption, they claim, is valid given their argument that science is 
limited, by its very definition, in only being able to tell us about the natural world. If science 
is limited to only being able to tell us about the natural world, then everything we filter 
through the scientific method must be natural. And, since verification is part of the scientific 
process, everything we verify must, therefore, be natural. Thus, if science verifies ghosts, 
then ghosts must be natural phenomena. If science proves the existence of psi as the 
mechanism behind extra-sensory perception, as many parapsychologists claim, then psi 
itself must be natural. And if God were observed and irrefutably proven to exist, then God 
would be natural. In other words, supernatural phenomena or objects would instantly and 
automatically lose their supernatural status and become “naturalized” upon scientific 
discovery in our world, the natural world. Therefore, the Essential methodological 
naturalist, unlike the Provisory methodological naturalist, would not be forced to re-evaluate 
or relinquish her ontological naturalism should the “supernatural” be discovered. 
 Since ontological naturalists already believe that the world contains only natural 
things, the motivation for them to subscribe to this form of methodological naturalism may 
be strong. According to Essential Methodological Naturalism, anyone who agrees that 
supernatural experiences or objects involve objectively observable and verifiable elements 
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as opposed to purely subjective ones must also agree that these experiences and objects are 
not supernatural at all. Take the following quote from Barbara Forrest: 
To become more than a logical possibility, supernaturalism must be 
confirmed with unequivocal empirical evidence, and such confirmation 
would only demonstrate that this newly verified aspect of reality had all 
along never been supernatural at all, but rather a natural phenomenon which 
just awaited an appropriate scientific test (Forrest and Council for Secular 
Humanism, 2000, p. 25 cited in Boudry et al., 2010, p.231). 
Forrest’s statement is a good example of how the Argument from Automatic Naturalization 
may be used to motivate Essential Methodological Naturalism. She asserts that the 
confirmation of the existence of supernatural objects must be done using empirical evidence, 
a process I previously referred to as “verification”.4 However, according to the Essential 
methodological naturalist, confirming the evidence of the existence of a supernatural object 
only proves that the object is natural rather than supernatural. Thus, all confirmed 
supernatural objects are natural and the Essential methodological naturalist can respond to 
any real or hypothetical scenario in which the supernatural is irrefutably proven to exist 
without needing to abandon her ontological naturalism. The ability to respond in this way 
is an advantage that Essential Methodological Naturalism holds over the rival view.    
 
2.3 Responses to the Arguments from Functionality, Established Models, and 
Hindrance 
BBB are opposed to the Intrinsic form of methodological naturalism and have offered a few 
arguments against that view. Given the similarities between Intrinsic and Essential 
Methodological Naturalism, many of their responses to Intrinsic Methodological Naturalism 
can also be used as responses to Essential Methodological Naturalism. For example, BBB 
offer some objections to the first two arguments discussed above (Boudry et al., 2010, p. 
234–35). Regarding the Argument from Functionality, the argument that science cannot 
function in the face of supernatural possibility, they make two claims. The first is a general 
claim (similar to Hume’s claim, noted above) that we cannot say that supernatural objects 
                                                             
4 I hold the term “evidence” to have the meaning ascribed to it by Forrest et al.  Roughly, evidence is 
empirical data which is used to determine the validity of beliefs, hypotheses and propositions.  I hold a claim 
to be “evaluable” or “testable” if there can be, following Martin Mahler and Mario Bunge, “evidence of 
whatever kind for or against a claim” (Mahner and Bunge, 1996b, p. 11, cited in Fishman, 2007, p. 816). 
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or phenomena are a priori impossible. We can never prove with certainty that only natural 
things exist. In evaluating the possibility of the supernatural, we can make probability claims 
based, in part, on experience but these can never jump to absolute certainty. This first 
response leads directly into their second argument which is that we have no reason to believe 
all of science will collapse should one of these supernatural phenomena be proven valid. 
Certain convictions scientists hold may need to be abandoned and entire scientific fields 
may even need to be restructured were this to be the case. However, this does not mean that 
science would be destroyed. We would be even more confident in this conclusion if the 
supernatural phenomenon were innately restricted in such a way that it did not affect 
experimentation and the scientific process in other areas. For example, if extra-sensory 
perception was shown to be real but the mechanism behind it was limited so that it would 
not affect the acquisition of knowledge from scientific experimentation in, say geology. If 
this were the case, there is no reason to think that the entire scientific enterprise would 
collapse.  
These responses to the Argument from Functionality have their merits. The first 
Humean point, that we can never disprove the possibility of the supernatural, is the basis for 
the alternative form of methodological naturalism that I will later endorse. The second point, 
that science is resilient enough to withstand the existence of the supernatural, is also well 
made. Even if the discovery of, say, extrasensory perception would have ramifications, in 
some perhaps non-obvious way, on every area of science (chemistry, astronomy, the social 
sciences including anthropology and archeology, etc.), this does not mean that all of science 
would collapse. If the point of the scientific process is the acquisition of knowledge, then 
the scientific enterprise might still be said to function so long as it provides new information. 
And nothing suggests that we could not still glean information using the scientific method 
after the discovery of, say, ESP. Additionally, even if violations of natural laws were to 
occur as the direct result of the actions of an agent who stands outside those laws, it seems 
that nothing would prevent us from scientifically studying the motivations of said actions 
or working to understand the behavior of the agent.  
While we can respond to the Argument from Functionality by suggesting that 
science is not as fragile as some might think, we can respond to the Argument from 
Established Models by suggesting that science may not be as limited as some might think. 
Recall that the Argument from Established Models held that science cannot evaluate the 
supernatural because none of the established scientific models are compatible with 
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supernatural explanations. Because supernatural explanations are incompatible with these 
models, Essentialism must be true. It is the case that the standard models do not lend 
themselves to supernatural explanations. We cannot explain God or God’s actions using DN 
model, for example. However, we cannot assume that the standard models we are familiar 
with today are exhaustive. It is possible that we will someday discover an alternative model 
of scientific explanation which does cover the supernatural. And given that such a possibility 
exists, we cannot say, unequivocally, that science and the supernatural must be closed off 
from each other.      
Finally, we return to the Argument from Hindrance which held that supernatural 
explanations hinder or interfere with the scientific method by providing easy answers to 
tough scientific questions. BBB argue that even though resorting to God as an explanation 
for an unexplained phenomenon may be the easiest route intellectually to an answer (i.e., 
requires the least amount of effort), this alone does not make that explanation incorrect. It 
may be that God is both the easiest explanation and the correct one (Boudry et al., 2010, p. 
236–37). I am, again, inclined to agree with them on this point. However, I think we can go 
further and question the likelihood of a situation in which a scientist, even an ontological 
supernaturalist scientist, gives up the search for naturalistic answers to the tough questions 
by appealing to easy supernatural answers. As Gillian Barker and Phillip Kitcher note, it is 
always possible that the ontological supernaturalist scientist herself holds that the 
assumption of supernatural explanations for mysterious events is a dangerous or 
unjustifiable move (Barker and Kitcher, 2013, p. 69).  
Additionally, while it is true that fully adopting a supernatural explanation for a 
phenomenon would prevent adopting a scientific one, this does not mean that fully adopting 
a supernatural explanation would prevent further scientific inquiry. The adoption of a 
supernatural explanation may only be temporary; something to be ratified upon discovery 
of further evidence but not something which prevents further investigation. With this in 
mind, we can conclude the following: The most an Essential methodological naturalist can 
claim is that a supernatural explanation might prevent further inquiry. She cannot state with 




2.4 Responses to the Argument from Cooperation 
Recall that the Argument from Cooperation holds that Essential Methodological Naturalism 
ostensibly allows for agreement between naturalists and supernaturalists over the domain of 
science. Both parties can agree that science cannot evaluate supernatural objects. Besides 
showing an admirable willingness to engage their opponents’ view, Essential 
methodological naturalists might argue that their approach also implies that the courtesy 
extends both ways; supernaturalists must, in turn, refrain from evaluating science. Essential 
methodological naturalists might see this as beneficial cooperation with supernaturalists and 
an advantage of adopting the Essentialist view. According to this Argument from 
Cooperation, the self-imposed limitation by Essential methodological naturalists on science, 
the restriction of science to the natural realm, is worth the resulting compromise. I will now 
provide a few responses to this argument. My first two responses, while perhaps initially 
credible, suffer problems. The third is, I believe, somewhat stronger. All three of the 
responses address the core assertion of the argument, that the limitation of science is 
worthwhile.  
 The first response to the Argument from Cooperation is that there is no justifiable 
reason to limit the scope of science and that, by doing so, Essential Methodological 
Naturalism is contradictory. In the next chapter, I will argue for the validity of the opposing 
form of methodological naturalism which assumes the possibility of the supernatural. As a 
Provisory methodological naturalist who accepts the possibility of the supernatural in the 
actual world, I argue that limiting science to the natural realm constitutes a real, if currently 
only theoretical, restriction to scientific inquiry. Given the assumption that the supernatural 
could possibly exist, it would be bad if science was prevented from studying existing 
supernatural objects or phenomena. There is no justifiable reason why it should be restricted 
from doing so. There is, in other words, no reason why science should be able to study 
nature but not supernature. Or why it should be allowed to examine animals, for example, 
but not ghosts. And given this acceptance of the possibility of the supernatural, we might 
then say that the assumptions made by Essential Methodological Naturalism are 
contradictory. It is not possible that a methodology can be (1) the “best and only” tool for 
discovering the properties of reality when it is simultaneously limited by (2), an inability to 
evaluate a theoretical aspect of said reality, namely the non-natural. A methodology cannot 
really be the best tool for discovering reality when it foregoes any evaluation of certain, 
albeit theoretical, elements of reality. The second assumption (2) undermines the first. 
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 But there are problems with this line of reasoning. This first response has it that the 
Essential methodological naturalist’s science would refuse to evaluate any existing 
supernatural object. It would examine animals but refrain from examining ghosts. However, 
strictly speaking, the Essentialist does not really limit science at all in terms of the possible 
objects it can observe and evaluate. Recall the previous discussion regarding the Argument 
from Automatic Naturalization (2.2). Essential methodological naturalists would be happy 
to accept the observation by scientists of objects or phenomena classified as “supernatural”. 
Should such objects be discovered by science, Essentialists would surely assert that they 
exist. Essentialists are simply opposed to the idea that such objects would be classified as 
supernatural post-discovery. Here we are distinguishing between an existence claim (‘God 
exists’) and a classification claim (‘God is supernatural’). If God, for example, were 
discovered to exist, that entity would no longer be classified as supernatural, according to 
the Essentialist. Instead, God would then be thought of as natural. The Essential 
methodological naturalist is never going to say that science cannot discover God. She will 
just say that science cannot discover a supernatural God. So, it is incorrect to assert that the 
Essential methodological naturalist’s science would be unable to evaluate the phenomenon 
itself.  
The second response we might give against the Argument from Cooperation is that 
limiting the scope of science may inadvertently lend credence to ontological 
supernaturalism. It may be that the very act of science restricting itself to the natural world 
suggests a domain of reality beyond science’s purview. In other words, by limiting science 
in this way, Essential Methodological Naturalism lends credence to the existence of a reality 
beyond the restrictions. The terms ‘limited’ or ‘restricted’ can be used in many ways. One 
way they are used is to refer to a complete finite quantity on its own with nothing outside 
its boundaries. However, these terms can also be used to refer to a complete finite quantity 
confined within its boundaries, beyond which other things exist. In our case, we can assume 
the latter connotation and hold that science ends where another domain begins. Beyond the 
limited realm of science lies the domain of the supernatural. Essential Methodological 
Naturalism, therefore, seems to confirm what ontological supernaturalists already believe: 
science can tell us much about the natural world, but it is unable to tell us about everything 
that exists.  
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Consider the following statement from BBB (In the original text, they discuss this 
issue in relation to Intrinsic Methodological Naturalism. However, the same might be said 
for the alternative Essential view): 
In the writings of theists, a defense of Intrinsic Methodological Naturalism 
is typically accompanied by the suggestion that there is more between heaven 
and earth than is dreamt of in naturalist philosophy. This claim is not shared 
by atheistic defenders of Intrinsic Methodological Naturalism, but one has to 
admit that it is a natural extension of it. In their polite reluctance to offend 
religious sensibilities, atheist defenders of Intrinsic Methodological 
Naturalism have bought into a philosophical view that inadvertently suggests 
that religion is a more powerful source of knowledge than science. After all, 
from the claim that science is ‘‘restricted’’ to the natural domain, it is but a 
small step to the conclusion that only religion can offer us deep knowledge 
about the world (Boudry et al., 2012, p. 1158). 
So, ontological supernaturalists can take advantage of the limitation (the “polite 
reluctance”) imposed by Intrinsic and Essential Methodological Naturalism to suggest a 
reality (“more between heaven and earth”) beyond the domain of science. And so, it appears 
that Essential Methodological Naturalism lends a certain credence to ontological 
supernaturalism. If the reasoning in this response is valid, it would mean that ontological 
naturalists seemingly cannot be Essential methodological naturalists. Essential 
methodological naturalism would suggest ontological supernaturalism, not naturalism. It 
would also mean that these confused Essentialist ontological naturalists cannot claim that 
the self-imposed limitation of science through Essential Methodological Naturalism is 
worthwhile as the Argument from Cooperation would have it. A limitation which leads to a 
consequence this dire for the Essentialist sympathetic to ontological naturalism could never 
be worthwhile. 
But adoption of Essential Methodological Naturalism could never lead to 
ontological supernaturalism. Along with the previously-noted acceptance of unfalsifiable 
ontological naturalism, it is logically necessary that Essential methodological naturalists be 
ontological naturalists. Therefore, this second response to the Argument from Cooperation 




(1) Science is the best and only method for discovering the properties of reality and 
what exists (Trait 1).  
(2) Science is not equipped to evaluate supernatural objects. (Trait 2). 
These are the beliefs every Essential naturalist must hold. We can now try to pair these 
beliefs with a supernatural ontology: 
(3) Supernatural things exist. 
The problem is that it is unclear, given (1) and (2), how an Essential methodological 
naturalist could ever come to hold (3). While Essential Methodological Naturalism does not 
place restrictions on the type or number of objects science can discover, it does prevent 
discovered objects from being classified as supernatural. Therefore, if the Essential 
methodological naturalist were to say that science proves the existence of truly supernatural 
things, this would contradict (2). But if she says that some method other than science assures 
her of the existence of supernatural things then this would contradict (1). Thus, the Essential 
methodological naturalist could never have justification for holding the belief that truly 
supernatural objects exist. 5  However, if we replace (3) with ontological naturalism, 
according to which only natural things exist, then there are no such contradictions with these 
two assumptions. The notion that only natural things exist can theoretically be justified by 
the method of science. Such justification does not contradict the assertion that science is the 
best and only method for discovering reality or the assertion that science is not equipped to 
evaluate supernatural objects. So, Essential Methodological Naturalism itself is logically 
incompatible with the belief that ontological supernaturalism is true. Essential 
Methodological Naturalism, in other words, requires ontological naturalism. And thus, any 
argument which suggests that Essential Methodological Naturalism supports ontological 
supernaturalism fails. 
         To be fair, BBB never explicitly state that Intrinsic or Essential Methodological 
Naturalism requires ontological supernaturalism. They only suggest, as this second response 
does, that restricting science to the natural realm (Trait 2) lends ontological supernaturalism 
credence. And, again, it should be noted that their original statement pertains to Intrinsic 
Methodological Naturalism, not Essential Methodological Naturalism. My 
                                                             
 5 Some might suggest that the Essential methodological naturalist might maintain ontological 
supernaturalism without justification but this seems unsatisfactory. Few theists, for example, would say that 
they have no reason for believing in God. Most cite either empirical or spiritual reasons or a mixture of both.  
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counterargument (that, by logical necessity, the Essentialist can never be an ontological 
supernaturalist) requires a commitment to trait (1) to go through. Essential Methodological 
Naturalism assumes (1). However, Intrinsic naturalism does not explicitly assume (1). 
Because of this, it is possible that this second response does work against the Intrinsic view. 
In other words, it may be that Intrinsic Methodological Naturalism does lend credence to 
the existence of the supernatural. At least, my response above offers no evidence to the 
contrary. 
That said, given the incompatibility of Essential Methodological Naturalism with 
ontological supernaturalism, theists could never endorse or defend Essential 
Methodological Naturalism and its restriction of science to the natural realm. The theist 
belief in a supernatural God directly conflicts with the two major assumptions of Essential 
Methodological Naturalism noted above. A theist could never defend or endorse Essential 
Methodological Naturalism in its entirety, meaning both (1) and (2). It seems that, at most, 
she could choose to adopt the “restriction” element, or (2), on its own.6 
It is because of this incompatibility that this second response, like the first, fails to 
adequately address the Argument from Cooperation and thus fails to provide a reason to 
dismiss Essential Methodological Naturalism. However, there is a third (and, I believe, 
stronger) response which calls into question the feasibility of the Argument from 
Cooperation. This response focuses on the fact that the dividing line between 
methodological naturalism and methodological supernaturalism to be agreed upon by the 
two parties, the line which both naturalists and supernaturalists promise not to cross, is 
problematically vague. Later I will touch on the problem of demarcation in the philosophy 
of science. This is the problem of determining a rule or system by which to distinguish 
science from non-science or pseudoscience. Coming up with a concrete method by which 
to make this distinction has proven exceedingly difficult. Until a valid demarcation method 
is determined, any attempt to draw the line between the natural method of science and other 
supernatural methods will always be imprecise. The Argument from Cooperation is 
problematic in that it wrongly assumes that a clear distinction between science and non-
science can always be made. The Argument holds that non-science can definitively 
                                                             
6 Evan Fales takes a similar position in (Fales, 2010, pp.1-2). There he makes the salient points that theists 
should shun the Essential Methodological Naturalist approach (prohibiting the scientific evaluation of the 
supernatural) because it completely devalues natural theology (theology which depends on reason or 
experience rather than divine revelation). Also, Essentialism does not allow for any Christian-centered 
science of the sort advocated by Alvin Plantinga (Plantinga, 1997) and others. 
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segregate itself from science and vice-versa. But science cannot rightfully be shielded from 
all pseudoscientific criticism or only pseudoscientific criticism (as opposed to other 
scientific criticism) unless a determination can be made as to which criticism is and is not 
scientific. Because such a determination cannot be made, the Argument from Cooperation 
fails. 
At this point, the Essentialist might demur and argue that Essential Methodological 
Naturalism remains valid because it fosters cooperation between two self-identified camps 
(naturalists and supernaturalists). While it may be true that science and pseudoscience 
cannot be definitively distinguished, there is enough agreement among the participants as 
to their respective group to at least justify the Argument. The naturalists who identify as 
naturalists can refrain from commenting on the methodology of the supernaturalists who 
identify as such and vice-versa. This is a valid point. However, it is important to keep in 
mind the considerable number of supernaturalists (among them, creationists in the guise of 
Intelligent Design proponents) who want their supernatural methodology classified as 
natural science. These participants “muddy the waters” by making the process of 
distinguishing science from non-science that much more difficult. Most scientists would 
argue that Intelligent Design advocates do not belong in their camp. The advocates, though, 
often argue otherwise. With enough such disagreement, differentiation between natural and 
supernatural methods would become impossible and cooperation would be limited.    
Essential methodological naturalists who want to use the Argument from 
Cooperation will, therefore, need to work to defuse the demarcation problem. One viable 
way to do this may be the following: Instead of drawing the line solely on an imprecise 
natural/supernatural distinction, Essential naturalists should draw the line between a  natural 
methodology which is supported by detailed theories and supernatural methodologies which 
are not. Scientists, working with a method that is supported by theories, can then neglect to 
comment on methods that are not so supported and vice-versa. As an example, let us return 
methodological naturalist’s assertion that what the creationist does is not science but is 
instead religion. Creation science, according to Essentialists who employ the Argument 
from Cooperation, should be restricted from being classified as scientific just as geology 
and evolutionary biology should not rightfully be classified as religions. Under the original 
Argument, this divide appears to be based solely on creation science’s supernatural 
associations. But, while it is true that creation science is not a science, its lack of scientific 
standing is the result of the fact that it lacks a detailed and systematic theory concerning its 
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subject of study (the Creator). 7 It is not a non-science simply because it references the 
supernatural. The field of creation science could, theoretically, someday become a genuine 
science. But to qualify it would need to produce a reliable and concrete theory (or theories) 
which incorporates a Creator. Such a theory should work to provide creation science with a 
certain amount of independence from other sciences. A scientific creationist methodology 
should not need to rely on gaps in other sciences such as biology or archeology to prove its 
own validity. Finally, the theory should suggest experimental approaches (i.e., make 
predictions) and produce repeatable results. Were it to produce such a theory, then it seems 
that creation science should be considered a legitimate science.8 The same holds true for 
parapsychology.9 The point here is that any classification of a theory or field as scientific or 
non-scientific should be based on the above criteria (along with, possibly, some other 
considerations, such as its falsifiability) and not simply on its association with the 
supernatural. The Argument from Cooperation fails to take this into account and, thus, fails 
as an argument against Essential Methodological Naturalism. 
 
2.5 Responses to the Argument from Automatic Naturalization 
The Argument from Automatic Naturalization for Essential Methodological Naturalism 
holds that Essential Methodological Naturalism provides a benefit which alternative forms 
of Methodological Naturalism do not. The advantage it holds is that Essential 
methodological naturalists (who, as we noted, must also be ontological naturalists) need not 
abandon or re-evaluate their ontological naturalism should “supernatural” objects be 
discovered. Because science discovers only natural objects, if it should discover an object 
formally deemed supernatural, we can state with confidence that the object is in fact natural. 
The notion that all observed objects (i.e., objects verified scientifically) must be natural 
implies that ontological naturalism is unfalsifiable, at least in our world. In this section, I 
will detail two responses to the Argument from Automatic Naturalization. 
                                                             
7 Many people distinguish creationism from Intelligent Design by holding the former to be a theistic view 
and the latter to be a secular one. Others disagree and argue that Intelligent Design presupposes theism (Edis 
and Boudry, 2014; Forrest and Gross, 2007). My own view falls in the latter camp. Regardless, the argument 
here applies equally to both as neither qualify as science. 
8 Admittedly, this gets tricky. Should the supernatural objects or phenomena being studied by the sciences of 
creationism or parapsychology be proven valid, we would need to avoid automatically classifying them as 
natural. I will address why this is the case in the next section.   
9 Paul Churchland argues that parapsychology is non-scientific because it lacks any theories about what the 
nonmaterial mind might consist of or what laws might govern it (Churchland, 1987, p. 312).  
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 Recall that the Argument from Automatic Naturalization offers two conclusions. 
The first conclusion, touched on above, is that ontological naturalism is unfalsifiable. The 
second conclusion is that, because Essential Methodological Naturalism allows for 
unfalsifiable ontological naturalism, it is preferable to the rival form of methodological 
naturalism. My two responses to this argument will each address one of these conclusions. 
My first response holds that unfalsifiable ontological naturalism is not possible given the 
fact that there could be existing but undiscoverable supernatural objects. In other words, 
undiscoverable supernatural objects are an ontological possibility. So, contrary to the first 
conclusion above, unfalsifiable ontological naturalism cannot be true. My second response 
is that unfalsifiability is not an advantageous trait for a theory to hold. Rather, a falsifiable 
theory is always preferred. So, a form of methodological naturalism which touts the 
unfalsifiability of a theory cannot be advantageous.  
In fairness, some might think this second response is too easy. Obviously, 
unfalsifiability is not an advantageous trait of a theory, they might argue. While it may be 
that unfalsifiable theories are not inherently problematic, it is still a stretch for anyone to 
assume that unfalsifiability is a positive trait. Since the Argument from Automatic 
Naturalization assumes that unfalsifiability is advantageous, that argument is obviously 
flawed. It is simply not clear that anyone would subscribe to the idea that unfalsifiability is 
advantageous. And if most believe that unfalsifiability is not an advantageous trait, it would 
seem that the Argument from Automatic Naturalization is something of a straw man.  
Certain Essential methodological naturalists, perhaps including Barbara Forrest 
(quoted above), may believe that the unfalsifiability of a theory does not count as an 
advantage. I do not want to assume that all Essentialists would adopt the Argument from 
Automatic Naturalization as formulated. However, I feel justified in presenting (and 
responding to) the argument here because we have seen how Essentialist views like Forrest’s 
motivate unfalsifiable ontological naturalism. The second conclusion of the Argument (that 
unfalsifiable ontological naturalism is an advantage) may indeed be controversial and not 
shared by all Essential methodological naturalists. But, at the same time, it does not 
contradict the Essentialist view. Therefore, those Essentialists who do agree with the notion 
of unfalsifiability being an advantageous trait may use the Argument. Finally, if they can 
use the Argument, then defending falsifiability as a requirement for a good scientific theory 





2.5.1 First Response to the Argument from Automatic Naturalization 
We may formally present the Argument from Automatic Naturalization in the following 
way: 
(1) Science is not equipped to evaluate supernatural objects (Trait 2). 
(2) Given (1), whatever is shown to exist via scientific methods must be 
natural (Even if science were to prove the existence of purportedly 
supernatural objects, those objects would be natural rather than 
supernatural). 
(3) Science is the best and only method for discovering the properties of 
reality and what exists. (Trait 1) 
Therefore, 
(4) Given (2) and (3) ontological naturalism (the thesis that only natural 
things exist) cannot be disproven in our world. 
Also, 
(5) Given (4), Essential Methodological Naturalism is the best form for the 
methodological naturalist (especially a methodological naturalist who is also 
an ontological naturalist) to hold. 
The preliminary conclusion (4) of the Argument from Automatic Naturalization is that 
ontological naturalism cannot be falsified in our world. The limitation of “in our world” 
here is important. The Essential methodological naturalist should, at the very least, limit 
their claim by holding that the unfalsifiability of ontological naturalism is only contingently 
true. It is not necessarily true in all possible worlds. Again, Essential Methodological 
Naturalism does not hold that truly supernatural objects (as opposed to incorrectly classified 
natural objects) cannot or do not exist in any possible world. It simply holds that they do 
not exist in the natural world. This leaves open the possibility of the truly supernatural 
existing in a world outside the natural world and beyond all possible observance or 
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detection.10 Coupled with the formal conclusion of (4) is the assumed conclusion of (5). (5) 
states that (4) provides Essential methodological naturalists with an advantage over rival 
methodological naturalists. Again, her ontological naturalism can never be proven wrong.  
 But even if (3) above is true and science is the best and only method for discovering 
reality and what exists, science may still be deficient; It may be that science cannot discover 
everything that exists. In other words, there may be existing undiscoverable objects in our 
world. Such objects would not simply be things which we have evidence for but cannot 
observe, like quarks. Rather, they would be objects which we cannot observe or even have 
evidence for. If it is ontologically possible that such unobservable objects exist in our world, 
then we cannot say that ontological naturalism is unfalsifiable in our world given that some 
or all of these unobservable objects might be non-natural. So, for the above Argument from 
Automatic Naturalization to work, an additional premise is required. This would be the 
premise that science is able to discover all objects or, that there are no undiscoverable 
objects in our world. For ontological naturalism to be unfalsifiably true, it must be the case 
that such a premise is correct. 
 Given the assumptions the Essentialist makes, can she reasonably assert this 
premise? I think she can. The premise that science is exhaustive can reasonably follow from 
the original methodological naturalism thesis (“Science is the best and only method for 
discovering reality, etc.”) that both the Essential and Provisory naturalist hold. However, 
the premise only follows from that thesis if we take the thesis to imply that reality is only 
what science says. If the thesis implies that some elements of reality cannot be known by 
science, then the premise does not follow. To clarify this last point, we need to pull the 
methodological naturalism thesis apart somewhat.  
The methodological naturalism thesis can be interpreted in two different ways. First, 
the thesis can be taken to mean that (a) science is the best and only source of knowledge 
about reality but that some of reality consists of (or may consist of) elements which cannot 
be known by science. Science is the best and only method, but some parts of reality will 
nevertheless remain outside of scientific understanding. In this case, being the “best and 
only method” does not require science to be exhaustive.  Alternatively, the methodological 
naturalism thesis can be taken to mean that (b) reality is only what science says. Only 
                                                             
10 BBB also seem to suggest something along these lines (Boudry et al., 2010, p. 232). However, some 
disagree. Yonatan Fishman argues that there is no way to confidently classify “inaccessible entities (entities 
that will forever lack observable consequences)” as supernatural rather than natural (Fishman, 2007, p. 826).  
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elements described by the sciences exist. In this case, being the “best and only method” does 
require science to be exhaustive. The reason why the Essentialist feels confident in asserting 
the premise that science is exhaustive is that this premise does indeed reasonably follow 
from the thesis if one uses interpretation (b). If reality is only what science says, then science 
observes everything that exists in our world. There are no unobservable objects.  
It is this assumption that leads to the Essentialist’s unfalsifiable ontological 
naturalism. Science observes everything in our world and everything observed is natural. 
Thus, ontological naturalism is unfalsifiable. The Provisory naturalist, meanwhile, should 
look to avoid interpretation (b). She does not want to hold that reality is only what science 
says. Rather, she should take the methodological naturalism thesis to mean (a); Certain 
elements of reality cannot be known by or, reduced to scientific theory. Doing this allows 
the Provisory naturalist to avoid certain problems such as scientism which I will discuss in 
Chapter Seven.        
So, the Essentialist can reasonably assert the premise that science is exhaustive given 
the assumptions of methodological naturalism. However, we can still question whether the 
premise is correct. I would argue that it is far from certain that such a premise is correct. For 
one thing, an object being undiscoverable simply means that it is impossible to prove its 
existence (or non-existence)! Undiscoverable objects, by definition, cannot be evaluated 
through natural means and so we could never say that there are no such objects. 
Furthermore, we must acknowledge that the things human beings can discover or observe 
using science may be limited. Science itself is a human-created methodology. And we 
ourselves have limitations as a result of our evolutionary history. Therefore, science too has 
limitations. It is reasonable to assume that there may be things that a human-created method 
like science cannot observe.  
In addition to these issues, the Essential naturalist has another problem. In effect, 
what she is doing here is asserting the non-existence of non-observable objects. But, 
unfortunately for her, all she can do is assert. She can never prove their non-existence. 
Proving non-existence is, generally, extremely difficult and maybe even impossible. The 
chances of proving the non-existence of a thing are lower than the chances of proving the 
existence of a thing, even when that thing is extremely unlikely. For example, proving that 
Santa Claus exists would only require the production of satisfactory evidence of his 
existence. This is difficult but not, on the face of it, impossible. However, proving that Santa 
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Claus does not exist is seemingly impossible. For the naturalist, the chances of proving the 
existence of things like Santa Claus, ghosts, and God are extremely low. But as low as these 
chances are, they are still not as low as the chances of disproving these things. What, exactly, 
would even be satisfactory proof of the non-existence of Santa Claus? One cannot say.   
In the case of non-observable objects, the chances of their discovery are nil. As noted 
above, these types of objects are by definition impossible to discover. However, just like the 
examples given above, proving the non-existence of unobservable objects is also 
impossible. Like Santa Claus, there can be no satisfactory evidence for the non-existence of 
unobservable objects. What all of this means is that, even though naturalists often assume it 
to be the case, we cannot unequivocally say that there are no undiscoverable objects in our 
world. And because the Argument from Automatic Naturalization neglects to take this into 
account, its preliminary conclusion fails. 
 Despite all this, the Essential methodological naturalist may still argue that 
unobservable objects are impossible in our world. Perhaps being observable in the sense 
that an object directly or indirectly supplies evidence for its existence is simply a necessary 
condition for being an object. All objects are observable via some means. Their very 
existence affects their environment in ways that are measurable. So, while it is obviously 
true that current science is unable to observe evidence for the existence of undiscovered 
objects, there are strong reasons to reject the idea that said evidence could be unobtainable 
or that science is incapable of ever discovering certain objects. For one thing, future science 
will surely be able to make observations which current science is incapable of. What seems 
to be beyond the scope of science now may be common scientific practice in the future. At 
least such has proven to be true in the past. Thus, we might conclude that, given enough 
time, science can indeed discover all objects. But even if human beings fail and future 
science does not make those observations, leaving some object or objects unobserved, what 
matters is that science could have observed the objects. Even if scientists fail to connect the 
dots and find the evidence leading to discovery, all objects in our world do supply it, one 
way or another. Thus, there can be no unobservable objects and the argument for automatic 
naturalization and Essentialism is supported. 
The problem with this response is that being able to supply evidence for existence is 
not necessarily a requirement for all objects. If it is a requirement at all, it is likely only a 
requirement for natural objects. There is no reason to assume that supernatural objects 
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would be under such constraints. It may be that being unobservable in every sense ensures 
that an object is not a natural object, but it does not ensure that the object does not exist. If 
supernatural objects are not required to supply evidence for their existence in this way, then 
there may be non-observable objects in the natural realm. And if there are such objects, then 
ontological naturalism is not unfalsifiable in the natural realm and the first conclusion made 
by the Argument from Automatic Naturalization is false. The Provisory methodological 
naturalist, therefore, will want to say that there is no a priori restriction on science that 
prevents it from examining truly supernatural objects (i.e., genuine supernatural objects as 
opposed to incorrectly classified natural objects). No inherent property of the scientific 
practice prevents it from evaluating the supernatural. At the same time, the Provisory 
naturalist should remember that some or all supernatural objects, should they exist, might 
simply be unevaluable by any method, natural or supernatural.  
 
2.5.2 Second Response to the Argument from Automatic Naturalization 
The second conclusion made from the Argument from Automatic Naturalization is that 
because Essential Methodological Naturalism touts unfalsifiable ontological naturalism, it 
is a better form of methodological naturalism to adopt than its rival. I will now respond to 
this conclusion by arguing that falsifiability is a requirement for any theory to be scientific. 
Because Essential Methodological Naturalism assumes ontological naturalism to be 
unfalsifiable, it fails as a scientific theory. As a result, any argument for it, including the 
Argument from Automatic Naturalization, also fails. The brand of falsifiability I will 
endorse is a modified version of Karl Popper’s original falsifiability theory (Popper, 2002). 
The notion of falsifiability was first introduced by Popper in the 1960s. Since then, 
it has been considered by many to be a hallmark of any good scientific theory. Popper argued 
that the method for differentiating between a proper scientific theory and a non-proper one 
(or, for demarcating science from non-science) was to analyze whether the theory in 
question could theoretically be proven false. If it could, then that theory was acceptable as 
proper science. If it could not be falsified, then the theory was not proper science and should 
be discarded. An oft-cited example of an unfalsifiable theory is the practice of astrology. 
Many people argue that astrology is not a science because its practitioners do not make solid 
predictions which, should they fail to be realized, would lead to the falsification of the 
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theory. Popper’s criterion here is clear and easy to implement. It relies on the valid 
assumption that a true science should be willing to stringently test its claims.    
We see the importance of falsifiability to a theory when we consider a brand of 
specious reasoning that pseudoscientists employ in response to the general lack of evidence 
supporting their own claims. Specifically, these pseudoscientists utilize questionable ad hoc 
hypotheses to explain experimental failures. One example of this is the “experimenter 
effect” in which the experimenters’ own “psi”, or paranormal ability, is said to adversely 
affect the testing procedure (Blackmore, 1986). Blame for failures is also sometimes laid on 
the “actively evasive” nature of psi. Such evasiveness allegedly stems from the idea that 
psi’s primary function is to “induce a sense of mystery and wonder” (Kennedy, 2003, p. 67). 
These blatant attempts to dissociate one’s theory from conflicting data are not tolerated 
under a falsifiability criterion. Under such a criterion, contradictory evidence discovered 
during experimentation is considered a counter-example to the theory. As a result, the theory 
itself is discarded. It seems right that one of the requirements for a scientific theory would 
be that it does not consist of ad hoc supplemental arguments to explain evidential failure. 
Falsifiability guarantees that this requirement is met. 
Some might respond that, while falsifiability is indeed useful in highlighting such 
questionable reasoning, usefulness alone is not enough to establish falsifiability as a valid 
demarcation criterion. However, I would argue that the exact opposite is the case. One of 
the most important reasons we recognize certain theories to be true is because they are 
useful. A true hypothesis primarily works to help us solve a problem (Such a problem might 
consist, minimally, of the question of whether the given theory is true or false). Therefore, 
falsifiability’s usefulness as a hypothesis which helps to facilitate demarcation actually 
suggests it to be scientific. Furthermore, if falsification is indeed a requirement for a solid 
scientific theory, then Essential Methodological Naturalism, like astrology, fails as science. 
I believe that this is indeed the case. However, there are some considerations.     
 To begin with, not everyone believes that unfalsifiable naturalism is a mistake. Some 
philosophers explicitly assume that naturalism is inviolable. For example, Alistair 
McKinnon, in response to the proposed existence of violation miracles (events which violate 
the laws of nature), argued that laws of nature are inherently inviolable (McKinnon, 1967). 
McKinnon believed that if a “law” is verified as broken, then it was never a true law of 
nature. Or, it may be that the event which appears to break a law of nature is simply an 
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undiscovered law of nature itself.11 A man walking on water may be taking advantage of an 
unknown law of nature which somehow allows a human body to traverse the surface of a 
body of water without sinking, for example. By McKinnon’s reasoning, nothing which 
occurs in our natural world could ever violate a law of nature. Natural laws govern 
everything and, thus, naturalism is simply and incontrovertibly true.  
However, this view cannot be correct. Unless we can conclusively prove that the 
supernatural cannot exist in our natural world we cannot exclude the possibility that a 
violation of laws of nature can occur. And it is likely that few people will admit that the 
supernatural has been proven to be non-existent in our world. Anyone who states that it has 
been proven that the various laws of nature have never been violated is misinformed, to say 
the least. No such proof exists.12 Therefore, we are never justified in claiming that violation 
miracles are impossible. Translating this to the naturalism case, we must take it that the only 
hypotheses which are beyond the scope of science should be hypotheses which are simply 
untestable. Supernatural hypotheses should not qualify as untestable and, thus, should not 
be dismissed outright. For this reason, it is wrong to declare naturalism by fiat. And because 
the Argument from Automatic Naturalization in support of Essential Methodological 
Naturalism requires acceptance of this declaration, that argument fails. 
 To be fair, McKinnon’s view assumes naturalism to be unfalsifiable but it does not 
explicitly argue against the doctrine of falsifiability. His view is not a direct attack on 
Popper’s view. Others, however, have raised specific problems with falsifiability itself.13 
And Massimo Pigliucci argues that the real world is not so black and white as to allow for 
Popper’s edict that any theory which fails the falsification test must be abandoned. We can 
easily imagine counterexamples to various claims which should not cause the original claim 
to be thrown out (Pigliucci, 2012, p. 3). The theory that “Elephants are grey”, for example, 
should not be discarded if we happen to discover a rare albino pachyderm. A single non-
grey exception should not lead to the entire theory being dismissed. This is a salient point 
and serves to illuminate a flaw in Popper’s rather strict defense of falsifiability.  
                                                             
11 For an alternative account of laws which allows for exceptions see (Braddon-Mitchell, 2001). 
12 Importantly, the acquisition of proof here must equate to the gaining of knowledge and not to the gaining 
of mere belief. A naturalist may be justified in her belief that the supernatural does not exist, based on the 
lack of evidence for the supernatural, but she cannot say that she knows that the supernatural does not exist 
or that the supernatural is impossible. 
13 See (Lakatos, 1970; Pigliucci, 2012; Quine, 1951; Thagard, 1978). 
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Additionally, an element of Popper’s argument appears to conflict with assumptions 
I have already made and will return to in the next chapter. Since this conflict will require 
me to qualify my endorsement of falsifiability, it should be immediately addressed. 
However, I will attempt to explain the issue here without getting too far ahead of myself. 
As noted in Chapter One, the alternative to Essential Methodological Naturalism which I 
will soon endorse, Provisory Methodological Naturalism, follows Hume in relying on 
inductive reasoning. At the same time, Provisory naturalism holds the Problem of Induction 
to be a very real concern. So, we can use inductive reasoning to conclude that ontological 
naturalism is true given past experience. But we should not simply adopt ontological 
naturalism in the manner of McKinnon and others. That is, we should not hold that 
ontological naturalism is inviolable or unfalsifiable. This is in part because we recognize, 
as Hume did, that there is no guarantee that the future will be like the past. While we are 
right to assume, based on experience, that supernatural objects do not exist now, we are not 
justified in assuming they will never exist in the future.  
However, Popper thought that his falsification theory solves this Problem of 
Induction. Or, at least he thought his theory made the Problem moot. Popper believed that 
while some assumptions may be unprovable (e.g., the assumption that only natural things 
exist), we can still hold a theory which corresponds to that assumption. Should an exception 
to that theory be proven, then the theory would need to be abandoned. But until that happens, 
it is not irrational to accept the theory as true. Importantly, this production of a 
counterexample leading to the abandonment of the assumption is a case of deductive rather 
than inductive reasoning. For Popper, induction was a “myth” which real science does not 
use (Popper, 2002, p. 53). Thus, in accepting Popper’s argument for falsification which 
dismisses induction, I appear to be contradicting the form of methodological naturalism I 
want to defend later which relies on it. Like Hume, I want to say that the method of induction 
is valid but that there is a problem with its use. Popper, on the other hand, holds that 
induction is always invalid.  
Despite this apparent inconsistency, I think mine/Hume’s and Popper’s views are 
more compatible than they might at first appear. Or, at least they are compatible regarding 
their application to methodological naturalism. The two views have wide areas of 
agreement. For one thing, Hume and Popper both allow for the making of and adherence to 
qualified universal generalizations. A qualified universal generalization is the contingent 
acceptance of a theory. For example, the naturalist makes the qualified universal 
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generalization that it is likely that only natural things will be discovered. The ability to make 
and adhere to such generalizations is important because, if we could not prefer particular 
generalized universal claims, then we would need to hold that all claims are equally valid. 
If we cannot favor certain claims over others, then the claim that all non-human animals 
will start speaking English tomorrow (a possibility under Hume and Popper) would need to 
be recognized as equal to the claim that they will not. This is a problem that both Hume and 
Popper recognized. Thus, they both thought that qualified universal generalizations are 
required and warranted. And, as such, they agree that not all claims are equal. Both Hume 
and Popper allow that all non-human animals could start talking tomorrow. But they also 
allow that we can make the qualified universal generalization that (most probably) this will 
not be the case. The claim that “All non-human animals will start talking tomorrow” is, 
therefore, not on par with “All non-human animals will not start talking tomorrow”.  
The conflict between Hume and Popper only arises because the justification for this 
qualified universal generalization differs. Hume justifies generalizations inductively based 
on experience while Popper justifies them deductively based on empirical evidence (or, 
rather, the lack thereof). These two views may themselves conflict but such conflict need 
not result in problems for the methodological naturalist who adopts the form I endorse and 
embraces the falsifiability of ontological naturalism. This naturalist can adopt either Hume’s 
or Popper’s view. If she chooses to adopt Hume, she reasons inductively but uses the 
Problem of Induction to justify the falsifiability of ontological naturalism (“Because there is 
a problem with induction, we must assume that ontological naturalism might be falsified”). 
On the other hand, if she were to follow Popper, then her deductive reasoning requires that 
she simply assume ontological naturalism to be falsifiable (“One counterexample to 
ontological naturalism can invalidate it”). Both Hume’s and Popper’s approaches arrive at 
the same conclusion, that ontological naturalism is falsifiable. And, since that conclusion is 
valid, both approaches are valid as well (at least in relation to this discussion). To proceed 
further and argue for one approach over the other would merely be arguing for one form of 
reasoning (deductive or inductive) over the other. Such an argument does not concern us 
here but what does concern us are the following two truths: First, the fact that, for the reasons 
mentioned, Popper’s view must be separated from my own (and Hume’s). And second, that, 
despite this distinction, the two views do not necessarily conflict. At least, they do not 
necessarily conflict when applied to the methodological naturalism case.  
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But there are other areas of agreement between my own and Popper’s view. One 
such area of agreement concerns the requirements for the falsification of a theory. Both 
Popper’s broad falsification of general theories and my own endorsement of the falsification 
of ontological naturalism require only a single contrary example. If a single contrary 
example to ontological naturalism is discovered, then the theory is falsified. Interestingly, 
outside of ontological naturalism, this does not always seem to be the case. Regarding 
falsification in other areas, I agree with the above criticism leveled against Popper’s view. 
Specifically, I agree with Pigliucci’s assessment that the discovery of one contradictory 
example to a theory should not result in the entire theory being discarded when it comes to 
theories involving things like elephants. To think that one contrary piece of evidence is 
enough to invalidate a given theory is, generally, not a tenable position to hold. However, 
one of the times it is tenable is in relation to the falsification of ontological naturalism. If 
one proves the existence of even a single supernatural object then ontological naturalism 
would indeed need to be abandoned. So-called “strict” falsifiability, which requires the 
abandonment of a theory after a single contrary piece of evidence, should not be assumed 
generally, as Popper suggests. However, it should be assumed in the case of ontological 
naturalism and hypothetical supernatural discoveries.14               
 So, there are elements of Popper’s view which remain worthwhile (falsification as a 
means for evaluating a theory). But there are also elements of his view which should not be 
accepted (downplaying the Problem of Induction, abandonment of theories upon a single 
piece of contradictory evidence). Therefore, I believe an accommodationist position should 
be adopted. This position would lie somewhere between the complete rejection of 
falsification theory and the embracing of Popper’s view in its entirety. An accommodationist 
falsifiability position consists of the following belief: It is possible to recognize the value of 
falsifiability as a tool for determining whether a theory is worthwhile while simultaneously 
holding that induction is valid and that the Humean problem remains viable.  
Perhaps such an accommodationist view could also see a reconsideration of the 
ramifications of falsification itself. For example, rather than holding that falsification should 
lead to the outright rejection of a claim, perhaps falsification could simply mean that a theory 
                                                             
14 The reason for this likely concerns its being a universal thesis. Ontological naturalism holds that all 
existing things are natural. Thus, a single counter-example disproves the thesis. Similarly, the universal 
thesis that all existing things are blue, call this ontological bluism, would be proven false with the production 
of one red object. 
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should be modified in light of the new evidence. Rather than rejecting the claim that 
“Elephants are grey” upon discovery of a white elephant, a modified claim, say, “While 
elephants are normally grey, some are without pigmentation” may be put forward. Finally, 
if reevaluating falsification and its consequences in these ways allow us to retain 
falsifiability as a measuring stick for rejecting certain claims, then we should be able to 
reject the Essentialist argument based on its unfalsifiability.  
   
2.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have attempted to show why various arguments in support of Essential 
Methodological Naturalism fail. Despite Essentialist assertions to the contrary, the 
enterprise of science would not collapse if supernatural theories were introduced as 
explanations. And, while it is true that current scientific models cannot account for the 
supernatural, we must acknowledge that future models may be able to do so. Additionally, 
it would not be the case that science would collapse if supernatural explanations were 
allowed. Nor would scientists necessarily posit supernatural theories in place of naturalistic 
ones if allowed to do so. Finally, even if supernatural explanations are indeed easy to 
formulate, we should remember that this does not make them incorrect.  
The argument that Essential Methodological Naturalism fosters cooperation 
between naturalists and supernaturalists while shielding science from supernaturalism also 
fails. To definitively shield science from supernatural meddling, science needs to be able to 
definitively separate itself from non-science. But no method to conclusively demarcate 
science from non-science exists. That said, we cannot argue against Essential 
Methodological Naturalism by asserting that it lends credence to ontological 
supernaturalism. Pairing Essential Methodological Naturalism with ontological 
supernaturalism is impossible because the ontological supernaturalist would have no basis 
for her belief in supernatural things without contradicting her Essential Methodological 
Naturalism. She cannot say that science leads to her belief in supernatural objects. But nor 
can she say that a method other than science leads to her belief in such objects. Since these 
are the only options available to her to explain her beliefs and since both are not permitted 
given her methodology, her combination of (Essential) methodology and (supernatural) 
ontology must be incoherent. This is true even though we have previously seen that standard 
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methodological naturalism can coherently be held in conjunction with ontological 
supernaturalism (the atheist parapsychologist).  
 However, we can still hold that any argument which supports Essential 
Methodological Naturalism by stating that it allows for the supernatural to be automatically 
naturalized fails. This is because such a view is problematically unfalsifiable. No one is 
justified in claiming that ontological supernaturalism is impossible. And yet we have seen 
that this is exactly what the Essential methodological naturalist who stands by the Argument 
from Automatic Naturalization must believe. Some philosophers have pointed out that 
religious explanations are often criticized based on their unfalsifiability.15 It is only fair that 
unfalsifiable naturalistic explanations are likewise challenged.    
Because the strongest arguments for Essential Methodological Naturalism have 
proven unsuccessful, we can conclude that this form of methodological naturalism should 
be avoided. Recall in the introduction I noted that the two forms of methodological 
naturalism on offer, Essential and Provisory, are exhaustive in that they are the only forms 
available to methodological naturalists. I also noted that they are mutually exclusive. The 
methodological naturalist must subscribe to one of the two forms and she cannot choose 
both. If Essential Methodological Naturalism does indeed fail, then its rival, Provisory 
Methodological Naturalism, must be correct. In the next chapter, I will further elaborate on 
this Provisory approach, discuss some of its benefits and examine some of the consequences 
associated with its adoption.  
  
                                                             
15 See (Flew and MacIntyre, 1955). 
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3. Provisory Methodological Naturalism 
 
3.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I will introduce Provisory Methodological Naturalism, the form of 
methodological naturalism which I hold to be the correct methodological approach. Again, 
this form has it that methodological naturalism, or the view that science is the best and only 
tool for discovering reality, is only provisionally true. Should the need arise, methodological 
(and, therefore, ontological) naturalism should be abandoned. In this chapter, I will discuss 
the Provisory view itself in more detail before examining its application and some of the 
benefits associated with adopting it. I will begin by explicitly defining Provisory 
Methodological Naturalism. Following this, I will present and respond to a potential flaw in 
the Provisory approach relating to circularity.  Finally, I will examine some of the benefits 
associated with adopting the view. Specifically, I will look at three such benefits: 
Falsification, Cooperation, and Scientific Work.  
     
3.2 Defining Provisory Methodological Naturalism 
In the previous chapter’s conclusion, I noted that “standard methodological naturalism” can 
be held in conjunction with ontological supernaturalism (2.6). It is possible for the 
“standard” methodological naturalist to be an ontological supernaturalist, as in the case of 
the atheist parapsychologist. In other words, Combination 3 (methodological naturalism 
paired with ontological supernaturalism) in Table 1.3 is coherent. I also previously noted 
that the Essential methodological naturalist, unlike the “standard” methodological naturalist, 
cannot coherently hold a belief in supernatural objects. The Essential methodological 
naturalist must be an ontological naturalist (2.4). What accounts for this difference between 
the “standard” and Essential methodological naturalists is the restriction (or lack thereof) 
placed on science by the two views. While Essential Methodological Naturalism prohibits 
science from evaluating truly supernatural objects, the “standard” methodological 
naturalism which I have thus far assumed implicitly allows for the evaluation of such 
objects. The atheist parapsychologist believes in supernatural things because her scientific 
method tells her that she has reason to. Her supernatural ontology is confirmed by her 
naturalistic method. But Essential Methodological Naturalism prohibits this type of 
evaluation and, thus, prevents any such confirmation. The Essential methodological 
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naturalist cannot say that science is the basis for a belief in supernatural things because the 
Essentialist holds that science cannot evaluate the supernatural. But she also cannot say that 
a method other than science is the basis for such a belief as then she would not be a 
methodological naturalist.  
I concluded that the former approach, the approach that allows for the scientific 
evaluation of supernatural objects, is the correct approach for methodological naturalists to 
take. The naturalist should avoid the Essentialist alternative. It may already be obvious that 
this former approach, what I assumed to be “standard” methodological naturalism is, in fact, 
Provisory Methodological Naturalism. Recall that I defined Provisory Methodological 
Naturalism in the following way: 
Provisory Methodological Naturalism: The thesis that science is the best and 
only method for discovering the properties of reality and what exists (trait 1) 
and that science can provisionally evaluate supernatural objects. 
By not limiting science to evaluations of only natural objects, the method of science 
can, in principle, prove the existence of supernatural objects and entail a supernaturalistic 
ontology. According to BBB, Provisory Methodological Naturalism holds that 
“methodological naturalism is a provisory and empirically grounded commitment to 
naturalistic causes and explanations, which in principle is revocable by extraordinary 
empirical evidence” (emphasis in text, Boudry et al., 2010, p. 229). The production of such 
extraordinary evidence would require the Provisory methodological naturalist who is also 
an ontological naturalist to change her stance and endorse ontological supernaturalism. It is 
important to note that this does not mean that the Provisory methodological naturalist begins 
with an assumption of ontological naturalism. Provisory Methodological Naturalism does 
not require either ontological naturalism or ontological supernaturalism. Nor does it 
necessarily endorse one over the other. The Provisory methodological naturalist may 
believe in supernatural things or she may hold only natural things to exist. However, the 
Provisory methodological naturalist who commits to ontological naturalism (likely due, at 
least in part, to the commitment to “naturalistic causes and explanations”) must also hold 
that her ontological naturalism is revocable.  
Thus, the Provisory methodological naturalist who is also an ontological naturalist 
accepts the following: It is true that Methodological naturalism has a long history of 
successes and so has proven enormously fruitful. For this reason, we are currently justified 
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in being methodological naturalists. Additionally, the method of science has thus far 
supported a naturalistic ontology because science has not, most scientists believe, shown 
supernatural objects to exist. Thus, we are also currently justified in being ontological 
naturalists. However, this could all change tomorrow given the right circumstances and 
evidence. Given conclusive evidence, ontological supernaturalism could be proven true.  
In the sections that follow I will present a few of the advantages associated with 
adopting this Provisory approach. However, before doing so, I will examine a potential 
problem with the view. This problem concerns circularity. 
 
3.3 A Problem for Provisory Methodological Naturalism: Circularity  
Until now, most of my discussion of falsifiability in relation to the Provisory view has 
concerned the falsifiability of the ontological naturalist’s thesis. The Provisory 
methodological naturalist believes that supernatural objects are discoverable by science, 
thus rendering ontological naturalism falsifiable. But we should note that, for the Provisory 
naturalist, the same falsifiability should apply to methodological naturalism as well. The 
acceptance of methodological naturalism should only be provisory. It is tentative and is 
subject to change. Methodological naturalism is the thesis that science is the best and only 
method for discovering reality. But, assuming that supernatural objects are possible, why 
should science be the only method by which we might observe them? If we were to find that 
ghosts are real, would it be too far-fetched to assume that there could be a better method 
than science to interact with or observe them? It would not. Thus, while the Provisory 
naturalist may believe that science is the best and only method to discover reality, she should 
remain open to the possibility that alternative, non-natural methods exist.  
Ostensibly, we would know if a non-natural method was more effective than science 
through the natural or scientific observation of that method. We could conclude that a 
supernatural method is more effective than science by simply comparing the results of the 
supernatural method with the results of science. If we observe the supernatural method to 
be more effective, then we know it to be the case.  Thus, we use the scientific method to 
determine if a method other than science is effective. This is the same procedure we would 
use for ontological naturalism falsification. We would know that ontological naturalism is 
falsified once we scientifically observed supernatural objects. The Provisory naturalist holds 
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that the scientific observation of truly supernatural objects is indeed possible.1 If this were 
to occur, then ontological naturalism would be falsified.  
So, both methodological naturalism and ontological naturalism are falsifiable 
according to the Provisory naturalist. Moreover, they both may be falsified using the same 
method of science. But some people take issue with the idea that science can investigate 
doubts raised about the scientific method itself. According to these individuals, one cannot 
rationally assert that the scientific method might, by investigating any doubts about science, 
ever come to disprove naturalism. This is because the method used to investigate those 
doubts (the scientific method) would be deemed illegitimate by the disproving of naturalism. 
Michael C. Rea formulates this problem well. He writes,  
As I see it, the problem lies in the fact that (a) those who call themselves 
naturalists are united at least in part by methodological dispositions that 
preclude allegiance to views that cannot be called into question by further 
developments in science, but (b) no one seems to think that developments in 
science could force someone to reject naturalism. So those who want to 
formulate naturalism as a thesis face a dilemma. On the one hand, if they 
formulate it as a thesis that cannot be overturned by scientific investigation, 
then naturalism turns out to be precisely the sort of thesis that naturalists are 
unwilling to accept. In the worst cases, such formulations are either vacuous 
or self-defeating. On the other hand, if they formulate it as a thesis that could 
be overturned by scientific investigation, then (obviously enough) naturalism 
stands at the mercy of science. 
One might think it odd that naturalists would resist this second horn of the 
dilemma. After all, if everything else is at the mercy of science, why not 
naturalism? But the question is confused. Naturalism is motivated by a high 
regard for scientific method. It would be completely absurd, therefore, to 
think that empirical investigation could overthrow naturalism without 
overthrowing scientific method itself in the process” (Rea, 2004, p. 51-2).  
Rea argues that naturalism faces problems in its formulation. We cannot hold that 
naturalism is unfalsifiable because this goes against the Provisory Methodological 
                                                             




Naturalism thesis. Provisory naturalists are wary of unfalsifiability. But we also cannot say 
that naturalism is falsifiable. The scientific method (“empirical investigation”) cannot be 
used to disprove naturalism because naturalism is based on “a high regard for scientific 
method”.  If we were to falsify naturalism, we would also falsify the scientific method itself. 
And we cannot use a method to disprove the effectiveness of said method!  
But I do not think that Provisory naturalists need to worry. In my view, there are at least 
two problems with Rea’s argument. The first problem concerns Rea’s questionable pairing 
of naturalism with the scientific method. Rea wants us to believe that any questioning of the 
truth of naturalism leads to the questioning of the scientific method itself. His motivation 
for this connection concerns naturalism’s “high regard” for the method itself. But it is not 
clear that a high regard for the scientific method alone justifies the connection Rea makes 
between naturalism and the scientific method. Other views might have the same high regard 
and yet lack the connection. Take physicalism as an example. Physicalism is the 
philosophical view that, roughly speaking, the only things that exist are those things defined 
by the science of physics (and, maybe, those things that supervene on the things defined by 
the science of physics). Thus, physicalism too has a high regard for the scientific method. 
However, in questioning physicalism, we do not necessarily question the scientific method 
itself. Furthermore, we do not want to say that by overthrowing physicalism we would 
overthrow the scientific method in the process. Surely that would not be the case. 
The ambiguity here might be cleared up if Rea clarified the relationship of naturalism to 
the scientific method. However, he does not do this. His conception of naturalism seems 
broad. In the quote above, for example, Rea does not bother to distinguish between 
ontological and methodological naturalism. He simply refers to the more general term, 
“naturalism”. To be fair, this is probably intentional. Rea makes it clear that he does not 
appreciate the distinction between naturalisms. For him, distinguishing between 
methodological and ontological naturalism is pointless.2 But this is the second problem with 
his argument. Were he to make such a distinction his dilemma would be solved.  
If we distinguish methodological and ontological naturalism, we do not need to equate 
naturalism with the scientific method as Rea does. This is because neither methodological 
                                                             
2 Rea writes, “[T]hough it is certainly true that there are various doctrines in the literature all going under the 
label ‘naturalism’, we needn't infer from this that there are different versions of naturalism corresponding to 
the different doctrines. Another possibility is that there is just one version of naturalism but various 
mischaracterizations of it” (Rea, 2004, p. 53). A similar discussion can be found in (Dawes, 2009, p. 5). 
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nor ontological naturalism is identical to the scientific method. Furthermore, I already noted 
above that both methodological and ontological naturalism can be falsified (without 
contradiction) using the scientific method. Thus, after making the above distinction we can 
say that the scientific method can prove that the scientific method is not the best and only 
method for discovering reality. Or, in other words, we can use the scientific method to 
disprove the methodological naturalism thesis. Similarly, we can say that the scientific 
method proves that supernatural things exist. In other words, we can use the scientific 
method to disprove the ontological naturalism thesis.  
We can assume these things without contradiction because we are not saying that the 
scientific method is disproving itself. We are saying that the scientific method is disproving 
the methodological and ontological naturalism theses. Alternatively, if we simply equate 
naturalism with the scientific method as Rea does, then we would get a contradiction. 
Holding that naturalism equates to the scientific method and that the method can disprove 
naturalism is contradictory. Therefore, the solution to the problem of circularity and 
naturalism simply involves clarifying the types of naturalism under consideration.  
 
3.4 Benefits of Provisory Methodological Naturalism 
As noted in the previous chapter, Essential Methodological Naturalism and Provisory 
Methodological Naturalism are the only forms methodological naturalism can take 
regarding the evaluation of the supernatural. The two forms are also mutually exclusive. 
These facts allow us to conclude that, if one form is proven to fail, then the alternative must 
be accepted.  However, we should note that they also mean that any argument supporting 
one form also qualifies as an argument against the alternative. Or, we could say that an 
argument against one form is automatically an argument in support of the other. So, if I 
proved in that chapter that the best arguments in support of Essential Methodological 
Naturalism fail to convince, I have also shown that those arguments fail to convincingly 
fault Provisory Methodological Naturalism.  
I will now examine some unique benefits to holding the Provisory view. As far as 
these advantages can be considered arguments for the Provisory method, they also serve as 
arguments against the Essentialist one. Indeed, methodological naturalists who argue 
against the Essentialist view are almost certainly Provisory methodological naturalists. For 
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these reasons, I will at times refer to problems with Essential Methodological Naturalism in 
the process of advocating for its rival.  
 
3.4.1 Benefits of Provisory Methodological Naturalism: Falsification and No Hypocrisy 
The first and perhaps most obvious benefit of Provisory Methodological Naturalism is the 
fact that it holds ontological naturalism to be falsifiable. Just as unfalsifiability is a core 
element of the Essentialist view, falsifiability is a core element of the Provisory view. 
Ontological naturalism must be revocable if we are to assume a Provisory Methodological 
Naturalism which takes supernatural objects seriously. I have already argued for 
falsifiability as at least a partial requirement for a theory to be scientific. Essential 
Methodological Naturalism, with its embrace of the unfalsifiability of ontological 
naturalism, fails as a scientific theory. Provisory Methodological Naturalism, on the other 
hand, does not. 
  But just as it may have initially seemed that Essential Methodological Naturalism 
was giving too much up to supernaturalism because of the strict limitation it places on 
scientific evaluation (“science can evaluate no supernatural objects”), Provisory 
Methodological Naturalism may also seem to be giving something up to the opposing camp.  
Provisory naturalism readily admits the possibility that it is in error and clearly states the 
circumstances in which methodological and ontological naturalism would be disproved. For 
this reason, it might be argued that Provisory methodological naturalists’ naturalism is not 
as strong as the naturalism of the Essentialists. While Essential methodological naturalists 
have an unfalsifiable naturalism, the Provisory approach is less secure. Maybe Provisory 
methodological naturalists should be less confident in their methodology and the ontology 
their method advises. This is an interesting argument. However, I would respond by noting 
that this admission of the possibility of error should be recognized as an asset of the position 
rather than a weakness. Provisory Methodological Naturalism mirrors the general scientific 
method in allowing for correction of the view and therein lies its strength. 
Additionally, we might consider the following more pragmatic argument for 
Provisory Methodological Naturalism (or, against Essential Methodological Naturalism) 
from hypocrisy: It is hypocritical for the Essential methodological naturalist to declare in an 
ad hoc manner that all evidence, including evidence presented by supernaturalists in support 
of ontological supernaturalism, is really natural evidence. This is because earlier the 
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Essentialist criticized the hypothetical supernatural scientist who simply declares God as the 
ultimate mechanism behind any unsolved problem (e.g., the Argument from Hindrance). 
Given that neither declaration is adequately supported, it is unfair to make such a sweeping 
claim for naturalism while forbidding it for supernaturalism. In other words, Essential 
methodological naturalists cannot justifiably argue against supernaturalism by fiat while 
declaring naturalism by fiat in the same manner. To do so, given the problems with both 
unfalsifiable ontological naturalism and the Argument from Hindrance, is hypocritical. In 
fact, some might go so far as to say that the Argument from Automatic Naturalization, which 
asserts that everything observed via science is natural and that ontological naturalism is 
unfalsifiable, could be reconstructed as an argument against Essential Methodological 
Naturalism rather than for it. The reason is that it simply makes Essential Methodological 
Naturalism trivially true. And this is, arguably, a problematic result. 
 
3.4.2 Benefits of Provisory Methodological Naturalism: Real Cooperation 
Another strength of Provisory Methodological Naturalism is that it opens the doors for 
supernaturalists and non-naturalists to use the proven method of scientific inquiry to test 
their claims. This is valuable for a couple of reasons. The first reason is a pragmatic one. A 
naturalist should want as many people as possible to not only adopt the scientific method 
but to utilize it correctly. The more supernaturalists who value science and use it correctly, 
the better.  
Of course, this does not mean that the Provisory methodological naturalist assumes 
that a greater number of people will become scientists as a result. Simply allowing scientific 
evaluation of supernatural objects will not necessarily lead to an increase in the number of 
physicists, for example. Rather, what I am concerned with here is the inclusion of two 
groups of supernaturalists. The first group consists of supernaturalists who do not use the 
scientific method regularly but want to use it to test their beliefs. The second group consists 
of supernaturalists, such as the parapsychologists, who do use the method regularly but use 
it incorrectly (thereby getting the false positives that lead to their ontological 
supernaturalism).  
Provisory methodological naturalism is advantageous because it allows for both of 
these groups to be included among those using science. Both groups have positive views 
about science and the scientific method. Both groups want scientific support for their claims. 
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If naturalists are serious about their method, they would do well to take these 
supernaturalists’ claims seriously and work with them to ensure their utilization of the 
scientific method is correct.     
The second reason why allowing supernaturalists to use science and naturalists to 
scientifically evaluate supernatural objects is important is that doing so could, at least in 
theory, foster real cooperation between the opposing views. The Argument from 
Cooperation in support of Essential Methodological Naturalism discussed in the previous 
chapter held that both naturalists and supernaturalists would benefit from an agreement 
mandating that each group refrain from interfering with the opposing camp. However, that 
argument failed because the distinction it makes between naturalists and supernaturalists 
cannot be clearly defined. If the distinction between naturalists and supernaturalists is not 
clear, then the argument’s assumption that both camps can refrain from interfering with each 
other is implausible. However, under Provisory Methodological Naturalism, we do not need 
to worry about distinguishing between the two camps. Everyone is free to use the scientific 
method, regardless of how one self-identifies. And by allowing investigation of the 
supernatural, it could be said that Provisory methodological naturalists are willing to lend 
the weight and respectability of science to supernatural claims and that, should a 
supernatural phenomenon ever be proven scientifically, such an event would have the added 
gravitas of scientific authentication.3 This, it seems, is more in the spirit of cooperation than 
a situation in which methodological naturalists refuse to allow supernaturalists to utilize 
their method at all.  
 On a related note, we might wonder how real cooperation could ever occur between 
Essential methodological naturalists and supernaturalists if Essentialists believe their own 
method is antithetical to any form of supernaturalism. Alongside the Essentialist belief that 
science cannot evaluate supernatural objects must lie the corresponding belief that non-
naturalists cannot utilize the natural method to evaluate their non-natural objects. The result, 
as we saw, is that the Essentialist Argument from Cooperation sees naturalists and 
supernaturalists in segregated groups. So, what comes from the Essentialist approach is not 
really “cooperation” in the traditional sense, at least if the traditional sense of cooperation 
requires integration. Rather, the result is more like a mutually agreed-upon tolerance. 
Naturalists and supernaturalists, in segregated camps, tolerate each other’s presence. On the 
                                                             
3 Of course, much of the tension between naturalists and supernaturalists concerns the genuineness of this 
offer given that science has, so far, been unwilling to accept any evidence of the supernatural as valid. 
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other hand, the Provisory methodological naturalist has no such reservations about the 
scientific evaluation of supernaturalists’ claims. The interaction which the Provisory view 
allows is more in the spirit of cooperation than having the two self-ascribed sides of 
naturalism and supernaturalism completely refrain from interaction or commenting on the 
opposing view. As such, this current “argument from cooperation” in support of Provisory 
Methodological Naturalism succeeds where the one for Essential Methodological 
Naturalism failed.  
  
3.4.3 Benefits of Provisory Methodological Naturalism:  Acceptance of Scientific Work 
on the Supernatural 
Finally, Provisory Methodological Naturalism is important given the amount of worthwhile 
scientific work that has already been done on various claims made by supernaturalists. As 
Victor Stenger points out, many rigorous and well-funded studies have been conducted at 
highly respected institutions on subjects concerning the supernatural (Stenger, 2007, p. 29). 
These include research into the efficacy of prayer (Benson et al., 2006), therapeutic touch 
(Rosa et al., 1998) and the Eastern concept of “life energy”, or qi (Colquhoun and Novella, 
2013) among others. We want to say that these investigations are worthwhile and tell us 
something about the existence, or lack thereof, of truly supernatural phenomena. Indeed, 
many scientists likely use this data as grounds for their ontological naturalism.4 However, it 
may seem that Essential Methodological Naturalism requires us to admit that 
experimentation to evaluate the existence of supernatural things is useless. BBB state 
The definition argument for [Essential Methodological Naturalism] sits 
uncomfortable with the fact that reputable scientists and sceptics have 
investigated allegedly paranormal phenomena which, if corroborated 
through repeatable and careful experiments, would point to the existence of 
supernatural forces, or at least so they claim...If defenders of [Essential 
Methodological Naturalism] are correct that science cannot deal with the 
supernatural “by definition”, does it mean that these experiments were 
pointless to begin with… (Boudry et al., 2010, p. 230–31)? 
                                                             
4 For example, (Dawkins, 2007). 
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Essential Methodological Naturalism seemingly cannot reconcile itself with the idea that 
strong scientific work of this sort has been and will be done on the supernatural. A view 
which holds that science cannot evaluate supernatural objects cannot be reconciled with the 
view that scientific studies of supernatural phenomena are potentially viable. So, we might 
want to say that Provisory Methodological Naturalism is preferable because it allows that 
competent work done in this area is indeed potentially viable. Of course, not all scientific 
work on the supernatural can be considered competent. Surely some fail to meet the required 
standards. However, there are plenty of adequately designed and well-executed studies of 
the sort noted above. Provisory naturalists will see these studies and their findings as valid.  
But it cannot merely be the fact that Provisory naturalism allows this scientific work 
to be valid that makes it preferable over Essentialism. The Essentialist will simply disagree 
that this allowance is an advantage and we are back to where we began. In other words, we 
cannot simply point to the fact that the Provisory naturalist holds this different view and call 
it an advantage. We must go a step further and show exactly why allowing for this scientific 
work is advantageous. Therefore, I would argue that allowing this work is an advantage for 
certain Provisory methodological naturalists because it allows them to validate their 
ontological naturalism. Provisory naturalists can argue that supernatural objects or 
phenomena have not yet been proven scientifically. None of these competent studies have 
findings which support supernaturalism and this conclusion, according to Provisory 
naturalists, is quite telling. Essential Methodological Naturalism, on the other hand, seems 
to deprive the methodological naturalist of this valuable ability.   
However, there is a caveat: As previously noted (2.4) Essential methodological 
naturalists do not necessarily hold that science is incapable of observing objects which the 
Provisory methodological naturalist would categorize as supernatural. Essentialists do not 
argue, for example, that science does not have the ability to observe ghosts. Essential 
Methodological Naturalism merely holds that those objects, should they be observed, would 
be automatically naturalized upon discovery. Any scientific work that is thought to prove 
the existence of supernatural objects is merely proving the existence of heretofore 
undiscovered natural objects. We might notice that BBB present their idea in the form of a 
question in the quote above. They correctly refrain from explicitly stating that Essential 
methodological naturalists see such science as futile. Rather they seem to be asking if we 
should take the Essential methodological naturalist position to be that experimentation is 
pointless. Were they to argue or insinuate that the Essential methodological naturalist must 
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consider all scientific experimentation on the supernatural inane, they would be wrong. For 
there is inherent value in the discovery of heretofore unknown natural objects.  And 
unknown natural objects are, again, what Essentialists would take discovered supernatural 
objects to be. 
This is a crucial point and deserves further analysis. Thus far I have argued that, with 
the above caveat in mind, Essentialists prohibit scientific evaluation of the supernatural 
while Provisory proponents allow it. This difference in approach to the question of scientific 
evaluation can be attributed to the two views’ approach to classification: Essentialists hold 
that all “supernatural” objects discovered scientifically are, necessarily, incorrectly-classed 
natural objects. Provisory naturalists, on the other hand, hold that all discovered supernatural 
objects are not necessarily misclassified. If we fail to recognize the scare quotes here it may 
seem that the Essentialist holds both that science can evaluate the supernatural and that it 
cannot. In reality, the Essentialist believes that science can evaluate “supernatural” objects 
(incorrectly-classified natural objects) but not supernatural objects (truly supernatural 
objects). The former may include the things we commonly conceive of as supernatural 
(ghosts, demons, etc.). The latter, if they exist, must be spatiotemporally distinct from our 
world according to the Essentialist (because science observes everything in our own world 
and everything in our world is natural). The Essentialist will agree that scientific work on 
the former objects is useful even though labeling them supernatural is incorrect. But the 
Essentialist will also say that, since truly supernatural objects are necessarily 
spatiotemporally distinct from the natural world, scientific work on them is worse than 
useless. It is impossible.         
How then is the Provisory methodological naturalist’s position on scientific work an 
advantage over the Essentialist’s view on the matter? Both views hold that there is value in 
scientific work done on the paranormal. One view (Provisory) simply holds that the subjects 
of studies may be truly non-natural while the other view (Essential) argues that the subjects 
are always only ever natural objects. The Provisory Methodological Naturalist view on 
scientific work is preferred because it offers stronger support for ontological naturalism than 
the alternative. The reason why it offers stronger support concerns the first benefit of 
Provisory Methodological Naturalism discussed: falsifiability. The methodological 
naturalist who aims to support ontological naturalism is better equipped with Provisory 
Methodological Naturalism than with the alternative because the Provisory view embraces 
falsifiability generally and the falsifiability of ontological naturalism specifically.  
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In Chapter Two, I argued that a falsifiable ontological naturalism is preferable to an 
unfalsifiable ontological naturalism. Evidence for ontological naturalism gathered in a 
context in which the ontology may be falsified is preferable to evidence for ontological 
naturalism gathered in a context in which ontological naturalism is unfalsifiable. The former 
context is Provisory Methodological Naturalism while the latter is Essential Methodological 
Naturalism. Scientific work can only truly support ontological naturalism if the support is 
falsifiable (again, keeping in mind that scientific support for ontological naturalism may 
come in the form of a lack of evidence for supernatural objects. This form of evidence would 
be falsified by the production of truly supernatural objects). 
Both the Provisory view and the Essentialist view claim support for ontological 
naturalism via the lack of evidence for existing supernatural objects. The lack of evidence 
for ontological supernaturalism serves as positive evidence for ontological naturalism.5 But 
the Essential methodological naturalist couples her positive evidence of ontological 
naturalism with unfalsifiability. And such a coupling is immediately unattractive. In saying 
that evidence for ontological naturalism can never be falsified, the Essentialist is really 
saying that the current state, in which no evidence for the supernatural exists, will never 
change. Put this baldly, the unfalsifiability of Essential Methodological Naturalism is quite 
difficult to accept. It is much more difficult to accept than the Provisory alternative. 
Provisory and Essential naturalists’ evidence for their ontological naturalism may be 
identical in all respects other than falsifiability. But even if that were the case, the evidence 
would not be equal. The Essentialist’s evidence for ontological naturalism, when coupled 
with unfalsifiability, is not equal to the Provisory methodological naturalist’s falsifiable 
evidence for ontological naturalism. 
We can summarize the basic tenets of the two forms of methodological naturalism 
and our justification of the third benefit of Provisory Methodological Naturalism in the 
following way. In its investigations into the supernatural, science has failed to discover 
evidence for supernatural objects. Therefore, we are justified in believing that a lack of 
evidence for the supernatural supports the claim that only natural things exist (ontological 
                                                             
5 It seems that evidence for the non-existence of anything, including supernatural things, must take the form 
of a lack of evidence for that thing. Obviously, theorizing in this way about the non-existence of something 
is not uncommon in science. There are assorted reasons why an object or phenomenon may be thought to be 
unlikely. For example, its existence may be inconsistent with observed truths about the world. Or, the data 
gathered in support of its existence may be shown to be unreliable. But the most straightforward reason may 
be that there simply is no evidence for its existing. 
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naturalism). However, as Provisory methodological naturalists, we recognize that evidence 
for the supernatural may one day be discovered. In that case, ontological naturalism would 
be proven false. The Essential methodological naturalist, meanwhile, holds that science has 
yet to discover the things which the Provisory naturalist would deem supernatural (ghosts, 
God, etc.) but that, if it did, these things would automatically be natural things. Because of 
this caveat for automatic naturalization, the Essential methodological naturalist is not on an 
equal epistemic footing with the Provisory naturalist. Her unfalsifiable evidence for 
ontological naturalism is not as strong as the Provisory naturalist’s falsifiable evidence for 
it. We might say that the evidence for ontological naturalism (which, again, comes by way 
of a lack of evidence for the supernatural) is more powerful for the Provisory naturalist 
because it is, as science demands, falsifiable. 
It is important to remember that no study or experiment, taken either individually or 
collectively, can tell us whether Provisory Methodological Naturalism is true or its opposing 
view false. It is also not the case that we should be Provisory methodological naturalists 
simply because, if we are not, all this scientific work will go to waste. Both Essential and 
Provisory methodological naturalists can claim that evidence gathered from scientific work 
supports their ontological naturalism. However, the Provisory method is the only one to 
hold that what science observes may be supernatural rather than natural. This, coupled with 
the fact that proper scientific evidence must have the element of falsifiability as one of its 
properties, guarantees that Provisory Methodological Naturalism better supports ontological 
naturalism. Thus, Provisory naturalism is more beneficial to the methodological naturalist 
who is also an ontological naturalist.   
 
3.5 Conclusion 
I began this chapter by first explicitly defining Provisory Methodological Naturalism. This 
involved re-labeling what we had previously referred to as simply “methodological 
naturalism” and “standard methodological naturalism”. Following this, I examined some of 
the practical consequences of the Provisory view resulting from the discovery of the 
supernatural. I then went on to argue that the Provisory view is beneficial because it (1) 
embraces falsification, (2) fosters true cooperation, and (3) is better equipped to present 
evidence for ontological naturalism gathered from scientific work.  
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In the next three chapters, I will present and respond to arguments in opposition to 
my preferred form of methodological naturalism, the Provisory view. Each argument 
roughly corresponds to one or more of the benefits noted above. The main argument in 
Chapter Four, for example, concerns benefit (1). This argument questions the need for 
falsification and presents a revised version of the Argument from Automatic Naturalization. 
The primary argument in Chapter Five concerns both (1) and (2). It questions our ability to 
distinguish between the natural and supernatural which, likewise, directly concerns 
falsification and the first benefit. But distinguishing between the natural and the supernatural 
is also a prerequisite to the second benefit of “real cooperation” between naturalists and 
supernaturalists. Obviously, naturalists and supernaturalists must be distinctive as groups 
for there to be any cooperation between them. Finally, the argument in Chapter Six concerns 
benefit (3). This argument questions whether scientific work can truly be done on every 


















4. Defending Provisory Methodological Naturalism: The Inductive 
Naturalization Problem 
 
4.1 Introduction  
Many opponents of Provisory Methodological Naturalism, including all Essential 
methodological naturalists who endorse the Argument from Automatic Naturalization, will 
find themselves at odds with the first benefit of Provisory Methodological Naturalism given 
in the previous chapter. They will not think that the falsifiability of the Provisory naturalism 
thesis is beneficial. Essentialists believe that disproving ontological naturalism is impossible 
in our world. So, for them, there is no way that holding ontological naturalism to be 
falsifiable could ever be a benefit. To the Essentialist, any object or phenomenon observed 
by science must be natural since a natural method simply cannot identify a supernatural 
object. Obviously, a natural method can help affirm a natural ontology. One can easily 
imagine such cases. Using a particle accelerator to discover new particles is using the natural 
method of science to add new members (the newly discovered particles) to the set of natural 
things the ontological naturalist believes in, for example. Likewise, we can imagine how a 
supernatural method could lead to one’s holding a supernatural ontology. For example, a 
séance ritual might compel a belief in the existence of ghosts. But it is more difficult to 
imagine how a natural method could prove the existence of supernatural things. It appears 
the use of natural methods to observe objects would require those objects to be natural. A 
scientific instrument that records evidence of the active ethereal remnants of the recently 
deceased would, necessarily, be recording something which is natural (perhaps because, 
some might argue, it is taking place in our world or, in spacetime). Any observable, 
measurable thing must be a natural thing. An opponent of the Provisory view following this 
line of reasoning will want to say that any “supernatural” objects discovered through science 
would simply be natural objects and that we would expand our natural ontology to include 
them. Discovered ghosts would, therefore, be natural ghosts. A discovered God would be a 
natural God. All of this might be thought of as not so much an argument for the 
unfalsifiability of naturalism, although that is implied, but rather an assumption of what it 
is to do science. In other words, science itself assumes an unfalsifiable ontological 
naturalism. 
Provisory Methodological Naturalism’s claim, then, is twofold; it holds that (1) 
science can evaluate supernatural objects but also (2) supernatural objects can, in principle, 
85 
 
be naturally (scientifically) proven to exist. One of the goals of this chapter will be to defend 
Provisory Methodological Naturalism by defending (2) against a modified version of the 
Argument from Automatic Naturalization. We must hold that the supernatural objects which 
science can evaluate should not be automatically classified as natural objects. This is at the 
very core of Provisory Methodological Naturalism. When answering the question of how to 
address supernatural objects under Provisory Methodological Naturalism we should argue 
that science has, until now, successfully shown ontological naturalism to be correct (despite 
calls by ontological supernaturalists to the contrary). Having said this, it may be the case 
that a supernatural phenomenon is someday proven scientifically but not explained 
naturally.   
Opposed to this Provisory Methodological Naturalist position is the Inductive Form 
of the Argument from Automatic Naturalization or, simply, the Inductive Form. Like the 
standard Argument from Automatic Naturalization, the Inductive Form is based on the 
above idea that the pairing of a natural methodology with a supernatural ontology is (despite 
the atheist parapsychologist’s assertions to the contrary) impossible. One cannot use natural 
methods to prove the existence of supernatural things. The Inductive Form remains a version 
of the Argument from Automatic Naturalization because many of its premises and its 
conclusion are the same. It likewise reasons that, if it is impossible for supernatural objects 
to remain supernatural after being discovered through natural means, then those objects 
must be automatically natural. And it also concludes that ontological naturalism must, 
therefore, be unfalsifiable. But the Inductive Form differs from the standard Argument in 
one important way. It attempts to defend an inductive assumption of the unfalsifiability of 
ontological naturalism (automatic naturalization) by citing historical precedence rather than 
simply asserting in its premises that every “supernatural” object is automatically natural as 
a brute fact.  
In the following section, I will present the structure of the Inductive Form argument. 
Following this, I will offer some responses. Section 4.3.1 will focus on the probabilistic 
nature of inductive reasoning. Section 4.3.2 will focus more generally on the problem of 
induction and the reductionist tendencies of the anti-Provisory methodological naturalist. I 




4.2 The Inductive Form of the Argument from Automatic Naturalization 
Recall that the standard Argument from Automatic Naturalization is 
(1) Science is not equipped to evaluate supernatural objects (Trait 2). 
(2) Given (1), whatever is shown to exist via scientific methods must be 
natural (Even if science were to prove the existence of purportedly 
supernatural objects, those objects would be natural rather than 
supernatural). 
(3) Science is the best and only method for discovering the properties of 
reality and what exists. (Trait 1) 
Therefore, 
(4) Given (2) and (3) ontological naturalism (the thesis that only natural 
things exist) cannot be disproven in our world. 
Also, 
(5) Given (4), Essential Methodological Naturalism is the best form for the 
methodological naturalist (especially a methodological naturalist who is also 
an ontological naturalist) to hold. 
My earlier response to this argument involved attacking (4). I did so by offering a 
defense of falsifiability. Since the Argument from Automatic Naturalization merely 
assumed the unfalsifiability of ontological naturalism, in showing that such an assumption 
is not justified, we are able to challenge both the Argument as well as the validity of the 
Essentialist view itself. Additionally, in introducing and defending Provisory 
Methodological Naturalism, I have also supplied a response to (1). Again, Provisory 
naturalism holds that, contrary to (1), science is indeed equipped to evaluate supernatural 
objects. This principle is at the heart of the Provisory view. If the Provisory view is correct, 
then both (1) and Essentialism are false.  
In this section, I will introduce and critique an Essentialist argument that attempts to 
provide additional support for (1). I call this argument the Inductive Form of the Argument 
from Automatic Naturalization. It may be constructed in the following way: 
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(1) We are justified in holding that science cannot prove the existence of 
supernatural objects just in case there has never been an instance of science 
proving the existence of supernatural objects.  
(2) There has never been an instance of science proving the existence of 
supernatural objects.  
(3) Therefore, we are justified in holding that science cannot prove the 
existence of the supernatural. 
These first three premises are exclusive to the Inductive Form. They replace the first 
premise from the original argument which simply held that science cannot evaluate 
supernatural objects. We can now apply the remaining premises (2-3) and conclusions (4) 
and (5) from the original Argument from Automatic Naturalization.  
(4) Given [(1)-(3)], whatever is shown to exist via scientific methods must 
be natural (Even if science should prove the existence of purportedly 
supernatural objects, then those objects must be natural rather than 
supernatural). 
(5) Science is the best and only method for discovering the properties of 
reality and what exists. (Trait 1) 
Therefore, 
(6) Given [(4) and (5)] ontological naturalism (The thesis that only natural 
things exist) cannot be disproven in our world. 
Also, 
(7) Given [(6)], Essential Methodological Naturalism is the best form for the 
methodological naturalist (especially a methodological naturalist who is also 
an ontological naturalist) to hold.  
The proponent of the Inductive Form asserts that we are justified in holding that 
science cannot prove the existence of supernatural objects because it has never been the case 
that natural methodology has proven the existence of the supernatural. Throughout history, 
all proposed natural evidence of the supernatural has either been shown to be invalid or, if 
genuine, been shown to indicate purely natural phenomena. Positing the supernatural as an 
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explanation for the phenomena is incorrect. Thus, a natural methodology entailing a 
supernatural ontology is impossible. 
Although the ontological supernaturalist may claim that science provides evidence 
of the truth of her ontology, the proponent of the Inductive Form holds that supernaturalist 
evidence, when presented in a form that can be properly examined (as opposed to evidence 
which is too slight to examine, too ambiguous to pronounce on, or which has been 
intentionally falsified), has always turned out to indicate only natural phenomena. Every 
supposed supernatural phenomenon has proved to be explainable using natural phenomena. 
Each proof provides additional support to the Inductive Form’s second premise. Here I will 
focus on a few cases.  
The first category of events which are believed by some to indicate supernatural 
phenomena but which have an alternative natural explanation is spirit communication. Spirit 
communication is any attempt by otherworldly beings to contact the natural realm, often 
using instruments such as pendulums or Ouija boards. In these cases, the effects of a 
pendulum swinging in a specific direction or of an indicator on a lettered board moving to 
spell out words are believed to be evidence of supernatural entities communicating with our 
world. However, as documented extensively in numerous studies (for example, Pfister et 
al., 2010; Shin et al., 2010), such phenomena are explainable as the workings of a natural 
response called the ideomotor effect. In certain conditions, appendages of the human body 
can produce very slight movements which the brain is unable to consciously detect. 
Regarding the examples given above, the hand might produce minute undetectable 
movements strong enough to slide a planchette on a Ouija board or initiate the swing of a 
pendulum. In such cases, to assume the cause of these movements to be supernatural is 
obviously a mistake. Unfortunately, the subject initiating the movement is usually unaware 
of her own involvement and may indeed attribute the results to outside non-natural forces.   
 In addition to spirit communication, the effect of feeling the presence of invisible 
non-material beings such as ghosts can likewise be attributed to natural sources. For 
example, in some cases, ultra-low frequency sound waves called infrasound are the cause. 
Infrasound waves are waves of a frequency just below the normal range of hearing. They 
do not consciously register as audible sound. These unheard sounds can register 
unconsciously, however. According to research, they may evoke feelings of fear and unease 
in the listener (Tandy, 2000). Infrasound waves have even been known to cause visual 
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hallucinations if emitted at a frequency that vibrates the subject’s eyeballs. Vic Tandy, an 
engineering designer whose pioneering research popularized infrasound, reported seeing 
human-shaped gray figures at the periphery of his vision as a result of such eye vibrations 
(Tandy and Lawrence, 1998).  
Other oft-reported non-material beings include menacing ghostly presences who 
seem to physically restrain their sleeping victims. These presences are now known to be the 
result of a physiological phenomenon known as sleep paralysis. A person experiencing such 
paralysis is unable to move or speak during the process of falling asleep or waking. Sleep 
paralysis is primarily the result of the Rapid Eye Movement (REM) state of sleep intruding 
into wakefulness. During REM sleep, the brain is active but the body is effectively 
paralyzed. Sufferers of sleep paralysis find their paralyzed state still in full effect for a brief 
period after they become conscious. Their mind is fully awake and yet their body remains 
frozen. Many who experience such paralysis claim to feel a weight or pressure preventing 
their movement.  Some sufferers attribute the cause of the force to an unseen agent, often 
thought to be both supernatural and malevolent in nature.  
A final category of phenomena which many believe provides evidence of the 
supernatural but which, upon scientific investigation, prove to have natural explanations are 
Near Death Experiences (NDEs). Individual NDEs vary in form but most share the common 
characteristic of exposing the subject to a non-natural realm, typically believed to be the 
afterlife, during a traumatic and/or life-threatening ordeal. The supernatural component of 
an NDE might be the non-natural realm itself, often thought of as Heaven, or a passage 
leading to it. Or, like spirit communication, the supernatural component of NDE’s might 
consist of supernatural beings. For example, the subject might meet deceased friends or 
family. It might also consist of the existence of a non-material soul in which form the subject 
may take. Thus, NDEs are often cited as evidence for dualism.1 Since the exact form which 
NDEs take varies, the natural explanations for each experience also vary. That said, 
elements which are commonly reported, such as traveling down long tunnels, seeing a bright 
light or floating outside one’s body, are usually explained by the effects of oxygen 
deprivation and the workings of the brain and visual cortex (Blackmore, 1991; Jansen, 
1990). Thus, NDE’s, along with all the above purported supernatural phenomena, have 
proven to be purely natural phenomena. The Inductive Form proponent can reason that since 
                                                             
1 Although, not all interpretations of dualism are supernaturalistic. For example, see (Chalmers, 2007, 1996). 
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past phenomena of this sort are explainable naturally, future phenomena will be likewise 
explained.  
But the proponent of the standard Argument from Automatic Naturalization may 
wonder why Essentialists using the Inductive Form feel the need to examine the data at all. 
They might argue that we do not need to insist that the data points to supernatural things 
being merely natural things when we can merely automatically naturalize all observed 
supernatural things. All that needs to be done is to simply conclude than anything observed 
by science is natural. The support for this is already in the original Automatic Naturalization 
argument. However, the Inductive Form proponent will not find this convincing. 
Essentialists using the Inductive Form do not take automatic naturalization as a matter of 
faith. Again, the Inductive Form seeks to provide additional motivation for its assumption 
of ontological naturalism unfalsifiability. We can reason inductively that science will never 
observe the supernatural because it has never done so. Any instances where it was thought 
to have done so, such as in the cases above, were only observations of natural things.   
Thus, the proponent of the Inductive Form uses these various examples of natural 
explanations for supernatural phenomena in her claim that any future discovery of evidence 
for purported supernatural phenomena will instead be evidence of natural phenomena. She 
can then conclude that any pairing of a natural method with a supernatural ontology is 
inconsistent. We should look, the Inductive Form proponent argues, at the natural 
explanations behind spirit communication, ghosts, and NDEs and conclude that similar 
natural explanations will apply to any supernatural claim. This would include claims which 
report evidence that would seem to even a conclusive majority of people to be irrefutable 
proof of the supernatural. The history of science is full of unheard of and unimagined 
discoveries that were truly unexpected and surprising. However, we could not classify such 
discoveries as unnatural merely based on their being surprising. Nor could we classify them 
as unnatural simply because they pertained to information and substances which were, until 
that time, unknown.2 Once these surprising ideas were tested and approved, the enterprise 
of science eventually changed to accommodate them. Perhaps the same may someday be 
said of ghosts. We may someday discover evidence, the likes of which we cannot now 
imagine, to support the existence of ghosts. But science will adapt and accommodate such 
                                                             




evidence. If such evidence were found, we should classify it, and ghosts themselves, as 
natural.   
 A few things are immediately noteworthy regarding the Inductive Form. Critics 
might see these things as problems inherent in the argument. However, I believe these 
immediate issues can (unfortunately, for those of us unsympathetic to Essential 
Methodological Naturalism) be dismissed by the Inductive Form proponent. First, a critic 
might note that the transition from the standard Argument from Automatic Naturalization 
to the Inductive Form involves making the transition from arguing that science cannot 
evaluate supernatural objects to arguing that science can never prove the existence of the 
supernatural (see the first premise of both arguments). If these two processes are different, 
then it may be that the Inductive Form is problematically formulated. Perhaps making this 
transition is not justified.   
However, this transition does seem to be justified and, therefore, cannot be pointed 
to as problematic. Until now, I have assumed that the process of evaluating a theory and the 
process of proving or disproving a theory is mostly the same. The latter merely involves an 
additional concluding step. To prove or disprove a claim one must evaluate it and then 
simply make a conclusion based on that evaluation. This additional step does not seem to 
negatively impact the Inductive Form’s effectiveness. The act of proving involves 
evaluation and, so, the Inductive Form’s transition from evaluate to prove is wholly 
acceptable. 
Thus, premise (1) appears solid. However, critics might instead hold that (2) is 
extremely difficult, if not impossible, to prove. Recall that premise (2) is 
(2) There has never been an instance of science proving the existence of 
supernatural objects.  
Since the dawn of mankind, there have been innumerable instances of purported 
supernatural events or phenomena. The sheer volume of these instances makes accurately 
pronouncing on their overall veracity a highly unlikely task. How can we make the wide-
sweeping assumption that none of these instances really happened? It does not seem, the 




Unfortunately, this second response also fails to dismiss the argument. Responding 
that (2) is impossible to prove merely misunderstands the premise. Premise (2) only holds 
that no supernatural claim has ever been proven scientifically, or, we might say, to the 
satisfaction of mainstream science. This is a lesser claim than one holding that no 
supernatural claim has ever been proven simpliciter and so is easier to assume. Granted, 
there are still many people, including our hypothetical atheist parapsychologist and many 
real parapsychologists, who would not accept (2) and would hold that scientific observation 
has indeed proven the existence of the supernatural. I do not believe this to be the case. 
However, definitively answering such an assertion here is problematic for purely practical 
reasons. To support their claim, supernaturalists must present specific instances of 
scientifically-observed supernatural occurrences. And, as most know, instances of 
purported supernatural activity (paranormal, religious, etc.) are quite common. While I will 
soon discuss a few of these cases, definitively answering the supernaturalists’ allegation 
would require the critical examination of every purported scientifically-observed 
supernatural claim. Obviously, that is well beyond the scope of this thesis. I cannot, though 
it may theoretically be possible, provide a refutation to every claim of scientific validation 
of supernatural objects here.  
In response, the supernaturalist might argue that such universal refutation is 
required. She may insist that, unless science can provide a natural explanation for every 
supernatural claim, then we are not justified in holding premise (2) to be true. However, I 
would again refer to the caveat noted above that (2) is only referring to instances where 
science already has investigated the supernatural claim. (2) does not hold that all 
supernatural claims have been refuted by science. Instead, it is saying that, in all cases in 
which purported supernatural phenomena have been investigated scientifically, no such 
phenomenon has ever been verified as truly supernatural. So, while we may not be able to 
respond to every purported occurrence of the supernatural, we can at least make the 
following claim: Accepted science has yet to prove the existence of non-natural objects or 
phenomena. Mainstream research is simply not producing evidence of the supernatural.  
There are other problems with parapsychologists pointing to various findings in that 
field as “scientific proof” of the non-natural. To begin with, parapsychology itself has had 
its scientific credentials questioned. Examples of work that critiques the idea of 
parapsychology being a science include (Bunge, 1987; Churchland, 1987; Kurtz, 1985). All 
of these authors compare methodologies in “established” sciences such as physics, 
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chemistry, and biology with parapsychological methods. According to them, the latter 
always comes up short. Those who, like these authors, do not believe that parapsychology 
is a science will obviously not see any of the field’s conclusions as scientific. 
But even if we dismiss these arguments and go so far as to allow that parapsychology 
is a science, we still cannot argue that it is a mainstream one. Parapsychologists themselves 
will be the first to acknowledge that their discipline has a long way to go before it is to be 
considered in the same category as physics or astronomy. As such, we can conclude that, 
despite the purported parapsychological findings, there has yet to be a single case in which 
a supernatural phenomenon has been verified by the majority of researchers in mainstream 
science.3  
 
4.3 Responses to the Inductive Form of the Argument from Automatic Naturalization 
In the next two sections, I will address responses to the Inductive Form. At this point, 
however, the average ontological naturalist, either of the Essentialist or Provisory variety, 
may wonder what, exactly, is wrong with the reasoning just presented. For the above merely 
seems to be the way science normally works. A hypothesis is made, tested, disproved, 
proved or found to be inconclusive. Should a new object be discovered, say a new form of 
matter, this object would be deemed natural. Why, then, is it wrong to assume that any object 
so observed should likewise be classified as natural, rather than remain supernatural?  
 Here it is important to acknowledge some things concerning the differences between 
the Provisory and Essentialist views as well as some things concerning the relationship 
between those two views and the Inductive Form argument. To begin with, the disagreement 
between the Provisory view and Essential Methodological Naturalism lies not in the above-
described methodology nor in the way each holds that science should advance. Rather the 
difference between the two views lies in how the naturalistic method suggests a naturalistic 
ontology. Again, the Essentialist holds that no discovery could ever threaten a naturalistic 
ontology as all things that exist in our world are and will always be natural. Meanwhile, the 
Provisory methodological naturalist knows it is wrong to make such a claim since 
                                                             
3 While the scientific status of certain fields may be up for debate, it seems that someone might be a 
methodological naturalist even if she herself is not doing valid science. Recall our atheist parapsychologist 
example in which I hold the parapsychologist to be a methodological naturalist. Even if parapsychology is 
not a science, the parapsychologist can still believe that science is the best and only tool for discovering the 
properties of reality. And my conception of methodological naturalism merely requires this belief.  
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ontological naturalism is fallible. What is right to assume today could be wrong to assume 
tomorrow.  
The premises and conclusion of the Inductive Form will surely look suspect to 
anyone who reasons that we can never assume that the future will be the same as the past. 
Indeed, the conclusion made by the argument is sweeping: Science can never prove the 
existence of supernatural objects. Many individuals sympathetic to Hume’s problem of 
induction (and all Provisory methodological naturalists) will consider this too presumptive. 
But, again, one of the characteristics of the anti-Provisory view is an over-reliance on 
science and ontological naturalism. Science has, until this point, supported ontological 
naturalism and so, they believe, it is reasonable to conclude that it will continue to do so 
indefinitely. As we have previously seen that all Essential methodological naturalists must 
also be ontological naturalists (2.4), it is understandable that these opponents of Provisory 
Methodological Naturalism would make this assumption. For as long as one remains an 
Essential methodological naturalist, one must remain an ontological naturalist. And, as 
one’s ontological naturalism is entailed by one’s method, there is no room for science 
proving the truly supernatural for the Essentialist.  
How then, as Provisory methodological naturalists, are we to respond to the 
Inductive Form? A direct response must obviously criticize one of the three premises 
exclusive to that Argument. However, only one of the three premises can be criticized 
because the other two are obviously true. The two true premises are (2) and (3). Neither of 
these two premises can be faulted. Therefore, we are left with (1) as the only exclusive 
premise which may be questioned and criticized for possible flaws. To see why this is the 
case I will now revisit the three premises. 
The first of the three exclusive premises, (1), is an assumption of the truth of 
induction. It holds that, if it is true that science has not proven the validity of the supernatural 
in the past, then the same will hold true in the future. The second exclusive premise, (2), 
states that it is true that science has not proven the validity of the supernatural in the past. 
The third and final exclusive premise, that science cannot prove the existence of the 
supernatural, is drawn from (1) and (2). Because (3) logically follows from the conjunction 
of (1) and (2), it cannot be questioned unless there is a problem or problems inherent in the 
first two premises. Thus, we know that (3), in and of itself, is a true premise. Likewise, 
premise (2) is true. It is the case that there have never been any instances of scientific 
95 
 
validation of supernatural claims. Therefore, the only premise left to take issue with is the 
first. 
Although we may be limited in which premise of the Inductive Form can be 
addressed, we are not limited in how to address it. At least a couple different responses to 
premise (1) exist. One method of critiquing the first premise of the Inductive Form involves 
critiquing inductive reasoning itself. This type of response highlights the problem of 
induction: “There is a problem with the use of inductive reasoning in any circumstance. 
Therefore, the Inductive Form, which utilizes such reasoning, is problematic.” While this 
method of critique can be effective, it is also quite common. More interesting for our 
purposes here, I believe, is to argue that there is a problem with Essential methodological 
naturalists using the inductive reasoning of the Inductive form. Namely, a characteristic 
inherent in inductive reasoning contradicts the tenets of the Essentialist view. 
 I will focus on this latter method first. My first response will explore the fact that, 
as an inductive argument, the Inductive Form is inherently probabilistic. Because of this, 
the Inductive Form does not allow for the certainty which naturalist opponents of Provisory 
Methodological Naturalism require. In other words, the inductive reasoning of the Inductive 
Form contradicts the opponents’ own Essential Methodological Naturalism. My second 
response will then cover the former method and briefly examine the general problem of 
induction. I have already focused on just such a response with regards to the standard 
Argument from Automatic Naturalization. However, my follow-up here will be slightly 
different. Here I will critique the reductionism inherent in both the Inductive Form as well 
as Essential Methodological Naturalism itself. We are not justified in automatically 
reducing supernatural objects to natural ones or, in other words, holding that ontological 
naturalism is unfalsifiable in our world. The problem of induction shows us that, while it 
may be the case that science has only discovered natural things in our world, we cannot use 
inductive reasoning to assert that this will always be the case. In advocating an anti-
reductionist view, I will hold that we can never reduce all supernatural objects to natural 
ones simply because supernatural alternatives (within our world) will always remain. 
Therefore, the Inductive Form of the Argument from Automatic Naturalization fails to 




4.3.1 Response to the Inductive Form: Induction and Certainty 
As previously noted, the Inductive Form differs from the standard Argument from 
Automatic Naturalization in one important way. While the standard argument merely 
assumed the truth of Trait (2) (“Science is not equipped to evaluate supernatural objects”), 
the Inductive Form seeks to provide justification for Trait (2) using the exclusive premises 
(1-3). The Inductive Form substitutes these exclusive premises in place of Trait (2). In doing 
so, these exclusive premises are thought to support the Inductive Form’s fourth premise, 
that whatever science observes must be natural (Again, in the standard Argument, that fourth 
premise simply followed from Trait (2) and the assertion that science can only evaluate 
natural things). But the problem with the Inductive Form and its exclusive premises is that 
mere inductive reasoning cannot be used to justify as strong a claim as “Whatever science 
observes must be natural”. The opponent of Provisory Methodological Naturalism requires 
certainty here. To support her view, this opponent must include in the Inductive Form the 
premise that science can never observe the supernatural or that whatever is shown via 
science must always be natural. But induction can only get her so far. Because induction is 
inherently probabilistic, such conclusions of certainty are impossible to draw.   
 It may help to unpack these ideas somewhat. First, we might question why the 
opponents of Provisory Methodological Naturalism must include such a strong premise. 
Why must Essentialists hold that science can never observe the supernatural? The reason is 
simple. If Essential methodological naturalists were not so stringent, if they could admit 
even the tiniest possibility of supernatural observation, then they would not be Essential 
methodological naturalists. Instead, they would be Provisory methodological naturalists 
who hold that scientific observation of the supernatural is in fact possible. Such stringency 
is, therefore, required to differentiate the two views. In other words, certainty is a 
requirement for the Essentialist to remain an Essentialist.  
Next, we might re-examine Trait (2), or the notion that science is limited to the 
natural realm, in the context of this Inductive Form argument. Again, the standard Argument 
from Automatic Naturalization took Trait (2) as given: Science cannot evaluate supernatural 
objects because science, by definition, is limited to the observation of natural things. The 
Inductive Form, on the other hand, wants to justify Trait (2) based on historical evidence 
and an inductive leap: Trait (2) is true because science has never evaluated the supernatural 
in the past (and, therefore, will never do so in the future). It is here, in the employment of 
induction, that the Essential methodological naturalist runs into problems. As an Essential 
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methodological naturalist, one must hold that science will never evaluate the supernatural 
in the future (“and, therefore, will never do so in the future”). But induction can only take 
us as far as “probably” or “likely” with regards to this scientific evaluation (“and, therefore, 
will likely not do so in the future”). Reasoning about the future based on the past can never 
produce non-probabilistic conclusions. So, the Inductive Form, unlike the standard 
Argument from Automatic Naturalization, fails to live up to the requirements of 
Essentialism. To see exactly where this occurs, we can look at the actual premises of the 
argument. In the Inductive Form, the first premise where an inductive leap is made is the 
third:  
(3) Therefore, we are justified in holding that science cannot prove the 
existence of the supernatural. 
This premise requires modification. The Essential methodological naturalist opponent of 
Provisory Methodological Naturalism will need to modify (3) to hold that science can never 
prove the existence of the supernatural. Again, this is because Essentialism requires such 
certainty. But induction only allows for a probabilistic claim. Therefore, (3) should be 
modified to read “science will likely never”. The same would hold true for the fourth 
premise: 
(4) Given [(1)-(3)], whatever is shown to exist via scientific methods must 
be natural (Even if science should prove the existence of purportedly 
supernatural objects, then those objects must be natural rather than 
supernatural). 
Here, the Essential methodological naturalist requires that “whatever is shown to exist via 
scientific methods must always be natural. However, the Inductive Form should only allow 
for something like “will probably be natural”. Because of all this, we can no longer say that 
ontological naturalism is unfalsifiable if we utilize the Inductive Form. All the things which 
science discovers will probably be natural, according to the argument, but it is not certain 
that they will be. This obviously poses a problem for the Essential methodological naturalist. 
In using the Inductive Form, she can no longer be an Essentialist but must be a Provisory 
methodological naturalist! Rather than support the Essential methodological naturalist’s 
acceptance of Trait (2), the inductive reasoning in the Inductive Form dismantles it. Any 
conclusion from an inductive argument regarding the scientific discovery of the supernatural 
would actually support the Provisory view: All which science discovers in our world is only 
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likely natural, not certainly natural. Thus, induction does not allow for the Essentialist 
conclusion that “unfalsifiable ontological naturalism is true”. The inductive reasoning of the 
first two premises of the Inductive Form argument does not justify the dogmatic certainty 
of premises (3) and (4). As ontological naturalists, we are, at most, only justified in asserting 
that general ontological naturalism is probably true.  
However, the Essentialist may have some room to respond here. Despite the 
argument above, the Essentialist might argue that inductive reasoning can still provide a 
conclusion that she can be happy with. The Essentialist might inductively conclude that 
probably science can never discover supernatural objects.   
As noted above, the inductive conclusion “All that science discovers is probably 
natural” is a Provisory naturalist conclusion. The Provisory naturalist is the only one who 
can reason that all that science discovers is probably natural (The Essentialist will need to 
say “definitely” rather than “probably”). The same holds true for the inductive conclusion 
“Science will probably never discover supernatural objects”. That conclusion also supports 
Provisory Methodological Naturalism. However, it might be argued that the conclusion 
“Probably science can never discover supernatural objects” is an Essentialist argument. This 
last conclusion is simply a less-than-certain endorsement of unfalsifiable ontological 
naturalism. 
So, the Essentialist can inductively conclude that “Probably science can never 
discover supernatural objects”. Meanwhile, the Provisory inductive conclusion is that 
“Everything that science discovers is probably natural”. Both conclusions hold that it is 
likely that science only discovers natural things. But the former conclusion is stronger than 
the latter. The Essentialist conclusion maintains the strict prohibition (“science can never”) 
that the Provisory conclusion lacks.     
What all of this means is that the Essentialist may be able to use the Inductive Form 
to reason inductively to a conclusion that is amenable to Essential Methodological 
Naturalism. Instead of arguing that the Inductive Form proves that unfalsifiable ontological 
naturalism is true, the Essential methodological naturalist can say that inductive reasoning 
allows us to conclude that probably, unfalsifiable ontological naturalism is true. Inductive 
reasoning may not allow for the original, more rigid Essentialist claim that ontological 
naturalism is definitely unfalsifiable. However, it does allow us to conclude that 
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unfalsifiable naturalism is likely. It is probably the case that everything discovered in our 
world is a natural object.  
Although likelihood is shy of certainty, this modification still results in a strong 
inductive argument for the Essentialist view. The modification successfully answers my 
earlier concern about induction and conclusions of certainty made by the Essentialist. 
Additionally, we cannot simply dismiss this modified argument by labeling it Provisory 
Methodological Naturalism. The conclusion that “probably unfalsifiable ontological 
naturalism is true” is not simply the Provisory view. While the addition of “probably” does 
suggest the possibility of the alternative (i.e., unfalsifiable naturalism not being true), the 
Provisory methodological naturalist must hold that unfalsifiable ontological naturalism is 
definitely not true in our world. For the Provisory naturalist, ontological naturalism is 
definitely not unfalsifiable in our world. Therefore, “probably unfalsifiable ontological 
naturalism is true” is certainly an Essential methodological naturalist viewpoint. 
We can even dig further into this Essentialist inductive conclusion and expand it 
somewhat. Recall our definition of Essential Methodological Naturalism:  
Essential Methodological Naturalism: The thesis that science is the best and 
only method for discovering the properties of reality and what exists (trait 1) 
but that it is restricted to evaluating the natural realm (i.e., unequipped to 
evaluate supernatural objects) (trait 2).  
The conjunction of Traits 1 and 2, according to the Essentialist, result in the unfalsifiability 
of ontological naturalism. The Essentialist knows that the unfalsifiability of ontological 
naturalism is not a necessary truth (i.e., true in all possible worlds); Rather, it is a contingent 
truth (i.e., true in some but not all worlds). But, while ontological naturalism is not 
necessarily true, the Essentialist might at least hold that it is a nomologically necessary truth 
(i.e., true in all worlds with the same laws of nature). The Essentialist might argue that 
ontological naturalism is unfalsifiable in all possible worlds that are governed by the same 
laws of nature as our own. The Essentialist might say that, in addition to having the 
characteristics listed in the definition above, Essential Methodological Naturalism is also 
the thesis that, given the laws of nature in this world, it is necessarily the case that whatever 
we discover through science is always natural.  
Then, instead of holding that the Inductive Form argument leads to the simple 
conclusion that (definitely) unfalsifiable ontological naturalism is contingently and 
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nomologically true, the Essentialist might argue that the Inductive Form allows us to 
conclude that probably unfalsifiable ontological naturalism is contingently and 
nomologically true. If we look at the history of science, we can see that science has never 
discovered anything supernatural. Therefore, it is not unreasonable to conclude that, given 
the laws of nature in this world, it is probably the case that whatever we discover through 
science is always natural. It is probabilistically most likely that unfalsifiable ontological 
naturalism is contingently and nomologically true.  
We can see that this modified Essentialist argument is at least plausible when we 
compare it to similar arguments with necessarily true conclusions. For example, many 
people coherently assume that the ontological argument, which holds that God necessarily 
exists, is probably true. These people argue that “Probably God necessarily exists” or, 
“Probably a necessary God exists”.  Irrespective of the ontological argument’s merits, to 
conclude that the ontological argument is probably true is surely acceptable. There is 
nothing wrong, in principle, with arguing that probably a necessary God exists. The same 
might be said for unfalsifiable ontological naturalism. There is nothing wrong, in principle, 
with arguing that probably unfalsifiable ontological naturalism is true. “Probably 
necessarily P” is a coherent logical statement. Indeed, “Probably necessarily P” is strong 
evidence for “necessarily P”. As such, the Inductive Form proponent might reasonably say 
that the coherent fact that probably unfalsifiable ontological naturalism is true is strong 
evidence for unfalsifiable naturalism being true. 
These intriguing qualities of the Essentialist response may suggest it to be a strong 
reply to my previous worries about the Inductive Form. However, there is some doubt as to 
its effectiveness. Concluding that necessary ontological naturalism is probably true based 
solely on observations of the history of science is suspect. Making the leap from these 
observation claims to this claim of necessity is questionable. Again, the only conclusions 
we can ever make from observations of the history of science are possibility claims, not 
necessity claims. For example, given the history of science, it is possible that everything we 
discover in our world is a natural object. Or, given the history of science, it is probable that 
everything we discover is natural. Therefore, the most one can derive from inductive 
reasoning here is that objects are most likely natural. 
Let us take P to represent ontological naturalism. Provisory Methodological 
Naturalism holds that “It is likely that P is true”. Meanwhile, Essential Methodological 
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Naturalism holds that “It is necessary that P is true”. As noted above, inductive reasoning 
only suggests that “It is likely that P is true”.  Therefore, we can say that the inductive 
reasoning suggests Provisory Methodological Naturalism. Inductive reasoning does not 
suggest the Essentialist view. “It is likely that P is true” is not strong enough to suggest 
Essential Methodological Naturalism because from “It is likely that P is true” you cannot 
derive “It is necessary that P is true” (or even “It is likely that it is necessary that P”). Having 
said this, while the inductive conclusion may not entail Essentialism, the conclusion is still 
compatible with the Essentialist view. “It is likely that P is true” is compatible with Essential 
Methodological Naturalism because “It is necessary that P is true” and “It is likely that P is 
true” can both be true at the same time. Thus, the inductive conclusion is compatible with 
both Essential and Provisory Methodological Naturalism even though inductive reasoning 
only suggests the latter.      
 In conclusion, the Inductive Form argument relies on inductive reasoning to 
motivate Essentialism or, the notion that everything which science evaluates is a natural 
thing. To motivate Essential Methodological Naturalism, the inductive argument must lead 
to the strong conclusion that everything which science evaluates will always be natural. But 
inductive reasoning cannot be used to support such a strong claim. As a result, the Inductive 
Form cannot support Essential Methodological Naturalism. And since the Inductive Form 
fails to support Essential Methodological Naturalism, it also fails as an argument against the 
Provisory view.  
 
4.3.2 Response to the Inductive Form: Anti-Reductionism 
We previously saw that the only viable form of response we can give to the Inductive Form 
is an argument against the Form’s first inductive premise. In my first response, I argued that 
the opponent of Provisory Methodological Naturalism (the Essential methodological 
naturalist) cannot use the inductive reasoning of the first premise to justify their view. My 
argument focused, in part, on specific characteristics of Essential Methodological 
Naturalism and those characteristics’ incompatibility with the Essentialist’s own Inductive 
Form argument. In this section, I will present a more general response to the Inductive Form 
in defense of the Provisory view. This response concerns the reductionism inherent in the 
Inductive Form: The Inductive Form suggests that supernatural objects are reducible to 
natural ones. But such reduction is unjustified because supernatural alternatives (in our 
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world) will always remain. Since such reduction is unjustified, the Inductive Form fails as 
an argument and Provisory Methodological Naturalism is vindicated.  
 The Inductive Form seeks to justify the assumption that science cannot evaluate 
supernatural objects. It does this by asserting that all attempts by science to evaluate the 
supernatural in which phenomena have been shown to truly exist have really been 
evaluations of natural phenomena. The implication, then, is that all future evaluations of so-
called supernatural objects, even those involving hitherto unknown phenomena, will 
likewise be evaluations of natural phenomena. There are two ways this could come about: 
Either the phenomena will be previously understood natural phenomena misidentified or 
mistakenly classified as supernatural. Or they will be (or be the result of) unknown natural 
phenomena, like infrasound, awaiting scientific discovery. Here we can recall McKinnon’s 
similar assertion regarding natural laws which can never be broken (2.5.2). According to 
McKinnon, if someone claims to have witnessed an individual walking on water, for 
example, only two possible explanations for the event could exist. Either the corresponding 
natural law was not actually broken (because the witness was mistaken or duped), or the law 
which states something to the effect of “objects of a certain weight will sink when placed 
unsupported on water” is not, in fact, a natural law. If the latter is the case, then a new natural 
law would eventually take its place to explain the event. This new law might be something 
like “most objects of a certain weight will sink when placed unsupported in water unless x 
is the case” where x denotes the conditions in which the walking on water occurred.4 
McKinnon’s argument obviously utilizes inductive reasoning since he reasons that every 
supernatural object or phenomenon which will ever be posited to exist will be explainable 
via natural law. His view is also a reductionist argument since it holds that ostensibly 
supernatural phenomena will be reduced to natural phenomena. In a similar way, the 
Inductive Form is also reductionist; the Inductive Form reduces supernatural objects to 
                                                             
4 This analysis of McKinnon itself recalls Pigliucci’s earlier criticism of Popper’s strict falsifiability thesis. 
There, Pigliucci stated that it is wrong to discard every theory in which a single contrary piece of evidence is 
discovered. Better, he argues, to modify certain theories in a manner similar to McKinnon’s creation of new, 
revised natural laws. I agreed with Pigliucci’s criticism generally but thought it problematic with regards to 
the falsification of ontological naturalism.  McKinnon’s argument is a good example as to why this is so. 
Unlike Pigliucci, McKinnon would not be justified in his ad hoc modification. When the original natural law 
is falsified, McKinnon should not be able to simply create a new one to take its place and protect ontological 
naturalism like Pigliucci does to protect other theories. Instead, he should hold that, in such a case, 
naturalism itself would be falsified. He should not, in other words, follow the Essentialist view and merely 
modify the law to maintain ontological naturalism. 
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natural ones. A supernatural object can never exist, according to the Inductive Form, 
because a non-reducible, non-natural object can never exist.  
 Along with McKinnon’s theory, the Inductive Form also mirrors physicalism in its 
reductionist tendencies. I noted earlier (3.3) that physicalism holds that everything that 
exists is physical (or supervenes on the physical) and is explainable via the science of 
physics. While the Inductive Form seeks to reduce the supernatural to natural objects, 
physicalism reduces all phenomena to physical objects. This would include little-understood 
and seemingly mysterious phenomena such as consciousness. Physicalist reductionism is 
controversial. But the Essentialist reductionism of the Inductive Form can also be 
questioned because of its unfalsifiability. The Essentialist opponent of Provisory 
Methodological Naturalism can never claim that all supernatural objects will be naturalized. 
Supernatural versions of or alternatives to those objects will always remain. As Provisory 
methodological naturalists, we can and should agree that the natural explanations supplied 
above for the cases of spirit communication, etc. do apply in those cases. However, we 
cannot say they apply indefinitely. Instances of spirit communication may be attributable to 
the ideomotor effect but this does not mean that it is a matter of necessity that all such 
instances are attributable to it. Additionally, even if we assume that we can explain a 
supernatural phenomenon such as ghosts naturalistically, there would ostensibly remain a 
version of that phenomenon which still resides outside of scientific reasoning (yet remains 
theoretically observable). A supernaturalist could easily accept a natural explanation for a 
formerly supernatural phenomenon while still holding that a supernatural version of the 
phenomenon remains. One can accept the existence of natural ghosts and continue to believe 
in supernatural ones as well. Likewise, one can accept a natural explanation of the soul while 
also believing in a non-natural explanation for it. Or one can accept a naturalistic account 
of the afterlife while positing a non-naturalistic version, and on and on. The number of times 
the supernaturalist might propose a supernatural version of a “naturalized” supernatural 
object seems limited only by the number of purported supernatural things. If this is true, 
then such natural explanations could never satisfy the determined supernaturalist. But 
whether such stubborn insistence is justified is not the point. The point is that the opponent 
of Provisory Methodological Naturalism will never be able to credibly assume every past 
and future phenomenon to be natural based on a posteriori reasoning about past scientific 
examinations. There will always be an alternative to those past explanations and 
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hypothetical future scientific discoveries. Truly supernatural objects, therefore, are non-
reducible. 
The idea that supernatural phenomena, while perhaps individually reducible to 
natural ones, could still spawn truly non-natural alternatives is an argument against the 
automatic reduction of all supernatural objects or, against the Inductive Form. If non-natural 
but observable phenomena could still be possible even after every known purported 
supernatural phenomenon is proven to be natural, then we cannot assert, as the Inductive 
Form and standard Argument from Automatic Naturalization do, that every observed object 
is automatically natural. But the proponents of these arguments may still question this: Is 
this notion of non-reducibility really successful in preventing the automatic naturalization 
of any proposed phenomenon? We accept that supernaturalists may have alternatives to 
proven natural phenomena which remain non-natural but, should we observe those 
alternatives, it seems that they should merely be naturalized as well. Assuming that 
supernatural alternatives will remain is simply assuming the falsifiability of ontological 
naturalism. But opponents of the Provisory view will find that assumption problematic. 
Ontological naturalism falsifiability must be justified, not merely assumed. At least, this is 
what the Provisory naturalist says in response to the Essentialist regarding the 
unfalsifiability of ontological naturalism. The Provisory methodological naturalist does not 
allow the Essentialist to merely assume unfalsifiable naturalism. Thus, to hold that it is okay 
for Provisory naturalists to make their assumption but not okay for Essential naturalists to 
do so is hypocritical.     
Crucially, here is where the Essentialist and Provisory views differ and the 
acceptance of one over the other has more to do with the acceptance of the arguments (many 
of which are pragmatic) detailed in the previous sections and chapters than it has to do with 
any flaw in the Essential methodological naturalist’s reasoning. The Provisory 
methodological naturalist accepts that science could indeed naturalize every proposed 
supernatural phenomenon which supernaturalists propose. However, while the Essentialist 
holds that objects that are truly supernatural are not observable via science, the Provisory 
methodological naturalist holds that, at least theoretically, they are.  
 The question then becomes one of differentiation. If the Essential methodological 
naturalist is going to observe a purported supernatural phenomenon and label it “natural” 
while the Provisory methodological naturalist is going to observe the exact same 
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phenomenon and label it “supernatural”, what exactly separates the two classifications 
beyond semantics? When, in other words, is the Provisory methodological naturalist 
justified in labeling a phenomenon “supernatural” and, thus, falsifying ontological 
naturalism? This question is a very difficult one to answer. Any attempt to develop a strategy 
for distinguishing between natural and supernatural discoveries appears to run into problems 
in much the same way attempts to demarcate between science and non-science do.5 Because 
of this, the Essential methodological naturalist might accuse the Provisory methodological 
naturalist of not having a satisfactory answer to this problem. The Essentialist might say that 
the Provisory view is untenable because there is no effective method for distinguishing 
between natural and supernatural objects. Ontological naturalism cannot be falsifiable if 
there is no standard criterion which we can use to prove the existence of objects which 
would falsify it. I will address this problem for Provisory Methodological Naturalism, the 




The Inductive Form of the Automatic Naturalization Argument holds that we are justified 
in always assuming all discovered objects to be natural objects since, historically, all 
discovered objects have been natural objects. However, the inductive reasoning utilized by 
the Inductive Form argument leads to premises which contradict the view of the only group 
who can utilize it. Essential methodological naturalists require certainty which induction 
cannot provide. Additionally, we can critique the reductionism of the Inductive Form and 
standard Argument from Automatic Naturalization by asserting the possibility of non-
natural alternatives to “naturalized” supernatural objects. 
However, opponents of Provisory Methodological Naturalism have another 
argument available to them. We have yet to provide a method which would allow us to 
conclusively prove the existence of the supernatural. Specifically, we have yet to provide a 
criterion for distinguishing supernatural from natural objects. Without such a criterion, it is 
arguable that Provisory Methodological Naturalism is untenable.
                                                             




5. Defending Provisory Methodological Naturalism: The 
Distinction Criteria Problem 
  
5.1 Introduction 
The arguments against Provisory Methodological Naturalism introduced thus far have failed 
to convince. For example, the Argument from Automatic Naturalization requires the 
unfalsifiability of ontological naturalism which is untenable. Additionally, the Inductive 
Form of the Argument from Automatic Naturalization fails because the inductive reasoning 
of the Inductive Form clashes with the anti-Provisory view. Methodological naturalists who 
oppose Provisory Methodological Naturalism require a certainty which the Inductive Form 
cannot provide.  
At this point, it might be beneficial to consider the burden of proof in relation to 
methodological naturalism. To defend Provisory Methodological Naturalism, we are not 
required to prove that (A) science has observed the supernatural. Provisory Methodological 
Naturalism does not require ontological supernaturalism. But nor do we only need to show 
that (B) the supernatural is metaphysically possible. Rather, along with (B), we need to show 
that (C) it is epistemically possible that science will observe the supernatural. If science can, 
in principle, evaluate supernatural objects, then the Provisory view is a viable option. The 
Provisory view requires the assumption of (B) and (C) even though what the Provisory 
methodological naturalist assumes is possible, namely the falsifiability of ontological 
naturalism, would itself require (A) and (B). To put it another way, the possibility of 
observing of the supernatural (i.e., the Provisory view) requires the 
metaphysical/ontological assumption of (B) and the epistemological assumption in (C). But 
the actual observance of the supernatural entails (A).1, 2 
 So, if we can show that we must allow for the above metaphysical and epistemic 
possibilities of the supernatural (and assuming some form of methodological naturalism is 
true), then Provisory Methodological Naturalism is true. However, in allowing the 
possibility of observable non-natural objects, the Provisory methodological naturalist faces 
some tough questions. As noted, we have always heralded the discovery of new forms of 
                                                             
1 Proving (A) would itself involve other requirements. For example, the requirement that any supernatural 
cause of a natural effect must be the necessary cause of that effect and not simply a sufficient one.   
2 Of course, if the supernatural were actualized (A), then (B)and (C) would also be the case. While (B) and 
(C) do not entail (A), (A) obviously entails (B) and (C). 
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matter as natural discoveries. The confirmation of the existence of the Higgs Boson, for 
example, saw this new particle being accepted into our “natural ontology set” or, the set of 
existing natural things. Likewise, allowing science to observe supernatural objects implies 
that their discovery is, at least theoretically, possible. But how do we justify this difference 
between the two discoveries? What exactly is the difference between natural and 
supernatural objects? Is there an underlying reason why we must continue to allow for a 
category of supernatural things and is there a method that allows us to consistently 
distinguish between natural things and supernatural things? With regards to these last two 
questions, I addressed the former in my responses to Essential Methodological Naturalism 
and to the Inductive Form of the Argument from Automatic Naturalization: We must 
continue to allow for a category of supernatural things because we cannot hold ontological 
naturalism to be unfalsifiable in our world. In this chapter, I will introduce a challenge for 
Provisory Methodological Naturalism which involves the latter question. This challenge is 
based on an argument for the claim that the Provisory view cannot be adopted because the 
falsifiability it advocates is untenable. It is untenable because we could never reliably 
distinguish between the natural and the supernatural. 
Another way to put this is to say that we cannot adequately classify supernatural 
objects as such. “An apple belongs to the category of ‘red things’” is an example of 
classification. We can note the characteristics of apples which allows them to fit into the 
category of red things, namely their property of being red. And while there may be some 
vagueness when it comes to the classification of certain objects and categories (Is Tom tall 
or average height?), when the object’s characteristics are clear and the parameters of the 
category are obvious, then classifications are often easily made. The problem with placing 
things into the “supernatural” category, as opposed to the “red things” category, is that it is 
not immediately obvious which properties of an object would lead it to be classified as such. 
The characteristics of ostensibly supernatural objects and the parameters of the 
“supernatural” category itself are entirely unclear. What, exactly, are the characteristics of 
a ghost that determine it to be supernatural? Or, what are the parameters of “supernatural 
objects” which allow us to place ghosts within that category?3 If we are unsure as to what 
qualities make a ghost a supernatural object, then it does not seem that we are justified in 
classifying it as such. We might just as well classify it as a natural object. And if we cannot 
                                                             
3 Saying that supernatural objects are simply non-natural or are the opposite of natural objects offers no 
solution. Unless we simply assume that every object is natural, a similar question to the one regarding the 
parameters of supernatural objects might be posed with regards to the parameters of natural objects.  
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distinguish between natural and supernatural things, then the first benefit which extols the 
falsifiability of Provisory Methodological Naturalism is proven false. We could never 
falsify ontological naturalism or prove without a doubt that supernatural things exist if we 
cannot distinguish supernatural things. We might call this argument the Argument from No 
Distinction Criterion. 
The Argument from No Distinction Criterion has the potential to be a powerful 
response to Provisory naturalism. However, it should be noted that only Essential 
methodological naturalists can use the Argument without contradicting themselves. 
Methodological supernaturalists who disagree with Provisory Methodological Naturalism 
cannot argue for this lack of distinction to disprove the Provisory view. This is because 
methodological supernaturalists must be ontological supernaturalists. Again, 
methodological supernaturalists already believe that supernatural things exist. And existing 
supernatural things are, necessarily, distinct from natural things. Because they implicitly 
rely on a distinction between the natural and the supernatural, supernaturalists obviously 
cannot employ a response which says there is no such distinction. At the same time, 
Provisory Methodological Naturalists will not want to utilize an argument that attempts to 
disprove their own view. Therefore, the only group able to use the Argument from No 
Distinction Criterion is the Essentialists.  
 In the next section, Section 5.2, I will present the structure of the Argument from No 
Distinction Criterion against Provisory Methodological Naturalism. In that section, I will 
briefly discuss what separates the Argument from No Distinction Criterion from previous 
arguments, including the Inductive Form examined in the previous chapter.  Following this, 
I will present four responses to this argument. The first response, which I will introduce in 
Section 5.3.1, holds that no distinction criterion is necessary. We can maintain Provisory 
Methodological Naturalism without distinguishing between natural and supernatural things. 
What is important is determining which objects exist, not whether said objects are natural 
or supernatural. This response, I believe, fails. The second response, which I will introduce 
in Section 5.3.2, holds that, while no definitive distinction criterion is needed, some sort of 
distinction between natural and supernatural things is required. In place of a universal 
criterion, we should have one that is subjective or, left to the individual. However, this 
response also fails. The third response, which I discuss in Section 5.3.3, assumes that a 
definitive, universal distinction criterion is necessary and, thus, cannot be subjective. This 
response will outline a universal method of distinguishing which I call the Similarity 
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Criterion. After introducing the Similarity Criterion in this response, I will then present and 
address two anticipated problems with its implementation in Sections 5.4.1 and 5.4.2. I 
argue that, while the Similarity Criterion has merits, the difficult problems it faces are 
insurmountable. Finally, I will lay out my fourth response in Section 5.5. Like the first 
response, this counter-argument holds that no distinction criterion is necessary. However, 
unlike that response, it also holds that it is still important to distinguish between natural and 
supernatural things. I conclude that it is this fourth approach, a pragmatic response to the 
Argument from No Distinction Criterion, that is successful. 
 
5.2 The Argument from No Distinction Criterion 
The Argument from No Distinction Criterion holds the following: It is accepted as fact that 
many phenomena which were at one time commonly believed to be supernatural, such as 
lightning, were later determined to be natural. Additionally, the opposite has never been the 
case. Something previously thought to be natural has never proven to be supernatural. We 
have no verifiable experience with supernatural objects and, therefore, no reliable way to 
differentiate the supernatural from the natural. So, not only do we lack the necessary 
experience with supernatural objects to be able to classify newly discovered objects as such, 
but any object so classified may, like lightning, eventually prove to be natural. Historically, 
at least, that has always proven to be the case. If we cannot reliably distinguish the 
supernatural, then we cannot say, as the Provisory methodological naturalist wants to, that 
the supernatural is discoverable by science. And if the supernatural is not discoverable by 
science, then ontological naturalism is not falsifiable. Thus, Provisory Methodological 
Naturalism is untenable. We might formulate a simple version of the Argument like this: 
(1) If there is no universal distinction criterion by which to distinguish 
supernatural things from natural things, then Provisory Methodological 
Naturalism is false. 
(2) There is no universal distinction criterion by which to distinguish 
supernatural things from natural things. 
(3) Therefore, Provisory Methodological Naturalism is false. 
 In a discussion of ideas related to this Argument from No Distinction Criterion, 
Yonatan I. Fishman writes, “Historically, the boundary between what has been defined as 
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‘natural’ or ‘supernatural’ has shifted with scientific progress. Disease, lightning, 
meteorites, and comets were all considered ‘supernatural’ phenomena until they were given 
law-like ‘natural’ explanations consistent with other empirically supported ‘natural’ 
theories” (Fishman, 2007, p. 824). Methodological naturalists who oppose the Provisory 
view will say that natural explanations will always be favored in this way. But even 
Provisory methodological naturalists (at least those who are also ontological naturalists) will 
need to admit that we have no experience with supernatural objects. As Fishman notes, 
“supernatural” phenomena with which we have had direct contact have always been 
incorrectly classified natural phenomena. As a result, we appear to have no reliable way to 
recognize these objects. 
The Inductive Form Argument against Provisory Methodological Naturalism 
introduced in the previous chapter also relied on the fact that scientifically verified 
supernatural phenomena are always recognized as natural phenomena. In that argument, this 
premise leads to the inductive conclusion that no supernatural phenomenon will ever be 
discovered by science. However, the Argument from No Distinction Criterion is not as 
overtly presumptuous as the Inductive Form. It does not hold that, based solely on a review 
of past experience, we are justified in thinking that every supernatural phenomenon will turn 
out to be natural. Instead, it states that, if we were to allow for the validity of truly 
supernatural objects, we would have no method of telling the difference between these non-
natural objects and natural objects. At the same time, the Argument from No Distinction 
Criterion is just as sweeping as the Inductive Form. The proponent of the Argument from 
No Distinction Criterion holds that this lack of any definitive distinguishing criterion is 
enough to counter the Provisory claim that evidence can be presented to falsify ontological 
naturalism. It is enough, in other words, to invalidate Provisory Methodological Naturalism. 
It may be important to point out here that this No Distinction argument against 
Provisory Methodological Naturalism is not asserting that the Provisory view merely lacks 
a way to observe supernatural objects. Although the Essential Methodological Naturalist 
opponent of the Provisory view would indeed hold that science cannot record or observe the 
truly supernatural, this is not what the Argument from No Distinction Criterion is claiming. 
Instead, it is arguing that science cannot distinguish the supernatural. There is a difference 
between saying that science cannot observe the supernatural and saying that science cannot 
distinguish the supernatural. Distinguishing supernatural from natural things involves the 
verification of supernatural objects. Even allowing the possibility that science could devise 
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a valid method to observe the supernatural, it would still face problems in the distinguishing, 
or verification stage according to the argument.   
 
5.3. Responses to the Argument from No Distinction Criterion 
In the following sections, I will look at some responses to the argument that Provisory 
Methodological Naturalism is false because we cannot adequately distinguish between 
natural and supernatural objects. But before considering these responses, I would like to 
briefly examine the idea that the argument fails because we are justified in categorizing an 
object as natural or supernatural even without knowing the exact reason why the object fits 
into the category. In other words, we are justified in calling a ghost a supernatural object 
even if we cannot determine the properties which make it such. We might consider the 
following example: As children, we know that an apple belongs in the category of red-
colored things even though we likely do not know the details of why that is so. We are 
ignorant of such things as the properties of light and the mechanics of vision. Similarly, we 
would be justified in classifying ghosts as supernatural even though we do not know, 
specifically, which properties of the ghost make it that way.   
There may be several problems with this analogy but one large problem is that it 
fails to recognize that prior experience is the basis of our knowledge of things like the color 
red. We know that an apple should be classified as a red-colored thing because we have 
prior experiences of other red-colored objects. But supernatural things are different. We 
have no prior experiences with supernatural objects and, therefore, no basis for comparison. 
This is the crux of the Distinction Problem. We have no history of supernatural objects. 
Thus, unlike natural things like apples, we cannot immediately know that any supernatural 
object might be classified as such.  
 
5.3.1 Response to the Argument from No Distinction Criterion: No Distinction Needed 
Some have defended Provisory Methodological Naturalism and the idea that science can 
test (observe and verify) supernatural objects while also arguing that distinguishing between 
the natural and the supernatural is useless or unimportant. To these individuals, what is 
important is not determining which objects are supernatural. Instead, the important thing is 
determining which objects exist and which do not. If this argument is sound, this would 
provide a strong response to the Argument from No Distinction Criterion which holds that 
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being able to determine natural from supernatural is necessary for Provisory Methodological 
Naturalism to work. Yonatan Fishman provides an example of this sort of dismissal in his 
paper entitled ‘Can Science Test Supernatural Worldviews?’ (Fishman, 2007). Fishman’s 
primary intention in that paper is to introduce a process for testing and determining the 
validity of supernatural claims.4 However, along the way, he also makes the claim, which I 
will soon discuss, that the natural/supernatural distinction is inconsequential.  
Fishman never labels himself a Provisory methodological naturalist. However, it 
seems likely that he would identify as such. Fishman, like all Provisory naturalists, endorses 
methodological naturalism and explicitly refutes the anti-Provisory view that science cannot 
evaluate supernatural objects. For example, he says 
Are claims involving ‘supernatural’ phenomena inherently untestable and 
therefore outside the province of science? The present article argues that this 
is not the case. Science does not presuppose Naturalism and supernatural 
claims are amenable in principle to scientific evaluation (Fishman, 2007, p. 
814). 
Fishman, like BBB and myself, also argues that restricting science to the natural realm 
merely corroborates the Creationist claim that science is problematically biased.   
To exclude, a priori, the supernatural would validate the complaint voiced by 
some ID adherents and other creationists that science is dogmatically 
committed to Naturalism and thus opposed in principle to considering 
supernatural explanations (Fishman, 2007, p. 814). 
The question then is this: In insisting that the supernatural be amenable to scientific 
evaluation are we then required to distinguish between natural and supernatural things? 
Must the Provisory methodological naturalist really devise a distinction criterion? Fishman 
does not think so. Late in the article, he says the following: 
[T]he present author maintains that demarcating ‘science’ from 
‘pseudoscience’ or ‘natural’ from ‘supernatural’ is not only problematic but 
                                                             
4 Fishman’s process utilizes a combination of Bayes’ theory and three established methods of scientifically 
evaluating the truth of claims to determine the legitimacy of purported supernatural phenomena The three 
methods are, “(1) by consideration of the prior probability of a claim being true, (2) by “looking and seeing” 
(i.e. by consideration of the evidence for or against a claim), and (3) by consideration of plausible alternative 
explanations for the evidence” (Fishman, 2007, p. 816). 
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unnecessary. The crucial question is not, Is it science? or Is it supernatural?, 
but rather, Is there any good reason to believe that claim X is true? Whether 
the entities or phenomena posited by claim X are defined as ‘natural’ or 
‘supernatural’ is irrelevant to the scientific status of the claim. If the 
fundamental aim of science is the pursuit of truth—to uncover, to the extent 
that humans are capable, the nature of reality—then science should go 
wherever the evidence leads. If the evidence were to strongly suggest the 
existence of supernatural phenomena, then so be it (Fishman, 2007, p. 830).  
Fishman asserts that distinguishing between the natural and the supernatural is irrelevant. 
To him, the focus should be on the truth of the claim which, utilizing his own approach, 
science can indeed determine. If we assume Fishman’s view, then we must hold that our 
previous emphasis on ontological naturalism falsification is simply misguided. It does not 
matter whether we discover a supernatural ghost but only whether we discover a ghost. It 
does not matter that we discover a new supernatural object but only that we discover a new 
object. We should be Provisory naturalists in the sense that we should assume that science 
can evaluate supernatural things. However, we do not need to worry about the falsification 
of ontological naturalism at all. Regarding discovered objects, what matters is existence and 
not classification as natural or supernatural.5 
If one assumes Fishman’s view, then talk of defending Provisory Methodological 
Naturalism by defending the falsifiability of ontological naturalism will seem wrong-
headed. Fishman would likely argue that Provisory Methodological Naturalism should not 
be concerned with distinguishing between natural and supernatural things to show that 
ontological naturalism may possibly be proven false. Instead, Provisory Methodological 
Naturalism should only hold that methodological naturalism is falsifiable (and, therefore, 
should be only provisionally accepted). It is the thesis that science is the best and only 
method for discovering reality that should be falsifiable. Ontological naturalism should not 
come into play.  
However, this does not seem reasonable. We cannot pull apart methodological 
naturalism and ontological naturalism in this way. The two forms of naturalism are 
inseparable. We know this for a couple of reasons. First, and perhaps most controversially, 
                                                             
5 One can perhaps distinguish a thing without classifying or labeling that thing. But here I will assume that 
when we distinguish natural from supernatural we also classify those objects as either one or the other.   
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science has never suggested the existence of objects that would be deemed supernatural. 
Thus, accepting scientific findings as the best and only picture of reality (methodological 
naturalism) should mean accepting ontological naturalism. A provisional acceptance of the 
thesis that science is the best and only method for discovering reality should require the 
provisional acceptance of the additional thesis that only natural things exist. This is true, 
despite the assertions of the atheist parapsychologist (methodological naturalist/ontological 
supernaturalist). Recall that she holds that science proves the existence of supernatural 
things. While this view is coherent, it is not correct.  
Second, should supernatural objects exist, science (or at least natural science) could 
not be the best and only possible method. There would need to exist methods other than 
science which tell us about these non-natural objects. In other words, should ontological 
naturalism be proven false, then methodological naturalism would necessarily be proven 
false as well. And we could say something similar if supernatural methods are ever proven 
effective. Ontological naturalism would necessarily be false (1.3). Additionally, because the 
two types of naturalism cannot be separated, Provisory Methodological Naturalism must 
recognize both methodological and ontological naturalism as falsifiable (3.3). If it is 
possible that the thesis that science is the best method for discovering reality is false, then it 
must also be possible that the thesis that only natural things exist is false. 
Additionally, Fishman’s assertion that the focus should be on the truth of the claim, 
which science ultimately determines, seems problematic if not contradictory. How is one to 
follow his suggestion and determine if the evidence “suggests the existence of supernatural 
phenomena” if one cannot define said phenomena as supernatural? We can imagine 
evidence which would “strongly suggest” the existence of ghosts, for example. Would 
Fishman hold that such phenomena should still be thought of as “supernatural” based on 
said evidence? This may be unlikely given that Fishman knows we can also hypothesize 
discoverable phenomena which have a nature like lightning. That is, we can imagine 
phenomena which appears supernatural but which is ultimately explainable naturally. It 
would be wrong to simply label this type of phenomena supernatural. Likewise, it would be 
wrong to label everything discovered as natural, for this would contradict Provisory 
Methodological Naturalism.   
  But perhaps Fishman would persist and hold that labels such as “natural” and 
“supernatural” should be dropped entirely. Again, the only thing that matters, implied in the 
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quote above, is what exists or does not exist. But this approach also leads to problems. If 
Fishman indeed holds this view, then, although he may identify himself as a Provisory 
methodological naturalist, he could not reasonably identify himself as either an ontological 
naturalist or ontological supernaturalist. Fishman would need to hold something of an 
“agnostic” view with respect to the distinction between naturalism and supernaturalism in 
ontology. In other words, he would need to hold that we are not justified in thinking either 
ontological naturalism or ontological supernaturalism to be true.6 Those views are simply 
meaningless without the use of the above labels. If objects can only be classified as 
“existing” or “non-existing” rather than natural or supernatural, then there obviously can be 
no classifying and differentiating between the ontologies which include supernatural things 
and those which do not.7 In short, the dropping of the natural/supernatural labels in favor of 
existence claims requires the immediate forced acceptance of an agnostic view of ontology. 
But that is too big a price to pay. Few will want to abandon their ontological position. 
Besides that, nothing in Fishman’s writing suggests a lack of commitment to naturalism or 
supernaturalism. So, it seems possible that he too would avoid this approach.  
That said, there is no denying that Fishman sees the classification of objects as 
existent or non-existent as more valuable than classifying them as natural or supernatural. 
If he does consider himself to be an ontological naturalist, then he does not seem to connect 
the implications for his ontological naturalism to his methodological approach. By focusing 
only on the existence of objects at the expense of distinguishing the natural from the 
supernatural, Fishman discards the core criterion of falsifiability inherent in Provisory 
Methodological Naturalism. Again, to hold that ontological naturalism is falsifiable, we 
need to be able to distinguish objects or phenomena which will falsify it. Granted, Fishman 
does not go so far as to explicitly suggest that ontological naturalism is unfalsifiable (nor 
should he as a Provisory methodological naturalist). However, it is a real question as to 
what, since he believes that science can test for the existence of the supernatural, he thinks 
the status of ontological naturalism is. Does Fishman hold it to be falsifiable or not? Perhaps 
                                                             
6 I take the term “agnostic” here to mean something like the “positive agnosticism” of an individual who 
believes that we cannot know whether a proposition such as “God exists” is true. Fishman’s view requires 
that we cannot know whether naturalism or supernaturalism is correct. I do not take the term to mean a kind 
of “negative agnosticism” in which an individual simply does not know whether the proposition is true, but 
thinks it possible that we could know. For more on positive and negative agnosticism, see (Scriven, 2003). 
7 An alternative to ontological agnosticism would be ontological nihilism, or the belief that neither 
ontological naturalism or supernaturalism are true. But this is an indefensible position. Either natural things 
(and only natural things) exist or supernatural things as well as natural things exist. We cannot say that none 
of these things exist. 
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he merely holds that, should an apparently supernatural phenomenon be discovered, then 
we would be justified in abandoning ontological naturalism. If said phenomenon were later 
proven to be natural, like lightning, then we might reclaim it. But if this is the case, I would 
still hold that his dismissal of the distinction question is wholly unwarranted. This is because 
the transition of the phenomenon from supernatural to natural just is distinguishing between 
natural and supernatural things.   
In this section, I have assumed Fishman’s position and have been attempting to 
provide solid answers to how it is, exactly, that we know labeling objects as natural or 
supernatural does not matter (and that only existence does). The reasoning behind Fishman’s 
position is not easy to determine because Fishman does not formally defend this view. One 
can only speculate as to his thinking. For example, maybe Fishman would say that 
classifying objects as natural or supernatural is unimportant because classifying does not 
help us determine ontology. It seems reasonable to assume that classification should help us 
confirm an ontological position. The discovery of a “supernatural” ghost, for example, 
should prove the truth of ontological supernaturalism. But, Fishman might say, we cannot 
assume that classification will help do this. Consider again the phenomenon of lightning. 
Upon discovery, lightning was classified by many as a supernatural object. But the 
discovery of lightning and its subsequent classification obviously did not confirm 
ontological supernaturalism. If people became ontological supernaturalists based on the 
existence of lightning, they were simply in error. Because classification cannot help us 
confirm an ontological position, classification of things as natural and supernatural is 
unimportant.  
Fishman’s opponent might object here and say that this is to be expected given that 
the object was mistakenly classified in the first place. She might say that what is important 
is only that correctly classified objects confirm ontology. Incorrectly classified objects 
obviously cannot confirm an ontological naturalism or supernaturalism but correctly 
classified objects can. And because correct classification confirms ontology, correct 
classification is indeed important. However, Fishman might still have a way to respond. He 
can argue that even classifications we assume are correct (“trees are natural”, for example) 
cannot always confirm ontology. This is most obvious in the case of natural things. Labeling 
an object as “natural” can never prove the truth of ontological naturalism. It always remains 
an open possibility that supernatural things exist in the natural world. Therefore, in this case, 
classification does not help us confirm the corresponding ontological position (ontological 
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naturalism). And, again, because classifying an object as “natural” or “supernatural” has no 
conclusive effect on the theses that only natural things exist and that supernatural things 
exist, labeling an object “natural” or “supernatural” is irrelevant. 
Naturalists would love to say that the exclusivity of natural objects confirms 
ontological naturalism. However, we cannot assume this to be the case. As previously noted, 
supernatural objects may one day be discovered as well. That being said, while the exclusive 
identification of natural objects does not confirm ontological naturalism, the exclusivity or 
natural objects does at least strongly support ontological naturalism. The fact that, thus far, 
science has only discovered natural objects and has yet to uncover ghosts or ESP or other 
phenomena generally classified as supernatural does provide strong support for the idea that 
ontological naturalism is true. And this strong support of ontological naturalism is enough 
to prove that the classification of natural things is indeed useful. Thus, Fishman would be 
wrong to hold that classification is not useful simply because it does not confirm an 
ontological position. 
From all of this we can conclude that, not only is the refusal to distinguish between 
natural and supernatural objects impractical generally for the above reasons, such a refusal 
is surely problematic for the Provisory methodological naturalist who requires the 
falsifiability of ontological naturalism. We must be able to distinguish supernatural objects 
if we are to hold ontological naturalism to be falsifiable. Therefore, this response to the 
Argument from No Distinction Criterion fails. We are not justified in dismissing the idea of 
distinction entirely in favor of focusing on existence. While it may be the case (as I will 
argue with my fourth response) that no distinction criterion is necessary, we still need to be 
able to classify objects as natural and supernatural rather than simply existent or non-
existent.  
 
5.3.2 Response to the Argument from No Distinction Criterion: Subjective Distinction  
Our first response to the Argument from No Distinction Criteria has failed. Distinguishing 
between natural and supernatural things is not a pointless endeavor. We might now consider 
taking the opposite approach. Rather than assume that distinction does not matter, we might 
assume that it does. The second approach I will examine affirms the existence of the 
distinction between the natural and the supernatural and holds it to be relevant. But this 
approach also suggests that the criterion for distinguishing is entirely subjective.  
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Again, contrary to the problematic first response, this response at least recognizes 
the difference between natural and supernatural things. However, it also holds that defining 
a universal criterion for distinguishing between the two categories is unnecessary. 
According to this argument, what is important is only that we embrace the falsifiability of 
ontological naturalism. How we embrace it (or, more specifically, that the criterion for 
falsifiability is definitive or universal) is not important. The Essentialist opponent of 
Provisory Methodological Naturalism argues that, without a definitive criterion to know 
natural from supernatural, we cannot know when to abandon our ontological naturalism. 
But we can respond to this by saying that, if the naturalist at least recognizes ontological 
naturalism to be falsifiable, the decision about when to consider it falsified can simply be 
left up to the individual. The individual naturalist can know, personally, when their 
ontological naturalism has been falsified and needs to be abandoned. A standard criterion, 
then, is not required. In other words, while there is no objective distinction criterion, we can 
instead have individual or, subjective distinction criteria.  
It is important to note that this view must only be applied to cases where a reasonable 
observer might question whether a discovered object or phenomenon is supernatural. So, 
for example, some people assume telepathy to be natural while others hold it to be 
supernatural. A reasonable observer might question the classification of telepathy. The 
proponent of subjective distinction would then hold that it would be up to the individual 
naturalist to determine whether the discovery of telepathy would qualify as a discovery of a 
supernatural object. Subjective distinction should not be applied indiscriminately. A 
naturalist who subjectively holds that, say, electrons are supernatural entities would not be 
operating in the true spirit of subjective distinction. A reasonable observer would not 
question whether electrons are supernatural.  
Subjective distinction may be necessary if an objective criterion to distinguish the 
natural and supernatural is impossible to determine. And, although I will later propose such 
an objective distinction criterion, a good case can also be made that objectively 
distinguishing the supernatural from the natural cannot be done. One person who believes 
this is Richard Carrier. He writes, 
Consider psi, the undefined power which would explain ESP and telekinesis, 
among other things. We would all readily call that supernatural. But why? If 
there was a lawful, regular feature of the universe which allowed ESP and 
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telekinesis to exist, then wouldn’t psi be natural, not supernatural?  What 
makes something supernatural anyway? We can levitate and move an entire 
train with magnetism, and transmit thoughts by radio, two powers that the 
ancients of Paul's day would certainly have called supernatural. Even God 
could be entirely natural, for if he existed he would be a regular feature of 
the universe, every bit as much as you or I. The attempt to draw a line 
between God and nature will always be somewhat arbitrary (Carrier, 1999). 
Given the arbitrary nature of distinguishing natural from supernatural things, it is not a 
stretch to hold that no objective criterion for distinguishing exists. But that does not mean 
that no criterion exists, period. Rather, the falsification of ontological naturalism is a 
subjective determination. (It is important to note that Carrier’s use of the word “arbitrary”, 
implies such subjectivity. It is not being used here, as it sometimes is, to imply randomness.)  
Making the criterion subjective answers the Argument from No Distinction Criterion 
but it also does something else. It prevents the indiscriminate elimination of the supernatural 
as a category. In other words, it prevents making ontological naturalism unfalsifiable. Prior 
to the above statement, Carrier argues against what he calls the “naturalistic fallacy”. 
Essentially, this is his term for the unjustifiable automatic naturalization of the supernatural. 
Like the Provisory methodological naturalist (perhaps Carrier would identify as such), 
Carrier believes that we are not warranted in dismissing without cause the scientific 
evaluation of supernatural objects. It is wrong to commit this naturalistic fallacy because 
the category of supernatural things is arbitrary or, subjective. We are never justified in 
dismissing any arbitrary categories, especially not without reason. For in doing so we 
“pointlessly eliminate possible theories”, according to Carrier. And these theories, he 
argues, may turn out to be correct. Therefore, automatic naturalization, or the holding of 
ontological naturalism to be implacable and unfalsifiable, is groundless if the supernatural 
is indeed subjective.   
But now we face a couple of problems. First, some might argue that there is little 
difference between the subjective naturalization of supernatural objects and the automatic 
naturalization of those objects. It seems wholly possible that the Provisory methodological 
naturalist could subjectively decide to naturalize all discovered objects, thereby effectively 
naturalizing objects automatically. In other words, the outcome of subjective naturalization 
and automatic naturalization could be identical. The Provisory methodological naturalist 
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might subjectively naturalize all supernatural objects just as the Essential naturalist 
automatically does. Because automatic naturalization contradicts Provisory Methodological 
Naturalism, the Provisory methodological naturalist will not be able to subjectively 
naturalize objects if doing so means she is merely automatically naturalizing them.  
We might attempt to answer this by saying that, while the outcomes may be identical, 
the processes of arbitrary naturalization and automatic naturalization are different. 
Automatic naturalization necessarily holds true for all discovered objects while arbitrary 
naturalization is done only when subjectively warranted. Essential naturalists necessarily 
naturalize every object that science discovers. But Provisory naturalists do not recognize 
this necessity. This differing motivation for naturalization is sufficient to make the two 
forms of naturalizing different.  
However, consider this claim from Carrier which immediately follows the above 
passage: 
Nature is what exists: we look at the world, learn how it works, discover its 
inhabitants and rules and call that nature. Consequently, God, miracles, 
psionics, angels, ghosts, flying saucers, would all be a part of nature if they 
existed (Carrier, 1999).   
 The above seems very similar to the position of the anti-Provisory naturalist who 
automatically naturalizes. Additionally, Carrier’s description in the first passage does not 
appear to be much different from the process of the Essential methodological naturalist who 
automatically naturalizes: According to Carrier, we observe psi and, as a result, deem it a 
part of nature. On the face of it, this appears to be automatic naturalization. But we also just 
noted that Carrier recognizes automatic naturalization as a fallacy. So how do we reconcile 
this apparent inconsistency? How can Carrier seemingly accept automatic naturalization and 
recognize it as problematic at the same time?  
 The confusion here stems from Carrier’s use of the word “nature” and what that 
word is thought to denote. In the above passage Carrier uses “nature” to denote the whole 
of reality or, everything that exists in our world. But “nature” has another connotation. It 
can be used to refer to the natural or, the totality of all natural things (and nothing more). 
Under this usage, to infer that a supernatural object might exist in nature is incoherent. No 
supernatural object can exist in a set consisting of all and only natural things. But under 
Carrier’s usage, it makes sense. Carrier is not suggesting that nature only consists of natural 
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things. Carrier’s “nature” or, the whole of reality, can include supernatural objects. In other 
words, it is possible for Carrier’s “natural” to include the supernatural. I believe it is 
important to make this distinction and that Provisory methodological naturalists should take 
care in their use of this term. They should not hold that nature is everything that exists in 
our world and that nature refers to the totality of all natural things and nothing more. This 
is because Provisory naturalists must believe that the supernatural could possibly exist in 
our reality.     
 In his discussion above, Carrier makes his own suggestion about how we can 
separate nature from the natural. While we can consider nature to be “everything that exists”, 
we can hold natural things to be “lawful, regular features of the universe”. Non-natural or 
supernatural things may be a part of Carrier’s nature if they exist. However, they would not 
be lawful, regular features of the universe. So, if an object fails to be a lawful, regular 
feature, it would not be natural. At the same time, things which are thought to be 
supernatural, like lightning, but prove to be lawful, regular features are in fact natural things. 
I believe this is a good general approach to distinguishing the natural from the supernatural. 
In fact, Carrier’s position here mirrors the approach I will soon defend in Section 5.5. 
Unfortunately, it is not perfect. For one thing, it is unable to answer the question of how we 
classify a newly discovered object now, while we wait to determine if it is a lawful, regular 
feature. 
So far in this section, I have introduced a few objections to the subjective distinction 
criterion but have provided answers to each. I will close by offering two final problems for 
a subjective criterion which are more conclusive. I argue that these problems constitute deal-
breakers for a subjective distinction criterion. The first problem involves the use of 
subjectivity for something as important as the falsification of ontological naturalism. It is 
too easy to move from the notion that each individual naturalist subjectively decides which 
evidence is grounds for the falsification of ontological naturalism to the idea that each 
Provisory naturalist holds different standards for falsification. Or, to employ a commonly-
used term, to move to the idea that Provisory naturalists accept varying defeaters for 
ontological naturalism. What serves as evidence to defeat or falsify ontological naturalism 
for one naturalist may not be satisfactory evidence to another naturalist. As such, do we 
really want to accept subjective distinction/falsification and rely on personal taste in 
deciding something as significant as the classification of natural and supernatural things? 
That does not seem reasonable. The method that would be used to bring about the 
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falsification of ontological naturalism, the scientific method, is thought to be the epitome of 
objectivity. However, if the actual decision to falsify naturalism is a subjective one, this 
objectivity is negated. 
 Second, and along similar lines, if we hold the falsification of ontological naturalism 
to be a personal decision, then we must also say that the truth of ontological naturalism itself 
is a matter of subjective judgment. A subjective distinction criterion holds that the correct 
ontology is whatever is true for the individual naturalist. While we want to say that 
ontological naturalism may be falsified, we do not want to go so far as to say that, should a 
single Provisory methodological naturalist decide that ontological supernaturalism is true, 
that this indeed would be the case. That is too big of a leap to make. Therefore, Provisory 
methodological naturalists who are also ontological naturalists will likely want to avoid a 
subjective distinction criterion. 
In part because of the above reasons, a compelling case can be made for the claim 
that Provisory Methodological Naturalism requires a non-arbitrary criterion for classifying 
discovered objects as either natural or supernatural. If we allow for both natural and 
supernatural sets in our world, then we should have a non-arbitrary method for determining 
the members of those sets. In the next section, I will take up the view that a non-arbitrary, 
universal distinction criterion is warranted and propose such a criterion of my own.  
 
5.3.3 Response to the Argument from No Distinction Criterion: The Similarity 
Criterion   
Again, the Argument from No Distinction Criterion formulated is: 
(1) If there is no universal distinction criterion by which to distinguish 
supernatural things from natural things, then Provisory Methodological 
Naturalism is false. 
(2) There is no universal distinction criterion by which to distinguish 
supernatural things from natural things. 
(3) Therefore, Provisory Methodological Naturalism is false. 
In the previous section, I challenged (1) by arguing for a subjective distinction criterion. 
There I held that Provisory methodological naturalists might subjectively determine when 
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supernatural things exist. I will now offer a response to the Argument from No Distinction 
Criterion which addresses (2). This response attempts to answer the question of how we 
know when ontological naturalism is falsified by taking into consideration current 
conceptions of supernatural phenomena and how closely the hypothetical observed 
phenomena resemble them. I call this principle the Similarity Criterion.  
The Similarity Criterion is quite simple. Everyone holds conceptions of 
paradigmatic examples of supernatural objects. The Similarity Criterion has it that whether 
a discovered object is supernatural can be determined by noting the similarity between the 
object and these examples. Under the Similarity Criterion, we might say that the closer an 
observed phenomenon resembles our current concept of a supernatural phenomenon, the 
more likely it is to be supernatural.8 We should note that the Similarity Criterion is not an 
argument. Instead, it is a principle or guideline for the falsification of ontological naturalism. 
That said, if it is an acceptable principle, then premise (2) above is false and the Argument 
from No Distinction Criterion against Provisory Methodological Naturalism fails.   
 Let us consider three possible scenarios: 
Scenario 1 (Ghosts): Scientists isolate and conclusively prove the existence of the spectral 
remains of a deceased human being. These remains are visible, roughly human-shaped and 
able to communicate and interact with the physical world.  
Scenario 2 (Energy): Scientists isolate and conclusively prove the existence of a new form 
of energy, attached in some way to human beings, and which operates after their deaths. 
This energy differs physically from the phenomenon in Scenario 1 in that, unlike the ghosts, 
it is invisible and temporary. Its behavior is different from the ghosts’ in that it is completely 
non-responsive to stimuli from the physical world. Also, it differs essentially from the 
ghosts in that it is not sentient and shows little of the other characteristics which living 
entities normally have. However, it does directly affect the physical world and can serve as 
                                                             
8 Daniel Stoljar suggests something similar when discussing conceptions of physicalism. His object-based 
conception holds that a physical property is one which is “required by a complete account of the intrinsic 
nature of paradigmatic physical objects and their constituents…” (Stoljar, 2001, p. 257). A chair is a 
paradigmatic physical object, for example. Therefore, the property of being a chair is a physical property. It 
is the intrinsic connection with paradigmatic physical objects that makes a property physical. We might want 
to similarly say that, according to the Similarity Criterion, an intrinsic connection with paradigmatic 
supernatural concepts makes a discovered object supernatural. But here we see a significant difference 
between the two ideas. Paradigmatic physical objects are different sorts of things than paradigmatic 
concepts. Stoljar’s conception of physicalism depends on paradigmatic objects which, idealist arguments 
aside, exist in the world. The Similarity Criterion, on the other hand, relies on paradigmatic concepts which 
exist only in the mind.  
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a possible explanation for purported cases of supernatural activity including poltergeists, 
hauntings, etc.   
Scenario 3 (Hallucinations): Scientists discover that, like infrasound (4.2), certain 
frequencies of the electromagnetic spectrum which operate just outside of the visible range 
(say, in the near ultraviolet or near infrared range) can have an unconscious effect on vision. 
These effects include hallucinations and can serve as a possible explanation for purported 
cases of supernatural activity including ghost sightings.   
 The first scenario concerns the discovery of an object which is identical to the current 
concept of certain supernatural objects, namely ghosts. Therefore, according to the 
Similarity Criterion, this object would be easy to classify as supernatural. The discovery of 
such an object, therefore, would obviously falsify ontological naturalism. The second 
scenario depicts the discovery of an object which, although it may be directly responsible 
for many of the occurrences associated with the supernatural, bears little resemblance to the 
common current concept of ghosts.9 Its classification, then, is questionable. Finally, the last 
scenario depicts the discovery of a previously-unknown form of radiation and would 
obviously be classified as natural. Another way to look at this Similarity Criterion is in terms 
of real-world (non-conceptual) familiarity: The object discovered in Scenario 3 is quite 
similar to other previously-made real-world scientific discoveries (the visible spectrum, 
ultraviolet, and infrared light) so is easily deemed natural. The object in Scenario 2 exhibits 
many new characteristics, yet is also familiar in the sense that other forms of energy are 
familiar. However, the object in Scenario 1 is almost entirely unlike anything previously 
experienced and is, therefore, easier to classify as supernatural. If the Similarity Criterion is 
valid, then the Provisory methodological naturalist has a way to respond to the Argument 
from No Distinction Criterion. She can respond by insisting that there is indeed a method 
for distinguishing between natural and supernatural things. One simply looks at how similar 
a discovered object is to current paradigmatic examples of supernatural objects.  
 One potential problem for the Similarity Criterion can be dealt with relatively 
quickly (compared to the more involved problems of the next section). This problem 
suggests that the Similarity Criterion is flawed because classifying future discoveries based 
on present concepts is backward. There is no reason to believe that our current concepts of 
                                                             
9 Although, admittedly, some may argue that it does bear a strong resemblance to other supernatural objects 
such as auras or psychic energy. 
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supernatural objects would accurately predict supernatural discoveries. Defining the 
supernatural based on current concepts is presumptuous. It is unlikely that we already know 
what all the possible supernatural things would be, especially since the ontological naturalist 
holds that those supernatural things have yet to be discovered by science. Additionally, we 
recognize that our current concepts are just that (i.e., present convictions or established 
ideas). Holding that science would only discover truly supernatural objects if those objects 
match said concepts (or, in other words, insisting that future supernatural objects must 
conform to present concepts) may seem like pulling the cart before the horse. Therefore, the 
Similarity Criterion fails. 
But the Similarity Criterion does not suggest that we will predict future discoveries. 
Such an interpretation of the Similarity Criterion is incorrect. The ontological naturalist 
believes that notions of the supernatural are entirely subjective.10  Supernatural objects 
simply are whatever our current subjective concepts of them are. The Similarity Criterion 
correctly assumes the subjectivity of the supernatural. It is not “pulling the cart before the 
horse” to maintain that any discovered supernatural object must conform to current concepts 
of that object simply because no object which is not currently conceived as supernatural 
may be considered as such upon discovery. In the same way, it is not pulling the cart before 
the horse for astronomers to assert that all planets discovered in the future must have certain 
properties, without which they would not be planets. It would be wrong to say that this 
cannot be the case because astronomers are predicting what future planets will look like.   
                                                             
10 The de facto position of the ontological naturalist, in my view, should be one which holds notions of the 
supernatural to be subjective, There are no, and never have been, supernatural objects. Therefore, concepts 
of the supernatural must be entirely subjective. We cannot even say that there is indirect evidence for the 
supernatural like there is indirect evidence for the existence of dark matter, for example. While it is true that 
the Provisory methodological naturalist who is an ontological naturalist will hold that it is possible that 
supernatural objects exist, acknowledgement of this possibility does not require agnosticism with respect to 
ontology. The Provisory naturalist need not be agnostic about the current existence of supernatural things. 
To be fair, though, one’s position on this matter may have to do with how one pictures the combination of 
Provisory Methodological Naturalism and ontological naturalism. Those who believe that the Provisory 
methodological naturalist must take a softer position with respect to ontological naturalism (given that the 
Provisory view allows for the possibility of supernatural things) may argue that holding all notions of the 
supernatural to be entirely subjective is too strict. Per this softer view, Provisory Methodological Naturalism 
does require personal agnosticism about the existence of supernatural objects. As such, we should not make 
the leap to labeling notions of the supernatural as entirely subjective. However, those like myself who argue 
that the Provisory methodological naturalist might take a more hardline view of ontology will say that the 
leap is justified. Yes, the Provisory methodological naturalist who is also an ontological naturalist must 
recognize the fact that her ontology as falsifiable. But this does not mean she should remain agnostic about 
the existence of supernatural things. A high degree of certainty about the truth of ontological naturalism that, 
nevertheless, happens to be less than one-hundred percent certainty does not mean that one should be 
agnostic about the truth of ontological naturalism.       
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We should also note that to say that all supernatural objects must conform to current 
concepts is not to succumb to automatic naturalization. The Similarity Criterion does not 
assert that every discovered object will necessarily be natural. Instead, the Provisory 
methodological naturalist who uses the Similarity Criterion believes that objects in-line with 
current concepts of supernatural objects are possible and should indeed be deemed 
supernatural upon discovery. It is just that she also believes that these are the only possible 
supernatural objects.        
Returning to our proposed hypothetical discoveries, we see that we have two 
extreme scenarios and one “middle ground” scenario. Scenario 1 concerns the discovery of 
an object which, the argument holds, should be considered supernatural while Scenario 3 
concerns the discovery of an object which should be considered natural. If we chart 
hypothetical discoveries related to purported supernatural phenomena on a line, these two 
would be on the extreme opposite ends. We then have Scenario 2 which appears to be a 
mixture of both, or something of a “middle ground”. We can imagine many such scenarios 
like this middle ground scenario, all perhaps incorporating some aspects of our current 
concepts of supernatural phenomena but differing in certain ways. Our line of hypothetical 
discoveries respective of the above scenarios relating to “ghost” might look something like 
the following:         
Hypothetical discoveries (respective of ‘ghost’): Conscious, 
communicative, immaterial spectral being with human-like 
characteristics/personality - Conscious immaterial being - Affective energy 
- Energy - Self-induced phenomenon (ideomotor effect, sleep paralysis, etc) 
The discoveries range from obviously supernatural at the beginning to obviously natural at 
the end. Keep in mind that these discoveries are not linked in any way. There is no implied 
connection between “affective energy” and “energy”, for example. They are merely possible 
discoveries, with the former being more like the paradigmatic supernatural object than the 
latter.  
Between the first (“Conscious, communicative…”) and last (“Self-induced 
phenomenon…”) discoveries are “middle ground” scenarios. With regards to these middle-
ground scenarios, it seems the Provisory methodological naturalist has two options. First, 
she might say that the closer the hypothetical discovered object is to the current concept of 
the supernatural the more likely it is that the object is supernatural. This option represents 
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the Similarity Criterion as I originally presented it above. The current concept of a ghost is 
identical to the first object in the line: a “conscious, communicative, immaterial spectral 
being with human-like characteristics/personality.” Thus, if a discovered object is a 
conscious, immaterial being, it is more likely to be supernatural than a self-induced 
phenomenon. This seems reasonable and avoids certain problems, one of which will be 
touched on shortly (5.4.2). However, this option also leads to ambiguity. Some may instead 
want a clear strategy for differentiation. They may argue that if the goal is to determine the 
conditions under which it is required that the Provisory methodological naturalist abandon 
ontological naturalism, “the closer an object is” and “the more likely” are not going to 
suffice. So, alternatively, we might consider the second option which is to hold that only a 
hypothetical discovery which is identical to the current concept (the first object in the line) 
can be considered supernatural while all other discoveries must be considered natural. We 
might call this the “strict identity requirement”.  
Admittedly, the strict identity requirement makes the Similarity Criterion something 
of a misnomer. Similarity is a degreed property and, therefore, any similarity criterion would 
seem to require the alternative “closer, more likely” approach. Strict identity goes beyond 
similarity into equivalency. As a result, the supernaturalist may protest, this strict identity 
requirement would allow for a wide range of natural phenomena and only a seemingly 
limited range of supernatural ones. However, proponents of the strict identity requirement 
would argue that this is necessary and warranted when what hangs in the balance is the fate 
of ontological naturalism. For if even one object identical to the current concept of a 
supernatural object should be proven to exist, then, contrary to the Essentialist view, 
ontological naturalism would be proven false.   
 
5.4 Problems with the Similarity Criterion   
In Section 5.3.2, I examined the argument that no natural/supernatural distinction criterion 
is needed because each Provisory methodological naturalist individually decides when or if 
ontological naturalism is falsified. This led to the response that such an approach is 
problematic because it leads to individual naturalists having varying defeaters for their 
ontological naturalism. A similar problem may arise with the Similarity Criterion and its 
use of current concepts of the supernatural. Some may argue that “current concept” is a 
vague term and, as such, may be interpreted in various ways. This makes its use in a 
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distinction criterion problematic. I can imagine a couple of problems with basing a criterion 
on current concepts of the supernatural, assuming that said concepts are vague. I will attempt 
to address these problems here. First, it seems that there can be general disagreement over 
what a current concept of a supernatural object consists of. Second, some might argue that 
our current concepts are wrong or incomplete because a “middle ground” object, such as a 
“conscious, immaterial being” should itself be considered supernatural.  
 
5.4.1 Disagreement about Current Concepts 
The first problem with the Similarity Criterion concerns the notions of “current concept” 
and disagreement. To fully realize the Similarity Criterion, we would need to list out all the 
current paradigmatic examples of the supernatural. While this would be an extraordinary 
undertaking, it does seem at least theoretically possible. But even if we could list out all the 
things currently considered to be supernatural (in all the myths, legends, belief systems, etc. 
in all the cultures that exist), there might still be disparities. It is likely, maybe even probable, 
that there would still be disagreement about what is included as current concepts of 
supernatural objects versus natural objects. In turn, this would lead to disagreements about 
which objects would classify as supernatural and which would simply be “middle ground” 
natural objects.  
The defender of the Similarity Criteria should admit that the above is very likely to 
be true. It is quite probable that people would disagree on various proposals for current 
conceptions of the supernatural. However, this, in and of itself, is not so great a problem as 
to make the criteria unusable. There are numerous areas in science where controversial 
theories within a mainstream view arise (for example, string theory within quantum 
physics). However, this dissent does not render the original mainstream method invalid. The 
same might be true for the Similarity Criteria. There may be sporadic disagreement as to 
what should be considered a valid “current conception” of the supernatural, but this alone 
would not immediately invalidate the criteria.  
Additionally, it is important to remember that, while science requires justification 
for its theories, the Similarity Criterion only requires consensus. The scientist might point 
to evidence as support for her views. One hypothesis is more plausible than another, she 
might say, given the evidence supporting it. But this is not the case with concepts and the 
Similarity Criterion. There is no way for one to argue that their own current concept is better 
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than another’s current concept by presenting evidence in support of their view. Instead of 
being a hindrance, this restriction may lend credibility to the Similarity Criterion. The 
Criterion does not require us to know how or why current concepts became popular nor does 
it require justification (perhaps in the form of evidence) for their popularity. It merely 
requires us to know which concepts are the most widely-held. And this is easy to do. Just as 
in science, the more popular views are going to be, among other things, more widely 
discussed. Thus, current paradigmatic examples of the supernatural could be easily 
distinguished from the less popular and fringe examples. 
 
5.4.2 “Middle Ground” Objects as Supernatural 
Another possible problem with the Similarity Criterion results from our earlier attempt to 
avoid ambiguity. By discarding the “closer, more likely” approach and insisting that only 
objects which are identical to the current concept be considered supernatural, we arguably 
place too strict a restriction on supernatural classification. For example, it seems wholly 
probable that many people, naturalists and supernaturalists alike, would think that the 
second hypothetical discovery in the line above, a “conscious immaterial being”, is 
supernatural.11 Perhaps this would be especially true should this being somehow be linked 
with a previously living counterpart. However, a Similarity Criterion with a strict identity 
requirement (“for an object to be supernatural it must be identical to the current concept”) 
prevents this discovery from being classified as such.  
Additionally, we might recall the argument against reductionism made previously 
that held that supernatural alternatives will always be available despite naturalistic discovery 
(4.3.2). In that argument, it was hypothesized that, if an object identical to the current 
concept of “ghost” was proven to exist and then automatically naturalized (as in the 
Essentialist account), an alternative supernatural version of a ghost could be posited. But 
such a supernatural alternative could be posited even without automatic naturalization. If 
such a conscious immaterial being were discovered, nothing could stop ontological 
supernaturalists from insisting that such a being is supernatural and it seems that, barring 
acceptance of the Similarity Criterion, there are no good reasons to insist otherwise. This 
                                                             
11 For space purposes, these descriptions of the supernatural concepts are brief. In truth, it seems that the 
Similarity Criterion would require a fuller description of each concept. Such a description would allow for 
the matching of a sufficient number of the properties of a discovered object to a sufficient number of 
properties of the concept in order for it to be both sufficient and necessary that the discovered object match 
the supernatural concept. But just what a sufficient number of properties would be is difficult to say.  
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being the case, it is unreasonable to assume that only objects identical to the current concepts 
of supernatural objects should be considered supernatural upon discovery.     
One response to this problem is to advocate a return to the more ambiguous “the 
closer, the more likely” form of the Criterion rather than insisting that the discovered object 
be identical to the current concept. True, such an approach is not definitive but we might 
say that it is better than nothing. And it does have the advantage of avoiding these problems 
associated with a strict identity requirement. Also, as noted before, similarity is a degreed 
property so “the closer, the more likely” better fits the notion of a “similarity criterion” 
anyway. If we prefer a Similarity Criterion to an “Equivalency Criterion”, then this approach 
seems reasonable.  
Having said this, the proponent of strict identity still has ways to respond to this 
“’middle-ground’ objects are supernatural” problem. For example, she might assert that 
sufficiently full descriptions of supernatural concepts (descriptions of the sort mentioned in 
the above footnote 11) would eliminate ambiguity and make this problem irrelevant. Were 
we ever able to provide full descriptions of supernatural concepts, we would eliminate 
“middle-ground” objects altogether. Alternatively, she might simply agree that these 
“middle-ground” examples (e.g. “conscious, immaterial being”) should themselves be 
considered current concepts of supernatural objects. In other words, what was once 
identified as a “middle ground” natural object (for example, as in Scenario 2) should simply 
become a supernatural object (or a “Scenario 1-type” object). If we allow the Similarity 
Criterion to recognize “conscious, immaterial being” as a supernatural object, then we have 
answered the problem above. Individuals who would hold that the discovery of a conscious, 
immaterial being is a discovery of a supernatural object would then be able to strictly 
identify that discovered object with the supernatural “conscious, immaterial being” in the 
Similarity Criterion. Essentially, what this response does is suggest that the number of 
current concepts of supernatural objects recognized by the Criterion is too low if none of 
these concepts reflect “conscious, immaterial being”. Since many people believe that these 
various secondary examples should be classified as supernatural, we should expand the 
number of supernatural concepts recognized by the Similarity Criterion to accommodate 
these people and their beliefs.  
The two proposed problems for the Similarity Criterion which I have examined in 
this and the previous section have not proven to be insurmountable. Disagreement about 
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current concepts and “middle ground” objects can both be addressed. But an argument might 
also be made that the Similarity Criterion is valuable for at least a few reasons: First, in the 
spirit of cooperation, the Criterion credits ontological supernaturalists’ current accounts of 
supernatural objects. Current popular concepts of the supernatural are based, at least in part, 
on what supernaturalists believe to exist. They are not based on naturalistic notions of what 
a non-natural object would be (assuming such notions are even possible). So, while it is true 
that the strict identity requirement (“for an object to be supernatural it must be identical to 
the current concept”) is demanding and that some supernaturalists would hold such a 
criterion to be too inflexible, few supernaturalists would be able to say that the supernatural 
concepts to which the discovered object must be identical to are ones which they could not 
endorse.  
Second, while individual Provisory methodological naturalists likely disagree about 
the chances of science ever discovering supernatural objects, all Provisory naturalists hold 
that a certain standard must be reached for any object to qualify as supernatural. One 
advantage of the Similarity Criterion is that it would have the indirect effect of keeping this 
standard sufficiently high. A supernaturalist who ascribes existence to a non-natural ghost 
based on sounds in the attic or photograph frames toppling over is not justified in her belief 
in the existence of the supernatural. This is because such occurrences would just as easily 
fit under Scenario 3 (hallucinations, natural object) as they would under Scenario 1 (Ghost, 
supernatural object). The believer would need to collect more (and more appropriate) 
evidence to justifiably label such a phenomenon as supernatural.  
Finally, the whole point of suggesting the Similarity Criterion was to enable us to 
avoid having to automatically naturalize every discovered object or, in other words, to avoid 
having to adopt the naturalist alternative to the Provisory view, Essential Methodological 
Naturalism. Should it be successful, the Similarity Criterion would provide an answer to the 
Argument from No Distinction Criterion and seemingly allow us to do just that. 
That said, the Similarity Criterion is far from foolproof. There remain numerous 
problems with the idea of accurately distinguishing natural from supernatural objects based 
on popular concept alone. One big concern has to do with the fact that “current conceptions”, 
despite the discussion above, remains a vague notion. This vagueness is exhibited in things 
like terminology. For example, in discussing current conceptions of the supernatural I have 
referred to them as both “concepts” and “paradigmatic examples”. While I have assumed 
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that these terms are interchangeable, an argument might be made that these are two different 
things. The former is an inherently subjective thing, the latter is something objective. If the 
subjective concept we have of a supernatural object is not identical to the objective 
paradigmatic example of that supernatural object, then we have disparity. And while our 
concepts may approximate the paradigmatic examples, it seems likely that they would not 
be identical to them. If this is the case, we would then need to know whether to compare the 
discovered objects to the idealist concept in our heads or to the realist paradigmatic example 
which objectively exists somewhere outside the mind. Perhaps simply adjusting the 
terminology here would sharpen the idea and help clarify things but perhaps not. 
It may be that, if the Similarity Criterion is in any way successful, it is only part of 
the answer. Mine is not the only attempt to develop a distinguishing criterion to separate the 
natural from the supernatural; Some other proposals are highly detailed (and are often quite 
technical).12 It is possible that the Similarity Criterion might work in tandem with one of 
these other theories. Or, more likely, it may be that we do not need to come up with an 
appropriate criterion. A universal distinction criterion is unnecessary. This does not mean 
that we do not need to distinguish between natural and supernatural things, as the first 
response suggested. Nor does it suggest that an objective distinction cannot be made 
between natural and supernatural objects, as the second response suggests. Rather, there is 
a pragmatic solution to the problem of No Distinction Criterion. 
 
5.5 Response to the Argument from No Distinction Criterion: The Pragmatic Solution  
While the Similarity Criterion does have the advantages just mentioned, it is unable to 
definitively answer the Argument from No Distinction Criterion given the vagueness of 
“current conceptions” of the supernatural. My final response will hopefully provide a more 
conclusive answer. The pragmatic solution to the Argument from No Distinction Criterion 
combines elements from the first and third responses given above. Like the first response, 
the pragmatic solution argues that no universal distinction criterion is needed. And like the 
third response, it argues that current conceptions should be taken as legitimate. Though it 
                                                             
12 For example, Taner Edis and Maarten Boudry seek to establish the boundary between the natural and 
supernatural by advocating a form of physicalism which uses combinations of necessity and chance or, 
algorithmic rules and randomness, to explain available data sets. As I understand it, this leads to the 
assumption that tasks beyond necessity and chance are also beyond physics. Utilizing concepts from 
theoretical computer science, they hold such tasks to be found in noncomputable functions. The existence of 
a noncomputable “oracle”, or, in other words, the existence of a unique signature in data sets, would signal 
something beyond physics or, supernatural (Edis and Boudry, 2014). 
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does differ slightly from the third response in that these legitimate current conceptions are 
conceptions of the natural rather than conceptions of the supernatural. The pragmatic 
solution holds that, given their usefulness, we should provisionally take our current 
conceptions of natural things to be legitimate.  
In his book, Science Without Laws under a section entitled, “Naturalism and 
Pragmatism”, Ronald N. Giere makes the following claim,  
A pragmatic orientation suggests that it would be a mistake to embark on a 
search for a universal criterion to demarcate science from non-science. 
Rather, we should provisionally take the recognized sciences of our own time 
as legitimate. If specific doubts are raised about any of them, these doubts 
can then be investigated… This attitude corresponds well with the historical 
record which shows that what counts as a scientific explanation changes over 
time (Giere, 1999, p. 76). 
While Giere here focuses on the demarcation between methodologies (science versus non-
science), we can apply the same pragmatic approach to the question of demarcating between 
ontologies (natural versus supernatural). Substituting ontology for methodology in the quote 
above we get: “A pragmatic orientation suggests that it would be a mistake to embark on a 
search for a universal criterion to demarcate natural from supernatural. We do not need a 
universal criterion to demarcate the natural from the supernatural. Rather, we should 
provisionally take our current conceptions of natural things to be legitimate (i.e., we should 
assume that ontological naturalism is true). If specific doubts are raised about [ontological 
naturalism], these doubts can be investigated. This attitude corresponds well with the 
historical record which shows that what counts as a natural explanation changes over time 
[e.g., lightning].” Giere does not get into detail in the quote above as to why we are justified 
in making this provisional assumption. However, a general tenet of pragmatism is that 
certain assumptions are justifiable just in case they are useful. In this case, our provisional 
distinction of natural things is useful because it allows for science to progress. Making this 
distinction allows for scientific advancement which itself provides benefits to mankind (e.g., 
medicine, technology, etc.). We might also argue that the distinction is useful because it 
allows us to maintain the falsifiability of ontological naturalism.  
With this, we have provided a pragmatic solution to the Argument from No 
Distinction Criterion. No universal criterion is needed to distinguish between natural and 
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supernatural things. Rather our current conceptions of the natural, resulting from scientific 
observation, may be thought of, at least provisionally, as legitimate and exhaustive of all 
existing things in our world. One appealing thing about this solution is that it specifically 
advocates for the Provisory view (“…we should provisionally take…”, “If specific doubts 
are raised about [ontological naturalism], these doubts can be investigated”).  
The pragmatic solution differs from the other responses to the Argument from No 
Distinction Criterion in several ways. First, as noted above, the pragmatic solution diverges 
from the third response in that the pragmatic solution focuses on conceptions of natural 
things rather than conceptions of supernatural things (“Rather, we should provisionally take 
the current conceptions of natural things to be legitimate.”). But another, perhaps more 
obvious way the pragmatic solution differs from the third response is that the pragmatic 
solution holds there to be no universal, standard distinction criterion. While the Similarity 
Criterion of the third response is meant to act as a universal criterion, the pragmatic solution 
says that no such criterion is necessary. All that is needed are our current conceptions of 
natural things. That said, this does not mean that the pragmatic solution follows completely 
in-line with the first response which also holds that no criterion is necessary. The pragmatic 
solution deviates slightly from the first response in that it does not argue that the 
classification of natural and supernatural things is unimportant (and that the only thing that 
matters is existence). Instead, the pragmatic solution holds that the classification of natural 
and supernatural things does matter. While no definitive distinction criterion is required, 
natural objects, as observed by science, are still distinct from supernatural objects. Finally, 
the pragmatic solution differs from the second response in that the pragmatic response does 
not consist of a subjective criterion. This is because it relies on objective concepts of the 
natural.    
 The Essentialist position, with its unfalsifiable ontological naturalism, is that the 
supernatural cannot exist in our world. Since science is all-pervasive in our world, and since 
science can only evaluate natural things, only natural things can exist in our world. The 
Argument from No Distinction Criterion attempts to support this view by arguing that 
hypothetical supernatural objects in our world could never be classified as supernatural 
because there is no method by which to distinguish natural from supernatural objects. 
Meanwhile, the pragmatic solution in defense of Provisory Methodological Naturalism 
insists that current conceptions of the natural are sufficient for determining natural things. 
The pragmatic solution dismisses the need for either a universal or subjective distinction 
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criterion. Rather than consisting of a distinct set of guidelines for the falsification of 
ontological naturalism, the pragmatic response is more of a “cross that bridge when we come 
to it” solution. We would have a good idea as to what, if discovered, should cause us to 
abandon ontological naturalism. Said discoveries would require the universal abandonment 
of ontological naturalism. Falsification would not be subjective. Yet, at the same time, there 
is no standard rubric by which to deem an object supernatural. We merely defer to current 
science and whether the object is eventually subsumed under natural things.  
The Essentialist will likely balk and respond that this puts us back where we started. 
In their view, we still would not know what the justification would be for science labeling 
Object X supernatural rather than natural. Additionally, like Carrier’s solution noted above 
(5.3.2), we would still need to wait for science to either subsume the discovered object or 
not. This may take some time, during which the discovered object may go unclassified or 
incorrectly classified. Both of these are fair points. The pragmatic solution may be the best 
we can do with regards to the distinction problem but those who insist that we are never 
justified in classifying any object as supernatural will never be convinced that science could 
ever recognize supernatural things. But nor will the Provisory proponent ever agree to the 
notion that the supernatural existing in our world is a priori impossible. Perhaps the best 
way to approach the stalemate is to appeal to areas of common ground. Both Provisory and 
Essential methodological naturalists hold that science has yet to affirm supernatural things. 
The Provisory naturalist may even go so far as to argue that such affirmation is highly 
unlikely (though she can never claim it to be impossible). Perhaps methodological 
naturalists can simply choose to focus on areas of agreement between the two views and 
then agree to disagree about the possibility of existing supernatural phenomena. This might 
be the most pragmatic approach to resolving the conflict between these two groups.  
  
5.6 Conclusion  
In this chapter, I have examined the argument that the Provisory view is untenable because 
the theoretical falsification of ontological naturalism that it proposes is unattainable. 
Falsification is unattainable because there is, seemingly, no surefire method to distinguish 
natural from supernatural things. I detailed a few ways the Provisory naturalist might 
respond to this charge and noted that not all the responses are viable. For example, holding 
that differentiation between natural and supernatural is unnecessary and that only existence 
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matters are not tenable positions for the Provisory methodological naturalist. Because she 
believes that ontological naturalism is falsifiable, the Provisory naturalist requires a distinct 
supernatural category by which ontological naturalism might, theoretically, be falsified. 
Additionally, the Provisory naturalist cannot respond to the Argument from No Distinction 
Criterion by asserting that the distinction should be subjective and left to the individual 
naturalist. Among other things, this would render methodological naturalism itself 
subjective.  
Some might insist that a universal distinction criterion provides the best defense of 
Provisory Methodological Naturalism against the Argument from No Distinction Criterion. 
I disagree with this claim but, nevertheless, attempted to fashion a universal distinguishing 
method using the Similarity Criterion. This Criterion holds that a discovered object is 
supernatural if it is similar or identical to our current concept of that supernatural object. 
While perhaps promising, the Similarity Criterion is an incomplete solution. In general, 
there are numerous problems with creating a standard demarcation criterion for 
differentiating between natural and non-natural things. But also, there are problems with the 
Similarity Criterion specifically (for example, the Criterion’s reliance on the arguably vague 
notion of “current conceptions”). For the above reasons, I concluded that the pragmatic 
solution is the most successful of the responses given here in answering the Argument from 
No Distinction Criterion. This solution does not rely on a standard demarcation criterion but 
nor does it rest exclusively on existence claims or subjectivity. Instead, it holds that our 
current conceptions of the natural, resulting from science, may be thought of as 
provisionally legitimate.   
Regardless of their overall success, all the responses to the Argument from No 
Distinction Criterion presented here do at least avoid making one problematic assumption. 
That is the assumption that natural things supervene on physical things. It is a mistake to 
simply assert that natural things are merely physical things (and that we can distinguish 
natural things accordingly). This is because ontological naturalism and physicalism are not 
synonymous. They are, despite the assumptions of many, two different views. I will discuss 
physicalism in a bit more detail in the last chapter of this thesis. First, however, I will look 
at the third and final problem associated with one of the above benefits of Provisory 








In this chapter, I will look at issues surrounding the practical application of science under 
Provisory Methodological Naturalism. I will examine the argument that Provisory 
naturalism is false because science can neither support nor disprove the veracity of a specific 
supernatural phenomenon, intercessory prayer. According to the argument, intercessory 
prayer lies outside the evaluative capabilities of science. This is a problem for Provisory 
naturalism because the Provisory view requires that all phenomena which affect the natural 
world should be evaluable by science. If even one supernatural phenomenon is unevaluable, 
then Provisory Methodological Naturalism would be false.  
We should note that, if this argument is sound and Provisory naturalism is false, this 
does not mean that, necessarily, Essentialism is true. The argument I will present is a 
supernaturalist argument, not a naturalist one. In other words, it holds that methodological 
supernaturalism is true. And while all naturalist arguments against Provisory naturalism are, 
necessarily, arguments for Essentialism, such is not the case for supernaturalist arguments. 
Clearly, no supernaturalist argument against Provisory naturalism will necessarily support 
Essential naturalism. Similarly, if we show that the argument is wrong and science can 
indeed evaluate a supernatural phenomenon such as prayer, this would validate Provisory 
Methodological Naturalism but it would not disprove Essentialism. As previously noted 
(2.4), the Essentialist also holds that science can examine supernatural phenomena such as 
prayer. The Essentialist simply asserts that, should such phenomena be proven effective or 
existing, we cannot label it supernatural. Therefore, even if we conclusively show in the 
following argument that science can potentially prove the effectiveness of prayer, this alone 
will not disprove Essentialism. This is because the Essentialist herself agrees with this 
conclusion.  
To disprove Essentialism with this new argument we would need to go a step further 
and show that any proof of the efficacy of prayer would mean that ontological naturalism is 
false. I have attempted to argue as much throughout this thesis so I will avoid doing that 
here. Instead, in this chapter, I will simply focus on one particular supernaturalist argument 
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that science is unable to evaluate prayer. If this argument is valid, Provisory Naturalism is 
false. I will argue that it is not valid.  
 That said, there may still be room for a smaller argument against Essentialism here. 
We might recall that the third benefit of Provisory Methodological Naturalism held that the 
Provisory view is advantageous to naturalists who value science because the Provisory view 
allows for competent scientific work done on supernatural claims to be potentially valid. 
Given the above, we can expand this third benefit somewhat to include the idea that 
Provisory naturalism is preferable to the alternative because, under the Provisory view, 
scientific experimentation on the supernatural is more in-line with our common expectations 
of such work. Under Provisory Methodological Naturalism, an experiment to determine the 
existence of supernatural entities such as ghosts would indeed be an experiment to determine 
the existence of supernatural things. It would not, necessarily, be an experiment to discover 
unknown natural objects. Likewise, testing the efficacy of prayer would not involve 
presupposing that any element of the prayer process which science observes (the practice 
itself or the agent acting in response to the prayers) would be natural. The Essentialist would 
need to make such presuppositions but the Provisory naturalist gets to avoid them.  
That said, most Provisory methodological naturalists fully expect science to discover 
natural causes for supernatural claims. For example, they expect to find that, say, atypical 
ventilation and air flow patterns are responsible for the eerie activities in a supposedly 
haunted house. They do not expect such phenomena to be the caused by the spectral remains 
of the recently deceased. Provisory naturalists know that natural explanations for 
purportedly supernatural events are much more likely, given that the supernatural has never 
been sufficiently shown to exist. But, at the same time, the Provisory naturalist does not 
assume that any and every new discovery will be automatically natural. We might simply 
say that the Provisory view is better because it allows us to evaluate supernatural claims 
without dismissing the possibility of the supernatural offhand. 
It may be the case that science cannot observe all truly supernatural objects. There 
may be unobservable objects which deserve to be classified as supernatural. But there is no 
reason why science is precluded from evaluating observable supernatural objects or 
evaluating the observable effects of said objects. Furthermore, Provisory naturalists will say 
that no possibly-existing unobservable objects can be identified. There is currently nothing 
that we can say is (or even could be) beyond scientific understanding. Therefore, the 
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methodological supernaturalist is not justified in asserting that, for example, the tangible 
results and benefits of prayer remain outside of scientific reach. Science can indeed tell us 
something useful about the practice and mechanics of praying. 
I should also note that this chapter is primarily devoted to (a) only one paper on the 
non-evaluability of prayer and (b) only one supernatural phenomenon (intercessory prayer). 
My justification for this is the following.  Until now I have mostly examined “broad” 
arguments against Provisory naturalism. By “broad” I mean arguments which lump all 
supernatural objects and phenomena together. Essentialists (and some supernaturalists) 
argue that science cannot prove the existence of any truly supernatural phenomenon. Thus, 
I have examined and criticized the various explanations given as to why science is prohibited 
from proving not just ghosts but also ESP, psychic healing, remote viewing, telekinesis, etc. 
However, it may be that an argument that focuses on just one supernatural phenomenon 
(and not the entirety of all phenomena) might prove to be a stronger critique of Provisory 
naturalism. A compelling argument for why science cannot prove the existence of 
supernatural out-of-body experiences specifically, for example, might provide details about 
the limitation of science in relation to OBEs that we would not see in an argument for why 
science cannot evaluate OBEs and every other supernatural phenomenon. 
Again, any supernatural object or phenomenon that affects the natural world should 
be observable by science according to the Provisory view. If science cannot evaluate even 
one such supernatural object or phenomenon, then Provisory naturalism is false. Thus, a 
compelling argument against the evaluation of only prayer (or OBEs, ghosts, etc.) is also a 
compelling argument against the Provisory view.1 For this reason, any comprehensive 
defense of Provisory Methodological Naturalism would do well to address this narrow 
argument along with the broad. All of this, hopefully, goes some way to explaining the focus 
on (b) or, the single phenomenon of intercessory prayer. With regards to (a), the reason I 
focus primarily on the one paper in this chapter is simply a matter of availability. While 
there are numerous works which give the broader argument, very few focus on the narrower 
one. Few academic works attempt to answer why science cannot evaluate, for example, a 
single phenomenon like qi without slipping into the broader argument. Among those that do 
offer a sufficiently detailed focus on a single phenomenon is the paper on the non-
evaluability of intercessory prayer that I will examine here. Finally, I should note that, even 
                                                             
1 And, incidentally, Essentialism as well.  
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though I do focus primarily on the narrow example of prayer in this chapter, my points are 
applicable to other examples. I will cover some of these in Section 6.4.7. 
Thus, in this chapter, I will argue against one particular supernaturalist claim that 
prayer is outside the boundaries of science. I will argue that Provisory Methodological 
Naturalism is better than certain approaches to supernaturalism because it allows that 
science can evaluate prayer and tell us something useful about the practice, namely whether 
it is effective. But it is also better than Essential Methodological Naturalism because, per 
the expanded third benefit, it holds that if science does deem prayer to be effective, the 
practice will remain a supernatural one. It will not be automatically naturalized. And this is 
more in-line with the commonly-held notion of prayer. 
 In an article entitled “Experiments on Distant Intercessory Prayer: God, Science, 
and the Lesson of Massah”, John Chibnall, Joseph Jeral, and Michael Cerullo (hereafter, 
“CJC”) argue that intercessory prayer is an unevaluable phenomenon. Intercessory prayers 
are petitions for the healing of sick or injured individuals which are directed to God by a 
third party, or, intercessor. CJC argue that, while such prayers are the subject of numerous 
scientific studies (for example, Benson et al., 2006; Harris et al., 1999; Matthews et al., 
2000; O’Laoire, 1997; Sicher et al., 1998; Walker, 1982), the effectiveness of intercessory 
prayer simply cannot be measured by science. In Section 6.2 I begin my critique of their 
argument by first qualifying CJC’s proposal and placing it in the context of the subjects of 
this thesis. CJC never discuss or explicitly advocate for methodological supernaturalism in 
their work. However, given the nature of their argument along with certain statements they 
make, it is safe to assume that this is their methodological position. It is therefore likely that 
CJC hold both Essential and Provisory methodological naturalism to be false. In Section 6.3 
I will explain CJC’s main argument. In Section 6.4 I will respond to CJC’s claims. I will 
also propose a few counter-arguments in defense of CJC and attempt to respond to them as 
well.   
 
6.2 CJC’s Argument Qualified 
The goal of this thesis is to defend the Provisory form of methodological naturalism against 
the rival naturalist view as well as against methodological supernaturalism. But CJC never 
identify themselves as methodological supernaturalists in the paper under review. Nor do 
they claim to support methodological supernaturalism with their argument. Since they say 
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little about methodological naturalism as a thesis, it will be necessary to place their argument 
in the context of the Essentialist/Provisory debate. In this section, I will briefly reiterate 
some of the pertinent details of that debate and then discuss CJC’s argument in relation to 
those details. I will also explain why I believe we are justified in assuming CJC to be 
methodological supernaturalists. Or, at the very least, we are justified in assuming that they 
seek to defend methodological supernaturalism.    
Because Provisory methodological naturalists hold that, currently, nothing 
observable by science (i.e., nothing that measurably effects our world) can be considered 
irretrievably beyond scientific understanding, they also must hold that the phenomenon of 
intercessory prayer is evaluable by science.2 As a result, we can obviously rule out CJC as 
Provisory naturalists. However, given the following quotes, it seems probable that they 
would not identify with methodological naturalism of any form: 
God cannot be compelled by our research designs, statistics, and hypotheses 
to answer our demand, ‘Is the Lord among us or not?’…[O]ur intercessions 
must be a matter of faith and trust in God, of putting our hope in God, of 
knowing we are part of God no matter what the outcome of our experience 
in the physical world. 
And on the same page,  
[M]ixing experimental method with faith degrades both concepts. We do not 
need science to validate our spiritual beliefs, as we would never use faith to 
validate our scientific data (Chibnall et al., 2001, p. 2536). 
Both statements advocate for the position that the scientific method is insufficient 
for describing the whole nature of reality. “Research designs, statistics, and hypotheses” 
only take us so far in our explorations. Additionally, spiritual beliefs can be validated using 
means other than science. These views are clearly antithetical to methodological naturalism 
or the notion that science is the best and only method for discovering the world. Thus, it 
                                                             
2 The argument might be made that while certain elements of intercessory prayer might be observable, the 
mechanics of prayer are not. The problem with this argument is that those purportedly unobservable 
elements would still need to act in our world. For example, an unobservable God would need to interact with 
the natural world to affect change. And while there may be unobservable objects in our world (2.5.1), it 
would seem that objects which affect the natural world would need to be at least partially observable.  So, 
the mechanics of prayer, in affecting the natural world, could not be completely unobservable.  
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seems quite clear that the authors would not identify as methodological naturalists, Essential 
or otherwise.  
Two options remain open to CJC. However, neither of these seem likely either given 
the quotes above. The first option would be a methodological agnosticism.  CJC would hold 
either that they do not know what the best method for discovering reality is or that we are 
incapable of knowing the best method. The reason why it is unlikely that they hold this 
position is because the second quote above strongly suggests that their preferred 
methodology is a mixture of natural and supernatural methods (entailing methodological 
supernaturalism). It does not suggest that they are unsure of or unwilling to commit to a best 
approach for discovering the nature of reality.  The second option would be methodological 
nihilism which holds that neither methodological naturalism nor methodological 
supernaturalism is the best method for discovering reality. But, like ontological nihilism 
(5.3.1) this option seems unlikely. If there were no best method for discovering the nature 
of reality then all methods would be equally useful. And if all methods to discover the nature 
of the world are equally valid then they are, strangely enough, also equally invalid. If all 
methods to discover truth are equally proficient, they are all useless. One would probably 
not want to live in a world in which the results of scientific polling or the findings of 
theoretical physics experiments might just as easily be obtained using tarot cards. In any 
case, nothing in the above quotes or in the rest of CJC’s work suggests a nihilist approach 
to methodology. Thus, after ruling out both approaches to methodological naturalism along 
with the agnostic and nihilist views, we may safely assume CJC to identify as 
methodological supernaturalists.        
 
6.3 CJC’s Argument against Scientific Evaluation of Distant Intercessory Prayer 
CJC argue that intercessory prayer cannot be tested via scientific methods because the 
concept of prayer cannot be adequately defined. The justification for this is as follows. In 
the various studies on prayer effectiveness, prayer may be considered the causal construct 
(Chibnall et al., 2001, p. 2529). A causal construct is an independent variable taken to be 
directly responsible for the given effects (healing, etc.) in a scientific experiment. If the 
operations in the experiment meant to evoke the causal construct (for example, kneeling, 
folding one’s hands, reciting certain words) are appropriate, then the experiment can be said 
to have good construct validity. An experiment on the effectiveness of performing a specific, 
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well-defined rain-dance in producing rain arguably has good construct validity. The causal 
construct (the rain-dance) may be accurately evoked in the specific, well-defined actions 
(appropriate bodily movements) of a dancer. 
But in the case of prayer studies, the authors argue, construct validity is always very 
poor. This is because there are too many methods of prayer, too many variations on ways to 
pray, to be able to single out a single notion of “intercessory prayer” that may then be 
accurately evoked through actions (kneeling, etc.). While the rain-dance has a well-defined 
structure, intercessory prayer does not. The result is that, in their experiments, scientists 
hold a view of intercessory prayer which is either too limited or is simply incorrect (i.e., out 
of touch with prayer as normally practiced). Because the crucial element of good construct 
validity will always be missing, science can never hope to examine the effectiveness of 
intercessory prayer.  
 
6.3.1 Prayer as a Causal Construct  
CJC provide two primary reasons why prayer cannot be considered a valid experimental 
construct and, therefore, cannot be studied scientifically. The first reason is that (a) a one-
size-fits-all notion of prayer is unavailable. Prayer comes in many different forms and 
cannot be reduced to a single type. Because of this, the “critical dimensions” of prayer 
cannot be easily defined and a solid construct cannot be formulated (Chibnall et al., 2001, 
p. 2529). To convey the futility of defining a prayer construct, the authors pose several 
questions:   
Is the amount of prayer important? Is the type of prayer important? The 
form? The duration? The frequency? The level of fervency? The entity to 
whom it is directed? The number of prayers per unit of time? Does the 
number of intercessors matter? Does a team vs individual intercession 
method matter? Does the faith tradition of the intercessor and/or intercessee 
matter? Does the power of the intercessor matter? Do the beliefs and 
experiences of the intercessor and/or intercessee matter? Does the worthiness 
of the intercessor and/or intercessee matter (Chibnall et al., 2001, p. 2529)? 
The lack of definitive answers to the above questions seems to be problematic enough. 
However, each of these questions might spawn their own additional questions such as, “If 
type and form are important, how many types and forms are there?” Such questions call 
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attention to the fact that there are many different methods by which to pray and multiple 
forms which prayer may take.  
 The second reason why prayer cannot be considered a valid construct according to 
the authors is that (b) the mechanism behind prayer cannot be precisely defined. There is no 
way to quantify what, if anything, makes prayer effective. This lacking in the understanding 
of the mechanism behind prayer is at least partly due to (a). As a result, prayer cannot be 
studied as an effective treatment in the way, say, antibiotics can. Scientists studying the 
effectiveness of antibiotics can 
…control the type of antibiotic, the dose of the antibiotic, the dosing 
schedule of the antibiotic, the coadministration of other medications that 
have antibiotic effects or interfere with antibiotic effects, and the duration 
the antibiotic is taken, to name a few of the most obvious parameters. Why? 
Because all of these factors are critical to the construct validity of the cause… 
No model guides our understanding of intercessory prayer as a treatment in 
the way we know that drug pharmacokinetics, type, dose, schedule, 
interactions, and treatment length are critical to an antibiotic as a treatment. 
In fact, we believe no scientific model can guide it (Chibnall et al., 2001, p. 
2530).   
Here the authors appear to be saying that, while we can control important elements of 
antibiotic research to obtain varying results and to, consequently, help us learn how 
antibiotics themselves work (or, to quantify what makes antibiotics effective), the same 
cannot be said for prayer research. Prayer research simply cannot be similarly controlled. 
The reason we cannot control the important elements of prayer research is that prayer is 
poorly defined as a construct. Thus, we cannot justifiably attribute positive or negative 
results to the prayer taking place in these studies. Scientific evaluation of prayer is hampered 
by a vicious Catch-22: We do not know enough about prayer to be able to evaluate it 
scientifically but we cannot learn more about prayer because we cannot evaluate it 
scientifically.  
 (a) and (b) work in tandem to create the crux of CJC’s argument which is (c): 
Because there is no universal notion of prayer, we cannot hope to determine the 
effectiveness or mechanism behind it through science. Pairing (a) and (b) is probably a good 
idea because both claims are fairly weak on their own. Saying that prayer is a poor construct 
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merely because there are various forms of prayer and methods by which to pray is obviously 
problematic. As I will soon note, each of the various forms and methods of prayer might be 
addressed individually. As such, each form and method could be individually defined as 
constructs. Likewise, it is also a problem to say that prayer cannot be scientifically tested 
because its workings are unknown. Such mystery has seemingly never obstructed scientific 
evaluation before. Thus, I will also soon argue that prayer can be tested, even though its 
causal mechanism remains undefined.  
 
6.4 Response to CJC’s Argument and Various Counter-arguments 
In the next two sub-sections, 6.4.1, 6.4.2, I will provide a couple of responses to CJC’s view. 
However, CJC’s stated argument extends beyond the points (a-c) mentioned above. There 
are some additional minor elements of their view which I have not yet addressed. I will 
present and respond to these elements of their argument in Sections 6.4.3, 6.4.4, 6.4.5, and 
6.4.6.  
At this point, it may be apparent that arguments like CJC’s might be made against 
the scientific evaluation of other supernatural phenomena. For example, an argument might 
be made that the scientific evaluation of tarot reading is impossible because it would suffer 
from construct validity issues. Or the evaluation of feng shui. In 6.4.7 I will examine how 
my responses to CJC and prayer might apply to other arguments of this type. For now, I will 
briefly note that, if it is the case that these other arguments can be made, then my response 
to CJC’s argument regarding construct validity and prayer would apply to them as well.  
I begin by offering up the idea that science can evaluate things, including 
intercessory prayer, which may seem indefinable. Therefore, contrary to what CJC and 
others might think regarding prayer and construct validity, science can still evaluate 
intercessory prayer.   
 
6.4.1 Response to CJC: Science Can Evaluate Indefinable Phenomena 
The basis of the authors’ criticism of the scientific evaluation of prayer involves the idea 
that prayer is, in some way, indefinable. But science has made it its business to examine 
phenomena which have been thought to be indefinable. In all varieties of inquiry, science 
has proven that we do not need to have full knowledge of a cause to test the effects of that 
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cause. CJC’s dismissal of scientific experimentation of prayer is wholly unwarranted for 
this reason. It is true that prayer is a multifaceted phenomenon. Because of that, molding 
prayer into a single concept on which to do research is indeed an impossible task. But the 
fact that we cannot define prayer definitively does not mean that we cannot test the 
effectiveness of different variations. While we may not be able to test the impossible-to-
obtain universal conception of prayer, we can test individual notions of praying. These could 
include various experiments formulated to answer all the questions asked in the quote above 
(regarding fervency, form, amount, etc.). 
For this reason, questions concerning cause which are meant to obtain construct 
validity (“Which form of intercessory prayer is the ‘universal’ form” “How does prayer 
work”) should be set aside as irrelevant. Again, we do not need to define a one-size-fits-all 
version of intercessory prayer to test the various versions’ effectiveness. When we test 
prayer we only need to focus on a specific form of prayer to see if this specific form (rather 
than prayer in general) is effective. Additionally, we can measure the effectiveness of 
specific forms of prayer without a proper understanding of the natural or supernatural 
mechanism which instantiates it.  
 
6.4.2 Response to CJC: Experiments with Similar Construct Validity “Problems” 
Remain Valid 
The reasons supplied by CJC for why prayer research is problematic are perplexing given 
that we can propose experiments with similar construct validity “issues” which, 
nevertheless, appear completely viable. For example, we can imagine an experiment to chart 
the effects of a gardeners’ happiness on plant growth. Does the gardener’s attitude affect 
plant size? To make the experiment manageable, constraints would need to be put in place 
to limit the meaning of “happy”. For it could be argued that, in much the same way as prayer, 
happiness is a challenging causal construct. Happiness, after all, comes in many forms with 
multiple methods of expression. Even so, there seems to be no reason why such an 
experiment could not be successful. Happiness, despite being an ill-defined construct, can 
still be qualified for experimentation. And the results (plant growth) may still be said to be 




Even more rigorously defined constructs could still run into the difficulties of the 
sort proposed by CJC if we allow them to. Instead of happiness, we might test for the effects 
of music on plant growth. In this case, we would have what some might consider a more 
precisely defined concept to test (music). However, numerous questions could still arise. 
What genre of music should be used? Should it contain lyrics or be entirely instrumental? 
If sung, should it be sung live? Should it be a male or female voice and of what type? If it 
is recorded music, what media format (CD, vinyl, radio) should be played? And so on. But 
the fact that such questions may be asked does not prevent restraints from being placed on 
“music” and valid experimentation from taking place. In the same way, “prayer” can be 
constrained within the context of the experiment. 
 We could, if we worked at it, use these various questions to chip away at the 
construct validity of music. At its core, music is merely sound waves, we might say. It is 
completely dependent on the listener and no different, in many ways, to other noises in the 
environment. The concept of music, considered a certain way, can be as vague a concept as 
prayer. Thus, the music, happiness, and prayer experiments are identical in the sense that 
their constructs may be questioned in this manner. However, that does not mean we are 
required to question them in this manner. As shown, experiments which allow us to derive 
valid empirical data and useful information can be built around subjects which are arguably 
vague. We can surely perform the experiments on plant growth proposed above and obtain 
worthy data.  
It is possible that some may contest the notion of these various experiments being 
identical. Perhaps they would insist that prayer studies differ from the other studies in that 
prayer studies purport to research a supernatural method while the others study natural 
methods. But this fact alone should make no difference. The point here is that we can run 
into similar difficulties in the testing of natural methods as we do in the testing of the 
supernatural method of prayer if we allow for them. But we simply should not allow for 
them. 
One reason we should not allow for these difficulties is that CJCs use of construct 
validity here to dismiss valid scientific work sets a dangerous precedent. It seems possible 
that CJC would dismiss experiments like the ones above. It is possible that CJC would 
respond to the above experiments on music and plant growth by arguing that we should 
dismiss all experimentation of this sort. For example, they might hold that, like the efficacy 
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of prayer, the efficacy of music on plants cannot be scientifically evaluated because music 
in this context (like prayer) is not precisely and universally defined. If a negative outcome 
obtains, we can always say that it didn’t work because the music wasn’t right, the media 
format wasn’t right, etc. Likewise, if prayer does not lead to positive results under scientific 
conditions, we can always say that the format of the prayer was wrong. Another way to 
illustrate the worry here, I believe, is to say that, while a negative outcome might be obtained 
in one context, it will always be possible that prayer in some other form or context would 
work. It may simply be the context of the experiment that prevents it from working. If the 
experiment on music and plant growth fails, we cannot conclude that music does not affect 
plant growth. This is because the experiment might have failed, not the music. And because 
we can never make a generalized conclusion of the sort “music does not affect plant 
growth”, we cannot say that valid scientific experimentation on music and plant growth can 
be done.  
The problem with this response is that construct of prayer being experimented upon 
is indeed sufficiently (“precisely”) defined. It is sufficiently defined within the context of 
the experiment (For example, “Individual x with background y praying at time z, etc.”). It is 
true that a negative result from this context does not mean that prayer, in general, does not 
work. In some other context (For example, “Individual a with background b praying at time 
c, etc.”) it may work. But we also cannot conclude from all this that science cannot ever 
observe the context (a, b, c) that does work. There is nothing preventing science from 
observing (a, b, c). Additionally, it should be noted that no competent scientist (and, 
especially, no scientist who identifies as a Provisory naturalist) would conclude from 
experiments such as the one above that prayer never, in any circumstances, produces 
positive results. In the experiments under consideration, the results were negative. But, as 
noted, such a conclusion surely cannot be generalized. In other words, we cannot say that 
what is true of the narrow concept of prayer in the experiment (x, y, z) is also true of the 
broader, more general concept of “prayer”. It seems that CJC are averse to any scientific 
evaluation of prayer at least in part because it could lead to the broad and possibly erroneous 
conclusion that prayer is always ineffective. But this conclusion is one that few good 
scientists make. 
The fact that one cannot make a broader conclusion about the efficacy of prayer 
based on individual experiments does not mean that the data gleaned from individual 
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experiments are not useful or informative. Or that a scientific evaluation of prayer could not 
lead to a narrow conclusion pertaining to the individual study-at-hand. But recall CJC’s 
assertion above that prayer in one context might not prove scientifically effective while 
prayer in another context might be effective. Perhaps CJC could respond to my claim by 
taking the opposite approach with regards to the “natural” experiments: Let us assume that 
one experiment does indeed show that music affects plant growth. It is still quite likely that 
another experiment will show that it is ineffective. Again, this difference is due to the fact 
that the contexts are different between the experiments. Because music is a multi-faceted 
construct, experiments on music can take various forms. Thus, experimentation of this sort 
is problematic. Again, when you experiment on a construct as broad as something like 
“music” you can never rely on the results, positive or negative.   
But this variation is not a problem with scientific evaluation. Rather, it is to be 
expected. Sure, one experiment may lead to a positive conclusion and another lead to a 
negative. But both do so within the context of their experimenting. Perhaps country music 
played from a radio affects growth while opera music sung live does nothing. By 
incorporating these different facets and limiting our conclusions to narrow conclusions 
about the context of the experiment, scientific evaluation of music and plant growth can still 
be useful. Nowhere is there a general conclusion about the effectiveness of “music” on 
plants. It is only when we consider the construct generally (“music” instead of “country 
music” or “live music”) that we might run into difficulties. 
Still, we might wonder: What if you could never have the same context between two 
experiments with a construct like prayer? In other words, what if one prayer experiment 
would have context (a,b,c…n) while every other experiment on prayer would be at least 
slightly different? The practices in every experiment would count as prayer because 
“prayer” has no universal definition, but no two practices would be the same. If that is the 
case, is CJC correct in saying that prayer is scientifically unevaluable or, at least, not very 
useful? What good is data on the efficacy of a one-time practice that is limited to the confines 
of the experiment itself? The next time prayer is done, the context will be different.  
The reason why such data remains useful is that data does not exist in a vacuum. 
Rather, it is aggregated and compiled. It is true that, as noted previously, the negative data 
from one experiment does not allow us to make a broader claim that all prayer is ineffective. 
However, the compilation of data from multiple experiments does allow us to draw tentative 
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conclusions on practiced prayer effectiveness. And these tentative conclusions are indeed 
useful. For example, we might say that prayer, as it is generally practiced in its varying 
forms, does not appear to be effective. No variation of prayer under study has produced 
positive results.   
I will now propose counter-arguments to my responses based on additional 
arguments given by CJC in their paper. I begin by examining what CJC see as incorrect 
assumptions about intercessory prayer. 
 
6.4.3 CJC’s Counter-argument: Construct Invalidity from Incorrect Knowledge 
Thus far, we have examined the charge that construct validity in experiments on intercessory 
prayer is poor because science has limited knowledge of the concept of intercessory prayer. 
Prayer can manifest itself in many ways. In choosing only one to focus on, science ends up 
with too limited an understanding of the cause under evaluation. However, in their paper, 
CJC also argue that poor construct validity can be the result not just of inadequate 
knowledge of the cause but also of incorrect assumptions about the cause. For example, 
science generally assumes that intercessory prayer is administered like antibiotics. A dose 
of prayer is given for a particular ailment or injury. Science also generally believes that 
prayer should elicit results in the same way medicine does. But these assumptions lead to 
problems. As CJC put it,  
The scientific explication of the construct prayer also contradicts many 
spiritual and theological conceptions of prayer. It contradicts many 
individuals' habits and beliefs regarding prayer and faith. For example, 
…[w]hen Catholics each Sunday at Mass offer a communal special intention 
to God to "heal all who are sick and suffering," is the probability of efficacy 
higher or lower than a single Catholic praying for a single individual (who 
would also be included in "all who are sick and suffering")? How about a 
group of Catholics praying for a single individual? These questions are not 
even askable, let alone answerable (Chibnall et al., 2001, p. 2531). 
The authors suggest that a scientific construct of prayer contradicts the commonly-held 
notion of prayer. Science, they argue, needs to be able to see direct correlations resulting 
from prayer practice. In testing prayer scientifically, we need to be able to see if, for 
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example, more prayer is more effective. But, they argue, what you are doing if you allow 
for such measurements contradicts many conceptions of prayer.  
 But a scientific evaluation of prayer is under no obligation to establish these types 
of correlations. It is enough that such evaluation simply measures effects. There is no reason 
why science would need to be able to establish the wide-ranging implications of prayer to 
effectively study it. This is as true in experimentation on the ostensibly supernatural as it is 
in experimentation on the natural. For example, returning to antibiotic research, we can 
imagine research done on the effectiveness of a particular antibiotic on ailment X. It is not 
a requirement of the causal construct “antibiotic” that it be able to tell us whether more 
antibiotic is more effective as a treatment for ailment X. If, during experimentation, we 
happen to discover this information, all the better. However, the ability to answer this 
question concerning correlation is not necessary for the construct to be valid and effective 
experimentation to take place. The same holds true for prayer. 
 
6.4.4 CJC’s Counter-argument: Intercessory Prayer Does Not Meet Hempel’s 
Testability Requirement 
The authors go on to argue that prayer needs to be better defined to have the required 
“testability”. Citing Hempel’s basic requirements for scientific examinations (Hempel, 
1966), CJC state, 
[A] given explanation must be empirically testable, in principle if not in 
reality. That is, a scientific hypothesis must have certain "test implications," 
such that empirical findings can either support it or contradict it… Hempel 
offers the example of entelechies or "vital forces" as explanations for the 
"organic directiveness" that occurs in embryonic development. Experiments 
that demonstrate repair of embryonic damage can and have been done. Yet a 
hypothesis that this process is a function of entelechies would be neither 
supported nor contradicted by the experimental results because the entelechal 
explanation cannot make differential predictions regarding when these forces 
will manifest and in what manner they do their directing. The vital force is 
just "there…  Distant intercessory prayer is no more testable than entelechies 
in this sense: God is there when effects are found or not there when they are 
not. To derive specific implications of such a hypothesis is not possible. It is 
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akin to qualifying an explanation of the origin of species through evolution 
with the proviso that, while evolution may work within the principles of 
biology and chemistry, it is really God who directs it. The proviso, while 
potentially spiritually meaningful, is scientifically irrelevant (i.e., it is 
without explanatory relevance and testability) (Chibnall et al., 2001, p. 
2531). 
CJC are surely correct to point out that a study on prayer that yields positive effects 
would not be able to attribute those effects to God. Even assuming God exists and that He 
at least sometimes responds to prayer, it could be the case that a positive result occurs 
outside of God’s immediate interaction. Likewise, a negative result from prayer does not 
signal the non-interaction of God. It may be that God produced the negative result. But, 
while we cannot attribute the effects to an agent, we can still separate the practice of prayer 
and hold it to be its own scientifically observable or beginning cause independent from any 
potential non-observable, intermediate cause such as God.3 
In the same way, we might perform an experiment on the effectiveness of dancing 
to produce rain. It might be that, should rain-dancing prove effective, a subsequent, primary, 
non-observable cause of the rain exists alongside the prior, secondary, observable cause 
(dancing). Perhaps the dance inexplicably causes changes in wind patterns which, under 
certain conditions, results in precipitation. In that case, the primary cause of the rain is the 
mystically-induced wind. Thus, the observable cause is distinguishable from the 
unobservable primary cause. Additionally, the secondary cause, just like the primary cause, 
might be said to have its own value. Some might want to attribute the positive effect of the 
rain to the dancing (rather than the wind) and, in a sense, they would be correct to do so. 
But the authors fail to distinguish primary and secondary causes and, thus, conflate prayer 
with God as the same (primary) cause.  
A consequence of this is that their evolution analogy in the quote above suffers from 
an incorrect comparison. CJC incorrectly compare intercessory prayer in scientific studies 
with God in evolution. In that analogy, they argue that God is scientifically irrelevant in 
studies of evolution because God is an untestable concept. Here God is meant to be 
analogous to prayer since prayer is, according to them, also untestable and irrelevant. To 
                                                             
3 Causes might be distinguished, among other ways, temporally or, by order (“Prior/first cause” vs. 
“subsequent/intermediate cause”), by causal power (“secondary cause” vs. “primary cause”), or by our 
ability to evaluate them (“observable cause” vs. non-observable cause”).    
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CJC, prayer should not be posited as a mechanism for healing just as God should not be 
posited as a mechanism for evolution. But the comparison of prayer and God is unjustified. 
In intercessory prayer, the prayer act is only the observable cause (while God is the 
intermediate, ultimate cause). Therefore, a proper analogy would have had the subsequent, 
primary, non-observable cause of the origin of the species (God) as analogous to the 
subsequent, primary, non-observable cause of healing (God) in prayer studies. Meanwhile, 
prayer, as the prior, secondary, observable cause of healing, must be analogous to the prior, 
secondary, observable cause of the origin of the species. This is not God but, rather, 
evolution.  
To put it another way, in the evolution example, the observable cause is evolution 
itself. The effect is the origin of the species. The intermediate cause, if there is one, would 
be God. The authors rightly argue that this postulated intermediate cause is scientifically 
irrelevant. In the prayer studies, prayer is the observable cause. The effect is healing. The 
intermediate cause, if there is one, would be God. Thus, following the analogy, God should 
be considered scientifically irrelevant in the case of prayer studies not, as the authors’ assert, 
the practice of prayer itself. Prayer, as the observable cause, is indeed relevant. We might 
call this argument, the argument that CJC are incorrectly conflating intercessory prayer and 










Evolution God Origin of the species 
Prayer God Healing 
 
Both evolution and prayer can be tested for their effectiveness as observable causes. 
We then can attempt to draw conclusions as to whether evolution resulted in the origin of 
the species and whether prayer results in healing. Those conclusions might imply the 
existence of subsequent, primary, non-observable causes. However, those implications, as 
the authors note, may or may not be correct. For example, some might want to say that the 
lack of positive results in prayer studies says something about the non-existence of an 
intermediate cause (God). But this implied conclusion cannot be ascertained given the 
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evidence. The only conclusion we can confidently draw from such a study concerns the 
effectiveness of the observable cause (prayer).  
 
6.4.5 CJC’s Counter-argument to the Incorrect Analogy Argument: God is not 
Irrelevant in Intercessory Prayer 
One possible response to the above Incorrect Analogy Argument is that, although God may 
be scientifically irrelevant in the case of evolution, he cannot be considered irrelevant in the 
case of intercessory prayer studies. This is because intercessory prayer, by definition, 
requires a relevant third-party intermediary deity to answer the request of the intercessor. 
Prayer without a relevant intermediary cause would not really be intercessory prayer. If this 
is the case, then God and prayer must be coupled together as one and the same causal 
construct. Contrary to my argument above, the combination of the two would not be 
incorrect. And, if God must be considered the causal construct, then we must say that the 
causal construct is invalid. It is imperative that we have at least some immediate experience 
with the causal constructs in experimentation. However, we have no immediate experience 
with God. Or at least no experience which can be scientifically quantified. It then would be 
the case that God/prayer, like entelechies, would fail to provide a testable hypothesis for 
experimentation. And if that is true, then science cannot evaluate prayer and Provisory 
Methodological Naturalism is false. 
There seem to be at least a couple of ways to respond to this. First, we might simply 
concede that intercessory prayer does require God as a relevant intermediary cause. And, 
because God is an untestable construct, intercessory prayer is not scientifically evaluable. 
Having said that, we can still insist that non-intermediary prayer is scientifically evaluable. 
In other words, science could study the effectiveness of one person’s non-petitioning prayer 
actions on the healing of a distant unaware individual. Such action would be the primary 
cause of any healing effects. No subsequent cause would be assumed to act. Of course, this 
would not answer the authors’ specific claim regarding the problems of scientific evaluation 
of intercessory prayer. However, it would still be a scientific evaluation of a supernatural 
method or phenomenon. And, as such, it would at least serve as a rebuttal to Essentialism 
or the idea that science cannot evaluate any supernatural objects.  
The second problem, though, is that it is not clear that such a thing as non-petitionary 
prayer even exists. If prayer inherently involves the petitioning of a third party, non-
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intermediary prayer would be impossible. It may be that all prayer meant to affect other 
individuals simply is intercessory prayer. Non-intermediary practices would fall under some 
other supernatural category, like psychic healing. On top of this, there seems to be no 
effective method by which to know that no intermediary cause is involved. God or some 
other subsequent non-observable cause could still act and we would never know.   
Another way to respond to the counter-argument that God and prayer must be 
coupled together as one construct is to hold that, even if it is the case that prayer does require 
a relevant third party, we can still test intercessory prayer’s effectiveness. Again, per the 
above Chibnall et al. quote, intercessory prayer is untestable because we would not know if 
God were acting in the case of positive results or not acting in the case of negative ones and 
vice-versa. But allowing that God sometimes acts on prayers and sometimes does not fails 
to render studies of prayer effectiveness impossible. When we are measuring effects, the 
action or inaction of the intermediary cause will simply be what we measure. So, in allowing 
for a relevant intermediate God, we would be measuring, in effect, God’s behavior. God 
may choose to act or he may choose not to.4 The measurements would reflect his choosing. 
This is not outside the realm of possibility as we can easily imagine a natural correlate to 
this. For example, it is possible to evaluate the effectiveness of begging on one’s knees in 
front of one’s boss as a method for acquiring a raise even though sometimes the boss acts 
on such pleas and sometimes she ignores them entirely. In such a case, as with God, we 
would simply be observing and measuring behavior. Without feedback from the boss, we 
would not be justified in assuming that the begging had anything to do with getting or not 
getting a raise. But we could at least measure the effects of begging. Similarly, we could 
measure the effects of prayer (again, without requiring any correlation of practice to said 
effects).  
 
6.4.6 CJC’s Second Counter-argument to the Incorrect Analogy Argument: We 
Cannot Know Whether God Acts in the World 
Finally, CJC might respond that there is a problem with my answer above. This problem is 
something I have already touched upon. I suggested above that we could measure the effects 
of prayer and that those effects would be measurements of God’s behavior. However, there 
                                                             
4 God’s omniscience in conjunction with his omnipotence entails that a choice is made by him whether to act 
or not.  
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is no way of definitively knowing (outside, perhaps, of a miraculous violation of the laws 
of nature) whether God acts in the world. At least, there is no way of knowing that may be 
scientifically quantifiable. God could intervene and cause a result which might never be 
attributed to Him. Or, he may fail to intervene and the result might still be incorrectly 
attributed to Him. If this is true, then CJC are seemingly correct in saying that science cannot 
evaluate prayer. We cannot evaluate or measure God’s behavior in the way I suggest above 
if we cannot definitively know when He acts.  
 To put it another way, since we cannot know when God acts, we cannot say, as I do 
above, that we are measuring God’s behavior. Since the implication that God acted as the 
intermediate cause of the healing can never be confirmed, we cannot attribute any positive 
results to God’s actions. Likewise, God cannot be blamed for inaction. While we can always 
confirm our boss as the proximate cause of our raise, we can never confirm God as the 
proximate cause of an instance of healing after intercessory prayer.  
But the Provisory naturalist can easily respond to this problem. It seems clear that 
science would be measuring behavior only if there is a behavior to be measured (e.g, there 
is an agent who is behaving or, acting in response to prayer). If God does not exist, then, 
obviously, the question of whether God is acting is irrelevant. Put another way, measuring 
the effects of prayer does not necessarily mean measuring behavior. That would only be the 
case if a prayer-answering deity existed. But we do not know this to be true. Thus, it is 
possible that we can measure the effects of prayer without needing to attribute those effects 
to the actions or non-actions of a deity. All of this is to say that the problem here is not for 
the naturalist. The naturalist does not assume God as an intermediate cause and thus is under 
no obligation to attribute the effects to his behavior. The onus is on the supernaturalist who 
posits God. It is true that we cannot deduce from the positive effects of prayer that God was 
the cause of said effects. However, the scientific evaluation of intercessory prayer does not 
require the presumption that such an intermediate cause exists. In fact, as an impartial 
process, science should actively avoid such a presumption. Instead, we might simply say 
that, if God exists as an intermediate cause, then the effects would be a measurement of his 
behavior. 
One might wonder how many of those who believe in the efficacy of prayer would 
follow CJC in accepting that science cannot evaluate prayer’s effectiveness. Although it is 
strictly conjecture, I would think that a good portion of the people who hold that prayer 
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leads to desirable outcomes also believe that these positive results can be objectively (i.e., 
scientifically) measured. Again, this is only speculation. That said, it seems safe to assume 
that CJC’s view is, at the very least, not universally held. Not all believers in the power of 
prayer think like CJC do. Of course, there are a fair number of supernaturalists who 
subscribe to Gould’s non-overlapping magisteria and feel that science and religion should 
not or cannot intermingle (2.2). It is possible that some of these individuals would be 
sympathetic to CJC’s argument and believe that science cannot evaluate prayer. And of 
course, even if some supernaturalists do think that the effectiveness is prayer is measurable 
by science, that fact alone does not make it so. CJC may be right and these supernaturalists 
wrong. Still, I believe it is reasonable to assume that, if prayer does have lasting effects on 
our world, then the prayer process itself should be evaluable.         
 In conclusion, because science does not require a thorough understanding of the 
mechanism behind prayer and because no problems arise from there being multiple methods 
and forms of prayer, we can assume that prayer is indeed a viable scientific construct. It 
does not, in other words, hold the privileged position suggested for it by the authors. The 
questions posed earlier in the chapter, then, are ones which scientific evaluation can address. 
We can test, for example, whether numerous prayers are more effective than a single prayer 
or whether prayers from individuals subscribing to specific religious faiths are more likely 
to generate positive results. Contrary to CJC’s assertions, we can evaluate prayer and answer 
questions related to the practice. And although we can never ascribe positive results to an 
existing deity (or definitively infer the lack of a deity from negative results), we can still 
draw conclusions about the effectiveness of practices related to the act of praying. For 
example, people often implore multiple individuals to pray for a single person. By 
conducting experiments, we get a clearer picture of whether doing so is effective.   
To say that questions like “Does having multiple individuals pray for a single person 
have a measurable effect?” and “Are multiple prayers more effective than a single prayer?” 
are “not even askable” is surely incorrect. But it is also telling. In the eyes of the authors, 
science is not only prohibited from evaluating any aspect of this supernatural phenomenon, 
it cannot even formulate the questions which evaluation would work to answer. To them, 
prayer seems to exist on a separate epistemic plane, unavailable to natural inquiry. Such an 
assumption is not only in error, it may even be dangerous if applied to other cases of the 
supernatural. Many questions regarding supernatural methods need to be asked lest harm be 
caused. Testing the effectiveness of various supernatural health remedies, for example, can 
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work to help people avoid spending precious time, money or energy on the application of 
useless treatments. If certain supernatural modes of healing are ineffective or even harmful, 
people need to know to avoid undertaking them in lieu of proven treatment. Refraining from 
testing such ineffectual methods under the misguided notion that they are simply untestable 
could cause great damage. 
 
6.4.7 Applying the Responses to CJC to Other Narrow Arguments 
I noted earlier that the potential exists for CJC’s argument to be used as a defense against 
the scientific evaluation of other supernatural phenomena. It seems possible that one could 
make a separate argument that, say, ghosts are invalid constructs and therefore cannot be 
scientifically evaluated. Or a similar argument might be made regarding qi. Each of these 
arguments would be dealing with one phenomenon (ghosts, qi) in particular and, thus, would 
remain narrow in scope (as opposed to the broad argument that “All supernatural phenomena 
suffer from construct invalidity and are, therefore, scientifically unevaluable.”).  
 I would argue that my supplied responses to CJC regarding prayer would also answer 
these other narrow arguments. Because science can evaluate all types of indefinable 
phenomena (6.4.1), it can as easily evaluate ghosts as it can intercessory prayer. 
Additionally, if a narrow argument is made that the practice of, say, crystal healing is an 
invalid construct because science would have incorrect knowledge about the concept of 
crystal therapy (6.4.3), then my earlier response can be given. Like CJC’s assumption 
regarding science and prayer, it would be a mistake to assume that we need to know if more 
crystals result in more healing (or some similar hypothesis).5 Various supernatural methods 
or phenomena might be substituted for prayer in these various narrow arguments regarding 
construct validity. However, they might all be answered in a similar fashion.  
 
                                                             
5 Or, take homeopathy. Homeopathic medicine can be tested in the same ways antibiotics are. But just as it 
is not the case that we must know whether more Antibiotic X is more effective on Ailment Y, it is not the 
case that we would need to know whether more homeopathic medicine is more effective in a proposed 
homeopathic treatment. If such treatments were to ever prove effective (as certain antibiotics have been), 
then we could readjust the experimentation to see if more of a proven effective homeopathic cure is more 
effective or not. Such testing has indeed been done with effective antibiotics. The problem for homeopathy 




I began this chapter by differentiating between broad arguments against Provisory 
Methodological Naturalism which hold that science is unable to prove the veracity of any 
supernatural phenomenon and narrow arguments which hold that science cannot prove 
particular supernatural phenomena. Thus far, I have mainly focused on broad arguments. 
However, it may be that narrow arguments offer a greater challenge to the Provisory view. 
Proof that one phenomenon lies outside scientific evaluation is enough to disprove the 
Provisory view. If any narrow argument is true, then Provisory Methodological Naturalism 
is proven false.      
 Fortunately for the Provisory view, the narrow argument examined in this chapter 
does not hold up. CJC’s criticism of scientific evaluation of intercessory prayer is answered 
once we recognize that science has a history of accurately evaluating what might be thought 
of as indefinable phenomena. Ambiguity has never been a deterrent to scientific evaluation. 
Additionally, the reasons given by CJC for why prayer is an invalid construct might just as 
easily be applied to other phenomena (such as music) which we know are scientifically 
evaluable. Having said that, CJC may disagree with this last point. They may argue that we 
cannot confirm that music and other similar constructs are evaluable. These concepts are 
not sufficiently defined and, therefore, are not valid constructs. However, my response to 
this counter-argument was that the constructs are sufficiently defined in the context of the 
experiment. Every experiment has a unique set of parameters, often the result of the subject 
of the experiment having unique and varying properties. These parameters very specifically 
define the subject under study (Christian prayer, in a private residence, kneeling, etc.). Data 
may be gleaned from these studies and, in aggregation, such data can tell us useful things. 
Finally, I argued that CJCs reasons for why prayer cannot be evaluated by science cannot 
be used in other narrow arguments. We cannot say, for example, that science cannot evaluate 
crystal therapy for the same reasons it cannot evaluate prayer. My response to the latter 










In this closing chapter, I will examine one last potential problem for Provisory 
Methodological Naturalism. This problem concerns the category of views which fall under 
the heading of scientism.  Scientism is, roughly, an exaggerated overconfidence in the 
abilities of science. Such overconfidence can manifest in several ways. People guilty of 
scientism assume that all elements of reality come under the umbrella of the sciences (or 
even just one science). Or they might believe that there are no other forms of knowledge 
other than scientific knowledge. Accusations of scientism have become increasingly 
prevalent in the wake of recent publications by the so-called “New Atheist” writers, 
including Sam Harris, Daniel Dennett, Christopher Hitchens and Richard Dawkins. Their 
work, some argue, contains numerous examples of the unjustified aggrandizement of 
science at the expense of alternative ways of knowing (Pigliucci, 2013b). The term is most 
often used as a pejorative; Scientism is generally something to be avoided.1   
The problem facing Provisory naturalists is that they can be accused of scientism 
based on the methodological naturalism thesis. The supernaturalist can argue that 
methodological naturalists, as I have defined them, are guilty of scientism given that they 
hold science to be the best and only method for discovering reality and what exists. This 
belief represents an overconfidence in science. To hold that science is the only method for 
discovering reality is presumptuous. If the supernaturalist is right, then both Essential and 
Provisory methodological naturalists are guilty of scientism since both subscribe to the 
thesis of methodological naturalism. 
Unfortunately for the methodological naturalist, the supernaturalist is right. When 
taken a certain way, the thesis that science is the best and only way to discover reality is 
scientism. As I noted in Section 2.5.1, the methodological naturalism thesis can be taken at 
least two different ways. The first way is to hold that science is the best and only method 
                                                             
1 Although at least one philosopher, Alex Rosenberg, has embraced the term as a descriptor for his own 
view. Rosenberg refers to his combined belief in physicalism and moral nihilism as “scientism”. While his 
view is scientistic, I am not sure that I agree with his appropriation of the term. Rosenberg should consider 
that, despite his appropriation, most people still see scientism as over-confidence in science. Rosenberg 




for discovering reality but that there are things in reality which science cannot explain. If 
the naturalist chooses to interpret the methodological naturalism thesis this way, she can 
avoid scientism. The second way is to hold that the only things which exist are the things 
which science describes. If the naturalist interprets the thesis this way, she succumbs to 
scientism. So, to avoid scientism, the Provisory naturalist needs to clarify her acceptance of 
the former approach. As it stands, the Provisory form of methodological naturalism fails to 
clarify this in its definition and, thus, leaves itself open to accusations of scientism.  
To simply say that science is the only practice that can discover or explain reality 
places too much confidence in science. It assumes that science can explain certain elements 
of reality which, in truth, are outside of its domain. Additionally, it discounts other valid 
practices which also help us explain reality. These include the practices of morality and art, 
for example. Science cannot explain things like artistic truth. We cannot determine what 
qualifies as art by referring to physics. Additionally, things like moral value do not seem to 
reduce to physical theory. It is the practices of art and morality themselves, not science, 
which help us explain these elements and answer questions related to them. I will discuss 
more how this is done later in this chapter. 
Before going further, it may be important to note that an accusation of scientism is 
not itself an argument. An accusation of scientism is merely an assertion that an individual 
is overconfident in science’s ability to answer certain questions. Physicalism is often called 
scientism but this accusation alone does not go far in proving that non-physical things exist. 
Opponents of physicalism need to provide a separate argument for why physicalism is false. 
Similarly, the very fact that some methodological naturalists are overconfident in science 
does not affect the truth of their arguments for methodological naturalism. We would need 
to go a step further and show why methodological naturalism represents overconfidence in 
science in order to prove it false. That said, the fact that the methodological naturalist may 
be guilty of scientism does at least detract from methodological naturalism and, ultimately, 
Provisory Naturalism as well. The main reason why Provisory Naturalism is attractive is 
that the Provisory naturalist, unlike the Essentialist, avoids dogmatic commitment to 
ontological naturalism. But if the Provisory naturalist were to assume a scientistic approach, 
she would be accepting a dogmatic commitment to science. The Provisory naturalist should 
avoid such inconsistency. Since she is willing to question the unfalsifiability of ontological 
naturalism, she should do the same regarding the capabilities of science.  
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But the problems associated with scientism go beyond inconsistency. Scientism 
poses a real danger because it uses the legitimate practice of science to justify unsupported 
metaphysical conclusions about the world. Richard N. Williams writes that “[S]cientism 
itself does no good service to science qua science. Rather, it attempts to hijack science to 
support metaphysical commitments in which science has no particular interest, and to which 
it owes no particular debt” (Williams and Robinson, 2016, p. 3). Scientism is more than just 
a practice, it is an ideology, and a problematic one at that. In only looking to science for 
answers, scientism dismisses other valid modes of inquiry (e.g., philosophical, artistic).      
In this chapter, I will outline what the Provisory methodological naturalist needs to 
do to avoid falling prey to scientism. The structure of this chapter is as follows. In Section 
7.2, I will further define scientism. Varying definitions of the term have been proposed in 
the literature. I will compile a few of them here to sketch out a broader description of the 
concept. In Section 7.3, I will re-examine the Essentialist and Provisory forms of 
methodological naturalism in light of the conclusion that they are scientistic. I will show 
that, given their methodological approach, Essentialism is unavoidably scientistic while 
Provisory Naturalism is not necessarily scientism. I will then outline what is required for 
the Provisory naturalist to escape the charge. This involves revising the definition of 
methodological naturalism. At least it involves revising the formulation of it that is used in 
the Provisory Methodological Naturalism thesis. It also involves presenting a plausible 
method by which the Provisory naturalist can explain elements of reality like art and 
morality without insisting that they reduce to scientific explanation and without invoking 
supernatural explanations. In Section 7.4, I will examine what such a naturalistic account of 
reality looks like. I argue that the best approach for explaining reality naturally, if not 
entirely scientifically, is an approach called pluralism. I conclude that the Provisory 
naturalist should adopt a pluralist approach to explain reality. This pluralist approach is to 
coincide with the Provisory view that science can provisionally evaluate supernatural 
claims.       
 
7.2 Scientism Defined 
In the Introduction to Richard N Williams and Daniel N. Robinson’s book, Scientism: The 
New Orthodoxy, Williams describes four tenets of scientism:  
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(1) “…[O]nly certifiably scientific knowledge counts as real knowledge. All 
else is mere opinion or nonsense.” 
(2) “…[T]he methods and assumptions underlying the natural sciences… are 
appropriate for all sciences, including, prominently, the social and human 
sciences. A corollary doctrine is that the arts, if they seek to be more than 
myth and self-expression, must somehow be brought under the umbrella 
of science.”  
(3) “Scientism exudes and promotes an exaggerated confidence in science… 
to produce knowledge and solve the problems facing humanity.” 
(4) “Scientism makes metaphysical claims… Scientism assumes and 
requires a naturalist, materialist, rather mechanistic metaphysics” 
(Williams and Robinson, 2016, p. 6–7).   
Per Williams, a view is considered scientism if it assumes that science is the only source of 
knowledge, that other disciplines ultimately reduce to science, that science can solve all our 
greatest problems, or that a naturalistic metaphysics is required by science.  Regarding this 
last point, it is important to note that Williams does not suggest that a general acceptance of 
“naturalist, materialist, rather mechanistic metaphysics” qualifies as scientism. He does not 
claim in (4) that anyone who subscribes to a naturalist metaphysics is guilty of scientism. 
This would be too strong an assertion. Rather, he claims that scientism is the belief that 
science requires acceptance of a naturalist metaphysics. Any individual who assumes that 
science requires a naturalistic metaphysics is guilty of scientism.2  I will return to this point 
in the next section when I discuss the Essential and Provisory views along with scientism.  
Some might claim that the topic of scientism is more of a cultural debate than a 
philosophical one. They might point out that while certain philosophical views like 
physicalism and naturalism might be labeled scientistic, scientism itself goes beyond 
philosophy. Many of the primary figures in the debate are scientists or popularizers of 
science like Dawkins, Neil deGrasse Tyson, and Bill Nye. These people are not 
philosophers. Besides this, much of the discussion about scientism takes place outside the 
                                                             
2 Williams confirms this when he writes, “Science does not require that naturalist, materialist metaphysics be 
true in order to proceed in its project of gathering and reporting empirical findings” (Williams and Robinson, 
2016, p. 4). For Williams, it is science that must remain agnostic with regards to ontology or metaphysics, 
not the individual. The Provisory naturalist should follow Williams insofar as she should hold that science 
must not require ontological naturalism. But the Provisory naturalist also recognizes that, just because 
science does not require naturalism, this does not mean that science must be agnostic about ontological 
naturalism. Science can provisionally pronounce on ontology. 
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realm of academic philosophy and many of the views labeled as scientistic concern 
philosophy’s irrelevance compared to science. 
All of this is true. However, while the concept of scientism has become a popular 
topic outside of philosophy, there is no doubt that it remains a philosophical issue. The views 
given by the above non-philosophers remain philosophical in nature. To propose that 
science is the primary or only source of real knowledge is to make a philosophical argument. 
It is, therefore, philosophy’s job to question this as well as to answer any charge of 
irrelevance. Philosophers recognize this and so, as the number of instances of supposed 
scientistic thinking has increased, so too has the amount of philosophical work being done 
on the subject.3 
 
7.3 Essentialism, Provisory Naturalism, and Scientism 
We know that both forms of methodological naturalism (Essential and Provisory) which 
utilize my definition (“…science is the best and only method for discovering the properties 
of reality…”) can fall prey to scientism. Holding that science alone discovers reality can 
amount to an overconfidence in the practice of science. There are certain elements of reality, 
things like art, love, poetry, and morality, which cannot be reduced to scientific theory. Our 
goal in this chapter is to resolve this issue, thereby allowing at least the Provisory naturalists 
to escape the charge of scientism. Unfortunately for the Essentialists, even if we are 
successful in fixing the above problem, their view will remain scientistic. This is because 
Essentialism is an example of Williams’ tenet (4) above. 
 We can recall from Section 2.5.1 the two approaches to the methodological 
naturalism thesis (“Science is the best and only method for discovering the properties of 
reality and what exists”) The first approach is to take the thesis to mean that reality is only 
what science says. In other words, there are no elements of reality which science does not 
explain. So, a proposed element of reality is either explainable using science or it does not 
really exist. This is the approach the Essentialist takes. The Essential methodological 
naturalist holds that science is the best and only method for discovering reality. From this, 
she assumes that science’s reach in the natural world is exhaustive. She then assumes that 
science is limited in that it cannot evaluate supernatural claims. Together, these beliefs lead 
                                                             
3 Some examples include (Mizrahi, 2017; Pigliucci, 2015; Williams and Robinson, 2016).  
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the Essentialist to conclude that only natural things exist and that ontological naturalism is 
unfalsifiable. Thus, the Essentialist holds that science requires a naturalist metaphysics or, 
(4). And because she holds (4), the Essential methodological naturalist is guilty of scientism. 
Of course, the Essentialist might choose to follow the path that I will shortly set out 
for the Provisory naturalist. She might revise her assumption that science is the best and 
only method, etc. in an attempt to avoid (4). But if she does that she will have no basis on 
which to assume that science is exhaustive and that ontological naturalism is unfalsifiable. 
In short, she will cease being an Essentialist. Thus, there is no way for the true Essentialist 
to avoid scientism. 
The second approach to the methodological naturalism thesis is to hold that science 
is the best and only method to discover reality, etc. but that there are elements of reality 
which science cannot explain. In other words, science is the best and only method but it is 
not exhaustive. This was the approach recommended for the Provisory methodological 
naturalist. By not assuming that science describes all of reality, the Provisory naturalist 
avoids drawing the conclusion that science is exhaustive and ontological naturalism is 
unfalsifiable. Thus, she does not hold that science requires a naturalist metaphysics (4).  
But just because the Provisory naturalist avoids (4), this does not mean she is safe 
from accusations of scientism. There are a couple of things she needs to do yet. The first 
thing she must do is revise her definition of Provisory Methodological Naturalism to reflect 
her approach to the methodological naturalism thesis. This will clear up any ambiguity about 
the Provisory naturalist’s view on the role of science in explaining reality. As noted 
previously, such revision is impossible for the Essentialist. The Essentialist cannot stray 
from the original methodological naturalism thesis or else she will have no justification for 
her unfalsifiable ontological naturalism. But revising this definition is easy for the Provisory 
naturalist to do. The Provisory naturalist is not as constricted. The Provisory Methodological 
Naturalism thesis will not face contradiction if the methodological naturalism thesis element 
is revised.  
To begin our attempt at revision, we might first recall the original methodological 
naturalism thesis. Per our original definition, the function of science is to discover reality. 
Methodological naturalism: The thesis that science is the best and only 
method for discovering the properties of reality and what exists. 
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One way to revise the definition of methodological naturalism for the Provisory naturalist 
is to simply assume the Provisory Methodological Naturalism stance outlined in Section 
2.5.1. In other words, we simply add the stipulation that some elements of reality cannot be 
known by science. Science is the best and only method for discovering reality. However, 
there are some things, like morality and art, which cannot be explained using science. Our 
revised definition would be [Changes in bold] 
Methodological naturalism: The thesis that science is the best and only 
method for discovering the properties of reality and what exists but that 
there are elements of reality which science cannot explain.  
This amended definition allows us to keep science as “the best and only method”. At the 
same time, this new definition admits that science is limited. This amended definition can 
then be distinguished from the obviously-scientistic version which holds that science is the 
best and only method for discovering reality and only entities described by science exist.  
While this amended definition is a step in the right direction, it is not a perfect 
solution. For one thing, we are left to wonder how the elements of reality which are 
unexplainable by science (e.g., art, morality) might be explained. The naturalist holds that 
these elements are natural things. Therefore, they all must have some sort of natural 
explanation. But this definition fails to acknowledge this point or provide any information 
as to how these explanations might come about. So instead, we might try a different 
approach. Again, we can begin with our original definition and go from 
Methodological naturalism: The thesis that science is the best and only 
method for discovering the properties of reality and what exists. 
to 
Methodological naturalism: The thesis that natural methods are the best 
and only methods for discovering the properties of reality and what exists. 
This change broadens the number of methods and practices which might be used to 
explain reality while still limiting them to natural methods. This way, natural practices like 
morality which stand independent of science might be utilized to explain certain aspects of 
reality. Additionally, natural forms of knowledge other than scientific knowledge might be 
considered legitimate. This would include, for example, moral and artistic knowledge. 
Meanwhile, we get to retain science as a valid method for discovering reality since it is one 
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of the natural methods for doing so. Provisory Methodological Naturalism can then be 
defined as 
Provisory Methodological Naturalism: The thesis that natural methods are 
the best and only methods for discovering the properties of reality and what 
exists and that science can provisionally evaluate supernatural objects. 
With this revision, the Provisory naturalist avoids the charge of scientism. In acknowledging 
that there are natural methods or practices which are not science and that these non-science 
natural methods might also discover the properties of reality and what exists, the Provisory 
naturalist can no longer be accused of being overconfident in science. Furthermore, since 
Williams’ four tenets all refer only to science (rather than natural methods), the Provisory 
naturalist is no longer in danger of holding a view which corresponds to (1-4).   
  However, there is one more thing that the Provisory naturalist must do. In revising 
our definition of methodological naturalism, we have gone from holding that one natural 
method or practice (science) explains all of reality to holding that several methods or 
practices explain all of reality. The Provisory naturalist needs to give a plausible and 
coherent account of how these other methods or practices do this. Such an account will need 
to provide natural explanations for elements of reality which science cannot explain. So, it 
will need to show how we might answer moral questions, for example, without a) invoking 
the supernatural or b) reducing those elements to scientific theory. Avoiding (a) allows the 
Provisory naturalist to remain a naturalist Avoiding (b) allows the Provisory naturalist to 
avoid scientism. We should also note that the Provisory naturalist only needs to provide a 
valid framework by which things like morality might have a natural explanation. In other 
words, we only need to show that the revised Provisory view is coherent. The Provisory 
naturalist is under no obligation to prove that morality does not have a supernatural origin, 
a task that is likely impossible anyway.  
 
7.4 A Natural and Non-Scientific Framework for Explaining Reality 
In his paper, Varieties of Twentieth Century Naturalism, John Shook attempts to present an 
exhaustive list of the many kinds of modern naturalistic views. He begins by describing 
seven viable naturalism options but eventually whittles the seven down to three “great 
naturalisms”. Each of these great naturalisms can be thought of as frameworks by which the 
naturalist explains reality. The first great naturalism is Reductive Physicalism. Reductive 
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Physicalism holds that physics is the best and only method for discovering reality. Reality 
is only what physics describes and all things are reducible to the physical. The second great 
naturalism is Non-Reductive Physicalism. Non-Reductive Physicalism prioritizes physics 
but thinks that things described by the other physical sciences also exist. These things 
described by the other physical sciences are theoretically reducible to physics. Non-
Reductive Physicalism does hold that some elements of reality, like mental states, are not 
reducible to physics. However, these non-reducible elements still supervene on processes 
described by the physical sciences (Shook, 2011, p. 10). 
Both Reductive Physicalism and Non-Reductive Physicalism have their adherents. 
However, neither will work for our purposes here. The Provisory naturalist should seek out 
a framework that not only explains reality naturally but avoids scientism as well. Both 
physicalisms do offer natural explanations of the world. However, they also assume that one 
science ultimately explains everything. All of reality, according to physicalists, comes under 
the umbrella of physics. Reductive and Non-Reductive Physicalism are the type of views 
referred to in Williams’ second tenet of scientism. Thus, the Provisory naturalist who is 
looking to avoid scientism will need to look at the third option.    
The third great naturalism is Perspectival Pluralism. Perspectival Pluralism differs 
from physicalism in one important way. While physicalism holds that the truth about reality 
can only be seen from the perspective of physics, Perspectival Pluralism holds that getting 
an accurate picture of reality requires multiple perspectives. Science is helpful but it is also 
limited. According to Shook 
Perspectival Pluralism concludes that the sciences are unable to fully explain 
experience and the mind, yet it also respects how the sciences can cohere 
with, and frequently illuminate, much of experience and the mind. 
Perspectival Pluralism finds that experience and scientific knowledge 
present multiple perspectives upon the same reality. The first-person situated 
and subjective perspective of consciousness is neither inexplicable nor 
incongruent with the third-person objective knowledge of the sciences, since 
all experience and knowledge is embedded in situated contexts. Our mental 
lives are correlated to some degree with nervous processes, scientific 
knowledge grows from our careful observations of the world, and our 
experiences of the world can be usefully coordinated with scientific 
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knowledge. Appreciation for the many vital and practical relationships and 
interpenetrations among experiences and scientific knowledge inspires the 
Perspectival Pluralist to postulate one natural world that experience and 
science both reveal (Shook, 2011, p. 12–13). 
The Perspectival Pluralist is happy to accept a great deal of autonomy among the 
various scientific and social or cultural practices. She does not look to reduce the findings 
of fields like sociology or anthropology to any of the “harder” sciences like biology or 
physics. Additionally, the Perspectival Pluralist will recognize these various perspectives as 
equally valid. The perspective of the neuroscientist who examines the brainwave patterns 
of Patient X is equally as important and informative as that of the psychologist talking to 
Patient X. They are different perspectives on the same thing, namely the brain activity of 
Patient X.  
The Provisory naturalist should adopt Perspectival Pluralism as the best approach to 
explaining reality. Perspectival Pluralism allows the Provisory naturalist to fulfill the second 
obligation noted above. It provides her with a method by which to explain elements of reality 
like morality without a) invoking the supernatural or b) reducing those elements to scientific 
theory.  
 
7.4.1. Perspectival Pluralism  
As previously noted, Perspectival Pluralism is happy to accept a substantial amount of 
autonomy among cultural projects. Naturalists who are Perspectival Pluralists hold that 
there are many autonomous cultural practices (of which science is just one) with equally 
valid perspectives of reality. Naturalists who are not Perspectival Pluralists, such as the 
physicalists, do not like the idea that there could be so much autonomy. Physicalists deny 
the claim that there are other perspectives which are equally as valid as physics.  
The stricter of the physicalists (those who reduce all elements of reality to physics 
or even eliminate elements which are not referred to in physics) do not recognize the 
autonomy of the other natural sciences (e.g., chemistry, astronomy, geology). Nor do they 
recognize the autonomy of the social sciences (e.g., economics, psychology, anthropology, 
sociology). Other, less-strict naturalists do recognize the autonomy of the individual natural 
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sciences but do not recognize the autonomy of the social sciences.4 Perspectival Pluralists 
believe that both of these approaches are too limiting. They believe that naturalists should 
recognize the validity of the various social science perspectives along with the natural or 
physical ones. But they also believe that naturalists should also go a step further and 
recognize that other disciplines, such as those grouped under the Humanities (e.g., Arts, 
Philosophy), offer valid perspectives on reality. It is a mistake to assume that the arts should 
be brought under the umbrella of science as depicted in Williams’ second tenet.  
Shook has alternately referred to Perspectival Pluralism as both a feature and a 
technical classification of a school of philosophy known as Pragmatic Naturalism (Shook, 
2009, p. 92; Shook, 2013, p. 580). Whether Perspectival Pluralism is an element of 
Pragmatic Naturalism or one form of it, the two views undoubtedly complement each other, 
as we will soon see. Pragmatic Naturalism or, Pragmatism was developed in the United 
States during the late nineteenth century. Among its adherents were Charles Pierce, William 
James, and John Dewey. A major component of Pragmatism is anti-foundationalism or, the 
view that there is no ultimate ground for inquiry or knowledge. The Pragmatists believe that 
there is no foundational rationalism (Rorty, 1982). 
Pragmatic naturalists hold that we do not need a foundational metaphysics to justify 
cultural projects like science, art, and morality. Instead, these things stand autonomously 
with no a priori justification. Furthermore, these projects have their own set of standards by 
which we (those who practice the disciplines noted above along with society-at-large) may 
work to answer the questions which science cannot. These questions include, “What is the 
nature of love?”, “What qualifies as art?”, and “Is there such a thing as objective moral 
truth?” From all of this, we can see that the Perspectival Pluralist assumption (“Explaining 
reality requires the use of multiple perspectives”) and the Pragmatic naturalist belief 
(“Cultural projects [i.e., perspectives] have their own standards and stand autonomously”) 
fit well together. For our purposes here, I will refer to the combination of these two views 
simply as pluralism. I will refer to the naturalist who holds pluralism as a Pluralist.  
                                                             
4 Shook notes an interesting divide among the naturalists who only see the physical sciences as definitive 
and those who see the biological and social sciences along with the physical sciences as definitive. “Because 
the biological and social sciences have traditionally used some methodological principles and modes of 
causality that depart from the physical sciences, many naturalists want to draw a line between trustworthy 
physical sciences (physics, chemistry, geosciences, astronomy, cosmology) and suspicious biological and 
social sciences” (Shook, 2011, p. 5). 
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The Pluralist believes that the various non-science cultural projects (e.g., art, 
morality) remain wholly natural despite being separate from science. This may be more 
superficially obvious in some cultural projects than in others. For example, it may be more 
obvious that there is nothing supernatural going on in the cultural project of art than in the 
cultural project of morality. It appears that there are fewer appeals to supernatural 
explanations for artistic truth than for moral truth, for example. Of course, there may be 
some arguments that something like objective beauty requires a supernatural explanation. 
But arguments that objective morality requires the supernatural are far more common. In 
any case, the Pluralist will argue that appeal to a supernatural or a priori foundation for both 
art and morality is unnecessary. In the case of art, art has its own standards for what qualifies 
as art and artistic truth.  
 The practice of morality also has its own standards. However, the Pluralist would 
do well to at least provide a plausible account of how morality originated in human social 
practices and not via any supernatural means. She might attempt to do so in the following 
way. It seems plausible that cultural projects like morality evolve as human beings work to 
study and improve the standards associated with them. Humans improve the standards of 
morality by using the tools of science (While practices like art and morality are autonomous 
and separate from science, they still utilize many of the tools we often associate with 
scientific practice). It is possible that, as human beings evolved, we used the tools of 
observation, experimentation, and inference to develop a shared system of morality.5 Since 
human beings are intensely social creatures, a shared morality would allow us to thrive while 
sharing the same space in communities (Kitcher, 2012). Our moral system may have 
evolved entirely on its own. Or it may be that elements of morality were invented by human 
beings. Either way, the Pluralist can tell a plausible and entirely naturalistic story about the 
development and practice of morality.  
Pluralism is the perfect choice for the Provisory naturalist seeking to avoid 
scientism. In pluralism, she has a view that satisfies the requirements mentioned above; The 
Provisory naturalist can now explain elements of reality like art and morality without 
reducing them to a scientific theory or invoking the supernatural.  Since pluralism avoids 
reduction, the Pluralist Provisory methodological naturalist avoids scientism. And since 
                                                             
5 One might develop the argument that, as a universal moral system, it may be objective and not relative. 
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pluralism avoids invoking the supernatural it remains compatible with ontological 
naturalism.   
 
7.5 A Pluralist Provisory Methodological Naturalism 
In my defense of Provisory Methodological Naturalism, I argued that the methodological 
naturalist should avoid placing certain limits on the discovery of reality. The methodological 
naturalist should not limit scientific discovery to just natural things. Rather, she should hold 
that science has the potential to discover supernatural things. In this chapter, I have 
attempted to show that the methodological naturalist should also avoid placing certain limits 
on her explanation of reality. The methodological naturalist should not assume that science 
alone is the best and only way to explain reality. This is because there are elements of reality 
which cannot be reduced to scientific theories. These elements have their own autonomous 
standards and are independent of science. Things like art and morality are independent 
cultural projects. That said, while they are separate from science, these projects remain 
entirely natural. They do not require any supernatural explanation.  
We can now combine our preferred approach to discovering reality with our 
preferred approach to explaining reality. In other words, we can combine Provisory 
Methodological Naturalism with pluralism.  We can start by recalling our revised definition 
of methodological naturalism:  
Methodological naturalism: The thesis that natural methods are the best and 
only methods for discovering the properties of reality and what exists. 
And, again, our revised definition of Provisory Methodological Naturalism consists of the 
revised methodological naturalism thesis as well as the assertion that science does not limit 
discovery to natural things:  
Provisory Methodological Naturalism: The thesis that natural methods are 
the best and only methods for discovering the properties of reality and what 
exists and that science can provisionally evaluate supernatural objects. 
Having changed our definition of Provisory Methodological Naturalism to 
incorporate the new definition of methodological naturalism, the Provisory naturalist now 
needs to provide a naturalistic account of how to explain reality. She must do this without 
reducing all of reality to science and, thereby, falling prey to scientism. This is where 
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pluralism comes in. Pluralism incorporates the Perspectival Pluralist assumption that 
explaining reality requires the use of multiple perspectives. We are not justified in 
explaining reality from the single perspective of physics or even science in general. 
Pluralism also incorporates the view, associated with Pragmatic Naturalism generally, that 
the cultural practices which provide these perspectives each stand autonomous and have 
their own standards. Thus, the Pluralist believes that certain elements of reality, like art and 
morality, which do not reduce to science are self-explanatory as independent, autonomous, 
and wholly natural cultural projects.  
Pluralism and Provisory Methodological Naturalism together form a pluralist 
Provisory Methodological Naturalism. The pluralist Provisory naturalist holds the 
following: Natural methods are the best and only methods for discovering the properties of 
reality and what exists. Supernatural methods are inefficient. Among the natural methods 
used for discovering reality is the method of science. Science is one of the best tools we 
have for discovering the properties of reality and what exists. Science has been incredibly 
successful in helping us navigate and learn more about our world. Additionally, science is 
not limited to only evaluating natural claims. It can evaluate supernatural claims as well.  
However, while it is enormously successful, science does have certain limitations. It cannot 
discover or explain all elements of reality. It cannot explain things like love, moral truth, 
artistic validity, etc., for example.  
But, while these things are irreducible to science, this does not mean they have a 
supernatural explanation. We can acknowledge that art and morality do not have a scientific 
explanation while still believing them to be natural things (thereby allowing Pluralist 
Provisory Methodological Naturalism to remain compatible with ontological naturalism). 
We do this by pointing out that cultural projects like art and morality have their own 
autonomous standards and, like science, do not require any a priori explanation. We use 
these standards along with scientific tools like observation and experimentation to answer 
questions related to the various projects (e.g., “What is moral truth?”) which are not 
answerable via any specific science (e.g., physics). 
 
7.6 Conclusion 
Supernaturalists and other non-naturalists may see methodological naturalism, as I initially 
defined it, as scientism. Scientism is overconfidence in science. The supernaturalist would 
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be correct to state that the thesis that science is the best and only method for discovering 
reality and what exists is scientism if that definition is taken to mean that only entities 
described by science exist. The Essential naturalist does hold this to be the case and is, 
therefore, guilty of scientism. The Provisory naturalist does not hold this to be the case. To 
avoid being accused of scientism, the Provisory naturalist must revise the definition of 
methodological naturalism incorporated in the Provisory Naturalism thesis.   
The Provisory methodological naturalist also needs to be able to provide an account 
of how best to explain reality. Moreover, she needs to be able to provide a natural 
explanation for things like art and morality which currently resist reduction to physical 
theories. Merely assuming that they will eventually be reduced to science is scientism. 
Assuming that they have a non-natural explanation is supernaturalism. The correct approach 
for the Provisory methodological naturalist is to adopt pluralism. Pluralism recognizes that 
some elements of reality are not reducible to science. It also recognizes that the mere fact 
that these elements being non-reducible does not mean they must be supernatural or have a 
supernatural explanation. Furthermore, pluralism holds that these projects have their own 
autonomous standards and, like the cultural project of science, are self-explanatory. They 
require no outside a priori explanation for their existence. Cultural projects use the tools of 
science (observation, experimentation, inference) to evolve and improve. A plausible 
explanation for our system of morality, for example, is that it evolved as human beings in 
communities used the tools of science to expand and improve it. With Pluralism, we have 
an explanation for things like art and morality which utilizes neither a narrow reductionism 












Naturalists must admit that there are certain things we do not know and maybe cannot know 
about science. We do not know for certain whether science provides us with a reliable view 
of the external world, for example. We have no way to prove beyond a shadow of a doubt 
that the scientific findings accurately represent the world as it truly is. Likewise, we cannot 
know what we will eventually discover to exist. Prohibiting supernatural objects or 
phenomena from ever existing in our world by stating that science is unable to observe such 
things is the wrong approach. Furthermore, we are not justified in re-classifying supernatural 
objects as natural objects should they ever be discovered. Because we cannot pronounce 
with any certainty on these things, naturalists must assume that their methodological 
naturalism and ontological naturalism is fallible. One of the goals of this project has been 
to highlight the fact that many naturalists fail to recognize the fallibility of naturalism and 
to show why it is vital that they should. Naturalists should adopt a methodology which 
allows them to revise their methodological and ontological positions should the need arise. 
I began this project by examining the meaning and relationship between natural and 
supernatural methodologies and ontologies. This was the subject of Chapter One. Following 
this, I examined a naturalistic methodology which does not allow for the sort of revision 
referred to above (Essential Methodological Naturalism) before introducing one that does 
allow for it (Provisory Methodological Naturalism). These methodologies were covered in 
Chapters Two and Three respectively. Chapters Four through Six examined hypothetical 
problems for my preferred methodology, Provisory Methodological Naturalism. In Chapter 
Four, I endeavored to show that the use of inductive reasoning to justify the automatic 
naturalization of supernatural objects fails. The Essentialist cannot insist that Provisory 
naturalism is false because all discovered objects have been and, therefore, will be natural. 
In Chapter Five, I attempted to prove that a valid way to distinguish supernatural and natural 
things does exist. As such, the Essentialist cannot argue that there is no distinguishing 
criterion and, thus, no way to falsify ontological naturalism. Once again, the Essentialist 
must hold that ontological naturalism is unfalsifiable. But the Provisory naturalist holds that 
it may be proven false. In Chapter Six, I examined the problem of scientific work and 
Provisory naturalism. Essentialists and some supernaturalists believe that scientific work 
cannot be done to prove the existence of truly supernatural things. But the Provisory 
naturalist holds that such work can indeed be done. To defend this Provisory claim, I 
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critiqued a supernaturalist argument that asserted that science cannot evaluate the viability 
of a supernatural phenomenon known as intercessory prayer. I concluded that the argument 
was not convincing and that there were no strong reasons to believe that science should be 
prevented from evaluating and possibly proving prayer’s efficacy. I also concluded that 
scientific findings from such research might be used by the Provisory naturalist to highlight 
the lack of evidence for supernatural phenomena. However, it should be mentioned that the 
same findings are not as helpful for the Essentialist. This is because her ontological 
naturalism is unfalsifiable. Evidence against ontological supernaturalism (perhaps, as just 
noted, in the form of a lack of evidence in support of supernatural objects) is more 
convincing in a context of falsifiable ontological naturalism (Provisory naturalism) than it 
is in a context of unfalsifiable naturalism (Essentialism).   
 Finally, in Chapter Seven, I looked at the relationships between both Essential and 
Provisory naturalism and scientism. After establishing that a scientistic view is problematic, 
I argued that Essential naturalism cannot help but be scientistic. Provisory Methodological 
Naturalism, on the other hand, can escape scientism. Avoiding blind allegiance and 
overconfidence in science is key here. Naturalists must admit that method of science itself 
requires a certain amount of faith on the part of those practicing it. Just as non-skeptics have 
faith that the world really is as it is represented to our senses, methodological naturalists 
have faith that the findings of science are accurate representations of our world. The fact 
that naturalism could be wrong, a fact that Provisory naturalists recognize, requires such 
faith. If the Essentialists were right, and naturalism was certain, no faith would be needed.  
 Some naturalists may object to my use of the word “faith” in a discussion about 
science. They may feel that the word is too enmeshed with religious ideas to be an accurate 
description of how scientists approach their field. Given the fact that most scientists see their 
discipline as highly objective, it is easy to see why some naturalists might be apprehensive 
about asserting that they have faith in science. And this may be especially true if faith in 
science is seen as on-a-par with supernaturalists’ faith in God. However, it is also possible 
that many naturalists are afraid of the word “faith” in respect to their own view simply 
because they are afraid to admit that science is fallible. Science is one of our best methods 
for discovering the world. As a tool, it has proven indispensable. Science is the primary 
cause of much of the intellectual and social progress human beings have made. It is only 
natural, I think, to wish for it to be perfect. Unfortunately, no human-created enterprise is 
faultless. Science, like every other method, suffers from deficiencies. Naturalists must 
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recognize this and work to avoid the dogmatism of Essential Methodological Naturalism 
and scientism.          
It is true that we cannot say that natural methods, including science, will always be 
the best tools for discovering our world. But saying that natural methods may not always be 
the best tools does not imply that natural methods are not currently the best methods for 
discovering reality and what exists. Although my intention in this thesis was not to defend 
naturalism over supernaturalism, I do hold naturalism to be the most viable approach to 
evaluating reality. Science, rather than some non-natural method does give us the best 
picture of the nature of our world. What I have attempted to do here is to argue for a 
measured approach to the methodological and ontological naturalism theses. In my view, a 
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